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INTRODUCTION

"For too many years when the diagnosis has been professional incompetence, the prescription has been cosmetic surgery."
-Rep.

Henry Waxman'

While others have blamed the so-called medical malpractice
"crisis" on litigious lawyers, greedy patients, overzealous juries, and
careless insurers,2 Congress has focused its attention on another
culprit: incompetent physicians. The Health Care Quality Improve1. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Hearings on H.R. 5110 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 191 (1986) [hereinafter Hearingson H.R. 5110] (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman presiding).
2. For discussions of various purported causes of the medical malpractice "crisis,"
see generally Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the
Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 293, 314-22 (1988) (surveying various
theories advanced to explain the medical malpractice explosion, and arguing that the
nondurable precaution theory is a better explanation); Hubbard, The Physicians' Point of
View Concerning Medical Malpractice A Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic Importance of
"Tort Reform," 23 GA. L. REV. 295, 300-30 (1989) (analyzing three possible causes of the
increase in malpractice insurance costs, and arguing that physicians' blame on perceived
flaws in the judicial system is more symbolic protest than accurate assessment); Nye,
Gifford, Webb & Dewar, The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of Claims
Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1497-98 (1988) (describing how
the medical malpractice crisis has led to finger-pointing among doctors, lawyers, and
consumer groups). For a representative sample of the finger-pointing that went on
about the time of HCQIA's consideration and enactment, see, e.g., The Blame Game, STANFORD MAG., Fall 1986, at 50 (six professionals with sharply divergent views discussing
the causes of the "liability crisis"); The Malpractice Crisis: Who's To Blame?, MD. B.J.,Jan.
1986, at 5 (five feature articles discussing legal and medical malpractice insurance dilemmas); The Manufactured Crisis, 51 CONSUMER REP. 544 (1986) (arguing that insurance
companies created the so-called "crisis" in the availability and affordability of liability
insurance); The Truth Behind the Insurance Panic,A.B.A. J.,July 1, 1986, at 38 (five feature
articles discuss effects of the increase in liability insurance costs on doctors, trial lawyers,
insurers, and manufacturers). See generally TREATING MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE (1986).
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ment Act of 1986' (HCQIA) is an attempt to improve the quality of
medical care in this country by encouraging the medical profession
to rid itself of bad doctors. In 1986 Congress diagnosed an "increasing occurrence of medical malpractice" 4 throughout the nation
that warranted the intervention of the federal government. Congress prescribed HCQIA in an effort to lower the incidence of professional incompetence, in part by lowering the incidence of peerreview litigation.5 Congress specifically found that the threat of
such lawsuits-particularly those raising federal antitrust claimsinhibited doctors and hospitals from sanctioning incompetent doctors. HCQA was enacted to minimize that threat and to encourage
physicians to police their peers.6
HCOIA addresses the problem of medical malpractice by establishing a two-part program to identify incompetent physicians
throughout the nation. Designed to encourage physicians to scrutinize the quality of their peers' professional performance, the first
part of the Act provides limited "immunity" from legal liability for
those who engage in peer-review activity.7 The second part of the
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1988), amended by Act of Dec. 19, 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-239, 103 Stat. 2208 (1989).
4. Congress found that "[t]he increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the
need to improve the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that warrant greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual State." 42
U.S.C. § 11101(1) (1988). See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(3)-(5) (1988). Peer-review litigation is typically brought by a
physician or other medical practitioner who alleges that she has been unlawfully excluded from a hospital or other medical facility in violation of antitrust, civil rights, and
various state laws. The defendants, usually the hospital and other physicians on the
medical staff (the plaintiff's "peers"), typically counter that the plaintiff was excluded
because of her incompetence, professional misconduct, or other incompatibility with
their efforts to achieve high-quality health care for their patients. See infra notes 244,
367 and accompanying text. In this Article, peer-review litigation encompasses litigation over the granting, denial, restriction, and revocation of staff privileges and other
means of formal access to institutional health-care providers. For a description of the
medical credentialing process by which such access is secured, see Dolan & Ralston,
HospitalAdmitting Privileges and the Sherman Act, 18 Hous. L. REV. 707, 709-12 (1981). For
a discussion of the antitrust implications of medical credentialing, see Havighurst &
King, PrivateCredentialingof Health Care Personnel: An Antitrust Perspective (pts. 1 & 2), 9 AM.
J.L. & MED. 131, 263 (1983).

6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101(4), (5) (1988); infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
7. 42 U.S.C. 99 11111-11115 (1988); 132 CONG. REC. H9957 (daily ed. Oct. 14,
1986) (statement of Rep. Waxman). The immunity provisions apply to peer-review actions challenged under state law after October 14, 1989. See 42 U.S.C. § 1111 l(c)(l)
(1988). I use the term "immunity" guardedly in this Article. The term is not used at all
in the Act to describe its protections. The Act simply states that peer-review participants
meeting the Act's requirements will not be liable in a suit for damages. See id.
§ 1111 l(a)(1), (2) (referring to "limitation on damages" and "protection for those providing information"). However, members of Congress repeatedly referred to the Act's
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Act establishes a nationwide computerized system for reporting instances of physician incompetence or malpractice, which finally became operational on September 1, 1990.8 The parts of the Act are
conceptually related, for the drafters envisioned a program that
would encourage the medical profession to bring cases of incompetence to the attention of disciplinary authorities and also would keep
track of such cases and other malpractice claims.9
protections as creating an "immunity" from liability. See, e.g., infra notes 9, 29, 50, and
53. The Supreme Court has similarly adopted the term, see Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S.
94, 105 n.8 (1988), as has the only court thus far to decide a case on the merits under
HCQIA. See Austin v. McNamara, 731 F. Supp. 934, 938-43 (C.D. Cal. 1990). Cf.Joy,
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: A Proposalfor Interpretationof Its Protection,
20 ST. MARY's L.J. 955, 965-66 (1989) (reasoning that while it is uncertain from the face
of the Act whether compliance with the Act provides immunity from suit or only a defense to liability, the legislative intent indicates that the Act provides the former). This
Article employs the term "immunity" simply as a short-hand reference to the Act's limitation on liability for damages. For overview discussions of HCQIA and its immunity
provisions, see generally Bierig & Portman, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 977, 987-94 (1988) (concluding that the immunity provisions
will be effective in encouraging participation in peer-review proceedings); Homer, The
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its Histoy, Provisions,Applications and Implications, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 453, 467-70 (1990) (discussing generally the immunity provisions and their exceptions); Pugsley, Implementing the Health Care Quality Improvement Act,
23 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 42, 44 (1990) (opining that the immunity provisions do not
prevent suit nor deprive a court ofjurisdiction, but dictate a favorable outcome for the
peer review); Symposium, Peer Review at the Crossroads: The Health Care Quality Improvement
Act, 11 WHrIrIER L. REV. 57, 63, 65-68, 70-71 (1989) (examining how federal immunity
affects existing state immunities); Comment, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986: Will Physicians Find Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1139 (1988)
(concluding that the immunity provisions will "encourage conscientious policing within
the medical profession").
8. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11137 (1988). The final regulations for the National
Practitioner Data Bank, established by the Act, were published on October 17, 1989, see
54 Fed. Reg. 42,722 (1989) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-.14 (1990)), and the Data
Bank became operational on September 1, 1990. See 55 Fed. Reg. 31,239 (1990). For
overview discussions of the National Practitioner Data Bank, see generally Anderson,
Problems of the National PractitionerData Bank, MED. STAFF COUNSELOR, Fall 1990, at 21;

Collier & Crowley, The NationalPractitionerData Bank: New Informational Duties for Hospitals, 7 HEALTHSPAN 4 (1990) (discussing the Data Bank regulations); Hudson & Koska,
The Data Bank: Final Regulations, HosPrrALs, Dec. 5, 1989, at 33, 36 (reporting practi-

tioners' fears about the effect of the Data Bank and the shortfalls of the system); Rothschild, Final Regulations for National PractitionerData Bank Are Published, 23 J. HEALTH &
Hosp. L. 31, 31-32 (1990) (pointing to issues yet to be resolved). See also Comment,
Physician, Heal Thysel. Because the Cure, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, May Be Worse
than the Disease, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 1073, 1097-1109 (1988) (suggesting that HCQIA's
reporting provisions may be unconstitutional).
9. Congressman Henry Waxman, a principal sponsor of the Act, summarized the
dual nature of the Act:
But underlying an essential point in this legislation is, from my point of
view, tying together the question of immunity and reporting. I think the two
must go together. We ought to give immunity to doctors to participate in peer
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Congress found the peer-review process-by which doctors review and recommend sanctions for the professional incompetence
or misconduct of fellow doctors-to be critical to solving the malpractice problem.' 0 Peer review can indeed protect the public from
medical malpractice to the extent that it can successfully curtail or
eliminate the professional practice of bad doctors. However, peer
review can also be used as a ploy to reduce or eliminate the competition posed by perfectly good doctors. The possibility of such abuse
makes peer review vulnerable to the public policy concerns of the
antitrust laws.'
Peer-review litigation has created a triple bind for policy-makers. Although the goal of peer review to encourage the medical profession to weed out its incompetent members is laudable, it has
proven difficult simultaneously to: (1) protect the peer-review participants from the threat of legal liability for their legitimate weeding-out actions, (2) avoid insulating them from liability if their
actions were in fact purely self-interested, and (3) decide quickly
and cheaply whether any given case involves legitimate review of
professional competence or illegitimate economic self-protection.
There may be good reasons to suppose that in most cases the physicians who assess the professional conduct of one of their peers are
principally concerned with the effect of that physician's practices on
patient welfare rather than on their own economic well-being. However, whenever competitors join together to cooperate in a course
of conduct that results in the exclusion of another competitor from2
the marketplace, antitrust concerns are inevitably implicated.'
review in order to encourage that peer review, but we have to protect the public

by making the information available from peer review to an institution so that
that information will be used in a meaningful way.
Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 459; see also id. at 192 (immunity and reporting
aspects of the bill can be described separately, but must be dealt with together); Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Hearingson H.R. 5540 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1986)
[hereinafter Hearingson H.R. 5540] (Rep. Wyden stating that the reporting provision is
grounded in the belief that the right to protection from damages comes with a responsibility to report malpractice); 132 CONG. REC. H9963 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement
of Rep. Tauke discussing two "tools" of HCQIA).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (1988); see also infra note 24.
11. See Curran, Legal Immunity for Medical Peer-Review Programs, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED.
233, 233 (1989) (antitrust laws have a "built-in bias against competitors' having the
power and authority to limit or exclude business opportunities for other practitioners in
the same field. Yet this is the very purpose of a medical-staff credentials committee.").
12. See United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1370 (5th Cir. 1980)
(where competing realtors joined together to cooperate in their businesses, suspicions
of antitrust violations automatically arose).
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Whenever antitrust is implicated, the potential exists for time-consuming and expensive litigation.
Thus, the recurrent cry from courts and commentators has
been for a method for accurately and expeditiously distinguishing
those cases in which legitimate peer-review activity has been undertaken in an honest effort to improve the quality of medical care,
from those cases in which the peer-review process has been used
illegitimately to shield anticompetitive conduct of medical practitioners.1 3 Through HCQIA, Congress has devised one method for
making this distinction. Whether the Act actually will assist in this
line-drawing process is the subject of this Article.
This Article analyzes whether HCQIA will effect any real
change in peer-review litigation under the antitrust laws, or whether
it is just another round of "cosmetic surgery."' 4 Although
HCQIA's protection from legal liability is not limited to antitrust
cases,"'5 the threat of antitrust liability provided the primary impetus
for enacting the immunity provision,16 and thus this Article focuses
on the Act's impact on antitrust litigation only. The Article contends that the statutory reform effected by the Act falls short of that
heralded by its supporters, and concludes that because the Act does
not change the substantive rules governing antitrust liability in peer-

13. E.g., Curran, supra note 11, at 235; Miles & Philp, Hospitals Caught in the Antitrust
Net: An Overview, 24 Duog. L. REV. 489, 505 (1985) ("Ways must be sought to weed out
meritless cases early on, but without doing injustice to appropriate principles of antitrust jurisprudence."); see also Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1365
(W.D. Pa. 1982).
14. This is the term employed by Congressman Waxman to describe prior efforts to
deal with medical malpractice. See supra text accompanying note 1. Thus far, only one
case has been decided on the merits of the immunity question under HCQIA, see Austin
v. McNamara, 731 F. Supp. 934, 943 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (granting immunity), while a
number of cases have mentioned HCQIA either in other contexts or as inapplicable to
the litigation. See Homer, supra note 7, at 476-81 (collecting cases); Strama, The Impact of
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act on Peer Review, HEALTHSPAN, Oct. 1990, at 14-15
n. 19 (collecting cases).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § IllI(a)(1) (1988) (exempting persons undertaking a professional review action in compliance with the Act from liability for damages "under any
law of the United States or of any State (or political subdivision thereof))". Although
this Article contends that the immunity provisions should not affect antitrust litigation,
they may affect the adjudication of other claims.
16. See id. § 11101(4) (congressional finding that threat of treble damage liability
under federal antitrust law unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in
effective peer review). See also 132 CONG. REC. H9960 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (Rep.
Edwards stated: "The committee report accompanying H.R. 5540, rests the damage
immunity provision almost exclusively on the treble damage remedy available under the
Federal antitrust law."); infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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review cases, its much-touted "immunity" is more imaginary than
real.
Part I introduces the reader to the provisions and legislative
history of the Act. Part II examines medical peer-review litigation
under the federal antitrust laws to determine what, if any, effect the
Act will have on such litigation. Superficially, HCQIA might be seen
as providing new sanctions for meritless peer-review litigation;1 7 a
new presumption of non-liability for peer-review defendants in antitrust cases;' 8 and a new recognition that the medical profession's
pursuit of quality medical care through its peer-review activities
should not be burdened or penalized by the antitrust laws.' 9 However, this Article contends that these propositions are not new, for
even without HCQIA, groundless peer-review litigation may be
sanctioned; 20 peer-review activities may be considered presumptively legal under the antitrust laws; 2 ' and the good-faith promotion
of quality health care through peer review is a legitimate objective
and thus a lawful activity under the antitrust laws. 2 2 Part II will develop these contentions and demonstrate that the so-called immunity granted by the Act from antitrust liability is so limited as to be
virtually nonexistent.2" Part II emphasizes that, as a consequence,
the legal approaches to analyzing HCQIA and non-HCQIA antitrust
cases will be the same. Thus, although the Act does help to clarify
some problems with applying the antitrust laws to peer-review cases,
Part II concludes that certain key provisions of the Act that were the
focus of reform effect no true substantive or procedural changes in
the application of the antitrust laws to such litigation.
Part III analyzes peer-review actions at their most critical juncture-summary judgment-and similarly concludes that procedurally courts should handle cases under HCQJA the same way as they
handle cases that are not covered by the Act. In addition, Part III
undertakes to untangle the current confusion in summary jugment
jurisprudence in antitrust conspiracy cases. By identifying specific
problem areas and providing guidelines for the disposition of motions for summary judgments, Part III is intended to be useful in
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 11113 (1988) (payment of reasonable attorney's fees and costs).
18. See id. § 11112 (professional review action will be presumed to have met with
statutory standards for immunity).
19. See id. §§ 11101(3), (4), (5) (congressional findings prompting legislation).
20. See infra subsection II(B)(I).
21. See infra subsection II(B)(2).
22. See infra subsection II(C)(3).
23. See infa subsection II(B)(3).
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analyzing medical peer-review cases whether they fall inside or
outside the scope of the Act.
The Article ultimately concludes that, although Congress could
have made reforms in the substantive or procedural adjudication of
peer-review disputes under the antitrust laws, it has not done so by
this Act, and that therefore courts should not interpret HCQIA as if
it had enacted true reforms. Moreover, because the immunity
granted by HCQIA is limited, a substantial amount of peer-review
litigation will continue to arise that is outside the scope of the Act.
This Article is therefore intended to guide courts not only in the
interpretation of HCQIA, but also in the resolution of medical peerreview litigation under the antitrust laws whether or not the Act
applies.
I.

WHY

HCQIA

WAS ENACTED

In enacting HCQIA, Congress recognized that one direct way
to improve the quality of medical care in this country was to prevent
incompetent or unprofessional physicians from providing such
care.2 4 The problem in the past has been that groups supposedly
responsible for weeding out the bad doctors-state licensing
25
boards, hospitals, and medical societies-often did not do so.
One reason for the past failure of peer review has been that such
groups simply were not aware that doctors within their jurisdictions
had a history of malpractice. To remedy this lack of information,
Congress enacted the national reporting provisions of the Act,
which require hospitals and other health-care entities to report to
state medical boards all disciplinary actions they take against physi24. See Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 270 (limiting the potential legal liability of peer-review participants will result in more candid deliberations and effective outcomes and improved quality of medical care); H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1986) ("The purpose of this legislation is to improve the quality of medical care by
encouraging physicians to identify and discipline other physicians who are incompetent
or who engage in unprofessional behavior."); 132 CONG. REC. H9963 (daily ed. Oct. 14,
1986) (ridding the profession of bad doctors is the first line of defense against malpractice) (statement of Rep. Wyden).
25. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 2. The failure of medical peer review in this
country was a recurrent theme throughout the congressional hearings, reports, and debates. See Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 48 (Rep. Waxman stated that "the
current system does little to eliminate bad doctors. Frankly, I have yet to meet a single
health care professional who believes that state licensing boards or hospital peer review
committees do an effective job of policing the medical profession.") (emphasis in original); H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 13 ("Unfortunately, to date, neither state
disciplinary boards [nor] the peer review system has adequately identified those incompetent or unprofessional practitioners from whom the public must be protected.").
26. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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cians for incompetence or professional misconduct. The Act further
requires anyone who makes a payment pursuant to a medical malpractice claim to report such payment to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.2 7
Another reason for the past failure of medical peer review has
been the reluctance of physicians to participate actively in the disciplining of their peers for poor professional performance. Whether
this reluctance was due primarily to physicians' fears of being sued
for imposing sanctions on their peers, or to physicians' feelings of
sympathy for a fellow professional and a resultant "conspiracy of
silence," the fact of such reluctance has generally been recognized.2 8 To overcome it, Congress enacted the immunity provisions
of the Act.
Congress recognized that the immunity provisions were a necessary quid pro quo to ensure strong support from the medical profession for the establishment of the national data bank of
information about physicians and to spur physician cooperation in
the reporting system.2 9 Thus, the two components of the legislation-legal protection to encourage physicians to identify and discipline their incompetent colleagues, and a reporting system to keep
track of those physicians with histories of malpractice claims or disciplinary actions-reflect a political compromise.
A.

The Purpose of the Reporting System

The fact of medical malpractice-that some doctors negligently
kill or injure patients-provided one impetus for HCQIA's enactment.3" Although the number of such doctors was assumed to be
27. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11137 (1988).
28. See id. § 11101 (4) (finding that the threat of treble damage antitrust liability unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional peer review); Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 237 ("brotherhood of silence" and fear of
legal liability have made physicians reluctant to participate in peer review); see also id at
330, 333 (physicians are "caught between the suspicion of the public that there is a
'conspiracy of silence' countenancing inappropriate professional conduct and the very
real possibility of lawsuit for libel or on anti-trust grounds by an angry colleague"), 430.
See also infra note 36.
29. See H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 3 ("Thus, there is a clear need to do
something to provide protection for doctors engaging in peer review if this reporting
system is to be workable."); 132 CONG. REC. H9962 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) ("[I]n
order to encourage physicians to act responsibly in reviewing the activities of their fellow physicians, this legislation would provide a very limited immunity from liability for
allegations of antitrust violations by disciplined physicians.") (statement of Rep.
Madigan).
30. See H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 2 (bill's focus is on physicians who injure
patients through incompetent or unprofessional service); 132 CONG. REC. H9957 (daily
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small, it was generally agreed that their impact on health care was
large.3 ' Ridding the profession of bad doctors was repeatedly called
for by Congressman Ronald Wyden, a sponsor of the legislation, as
32
the "first step" toward a national malpractice strategy.
One of the reasons why incompetent physicians, though arguably few in number, pose such a significant threat to the quality of
health care is that they have been able to continue to practice
medicine even after determinations were made of their incompetence or unprofessional conduct. Congressional committees received considerable evidence that such doctors have simply moved
to other states and reopened their practices."3 Because no comprehensive national reporting system existed, the state medical boards
and the health-care providers in the new locales had no thorough
way of uncovering these doctors' past malpractice or disciplinary
histories.' Moreover, even if those in the new locale did try to investigate the newcomer, the state medical board or medical providers in the old locale frequently were reluctant to provide complete
and accurate reports about the doctor because of fear of being
sued. 5
ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep. Waxman); id. at H9962 (Rep. Madigan noting
physicians with a history of incompetence or unprofessional conduct who continued to
practice and cause injury to patients); id. at H9963 (Rep. Tauke stating that the Act
should reduce the number of physicians with "long histories of incompetence or unprofessional conduct who have continued to cause needless deaths and injuries years after
their damaging behavior was noted.").
31. See Hearingson H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 47-48 (small but deadly group of incompetent and unprofessional physicians cause serious injury and needless death every
day across country); id. at 54, 59 (small fraction of doctors cause a large fraction of
malpractice payouts); Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 215 (3%-5% of all physicians have some impairment that detrimentally affects their ability to perform medical
care); H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 2 ("This legislation would do much to reduce
the damage committed by this small, but very destructive, group of doctors.").
32. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 52 (supporting HCQIA as part of
a national strategy to reduce medical malpractice); Hearingson H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at
114 (weeding out incompetent physicians is part of the solution to the current crisis); id
at 192-93 (touting HCQIA as a step toward a national malpractice policy); 132 CONG.
REC. H9963 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (same).
33. See Hearingson H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 271, 283, 316, 424; H.R. REP. No. 903,
supra note 24, at 2-3.
34. Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 223; H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at
3.
35. Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 41 (failure to report due to fear of being
sued); Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 216 ("Fear of legal action often is at the
root of a less than truthful complimentary reference."); id. at 307 (physicians "are afraid
to risk their own livelihood by reporting a fellow practitioner for fear they might be
sued"); H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 3 (hospitals remain silent "to avoid lengthy
and unpredictable litigation").
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Congress focused on the "chilling effect" that the threat of litigation was said to have on peer-review activities in the medical profession.3 6 This chilling effect was manifested in the willingness of
hospitals or state medical boards to accept the "voluntary" resignation of physicians found to be incompetent or unprofessional in exchange for silence about the reasons for the resignation. 7
Testimony demonstrated that this sort of "plea-bargaining" was
practically routine: "When doctors identify another doctor as failing to meet professional standards, the all-too-common solution has
been to say, 'Quit practicing here and we won't tell anyone.' "8
36. See Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 27 (Rep. Edwards observed that the
"Committee's hearing and report, as well as language of the bill, focus on the chilling
effect which treble damages in an anti-trust claim can have on effective peer review"); id.
at 44 ("fear of being sued has had a chilling effect on reporting incompetence"); id at
147-48 (damage claims "have a chilling effect on a physician's willingness to participate
in the peer review process."); Hearingson H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 270 (Jack W. Owen,
vice president of the American Hospital Association (AHA), observed that a "proliferation of lawsuits challenging hospital credentialing and peer review actions [has] had a
chilling effect on peer review activities"); id. at 298, 323, 327, 357-58 (threat of litigation
deters physicians from serving on peer review committees); id. at 338 ("chilling effect on
the willingness of members of the profession to challenge the competency of a colleague"); H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 3 ("Doctors who are sufficiently fearful of
the threat of litigation will simply not do meaningful peer review."); 132 CONG. REC.
H 11,590 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (Rep. Waxman observed that "nearly every witness
indicated that the threat of litigation under current law is a major barrier to effective
peer review"); id. at H9963 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (Rep. Tauke and Rep. Wyden noted
threat of lawsuits was a major deterrent to participation in peer review).
37. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 34, where the Office of Inspector
General testified:
For example, many physicians under investigation by state boards would voluntarily surrender their licenses in one state prior to a formal hearing and then
would continue practicing medicine by moving to another state where they also
maintained a license. In many cases voluntary surrender of a license became
part of a "plea bargain" arrangement whereby the boards could avoid costly
due process hearings.
Id. See also Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 311-12 ("standard practice" is for
physicians to try to negotiate surrendering of a license to a state medical board in exchange for dropping charges and then to move into another jurisdiction to save their
reputation); id. at 317 (Rep. Waxman noted reasons why a hospital might prefer "plea
bargaining" by giving a neutral recommendation in exchange for a "voluntary" resignation in order to get rid of incompetent physicians and pass them on to someone else);
H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 3 ("hospitals too often accept 'voluntary' resignations of incompetent doctors in return for the hospital's silence about the reasons for
the resignations").
38. Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 191 (statement of Rep. Waxman). See also
id. at 216 (providers "often force impaired physicians to resign to avoid adverse publicity and fail to report inadequacies known to them"); id. at 222 ("common practice" in
the medical profession "to provide neutral or good references to individuals who don't
deserve them); id at 226 (voluntary surrender of license in one state as part of a "plea
bargain" arrangement).
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The reporting system in the Act was intended to discourage this
kind of agreement and thereby "end the ability of incompetent doctors to skip from one jurisdiction to another without detection." 9
B.

The Purpose of GrantingImmunity

"Doctors are in the best position to do something about malpractice because they see it happening around them."4 0 The problem, continually discussed during congressional consideration of
HCQIA, is that competent doctors are disinclined to do anything
about malpractice because of fear that they will be sued by the incompetent ones:
Every physician I know in the country who is practicing
medicine tells me that there are one or more physicians at
his or her hospital who are incompetent and when I say
why are they still there, they say we are afraid to bring an
action against them because they will retaliate ....4
Whether the belief is justified or not, many physicians believe
that to serve in any peer-review capacity is necessarily to risk being
named in a lawsuit.4" This fear of litigation has led some physicians
to refuse to participate on peer-review committees or panels; and
even if they do serve, some refuse to discipline a colleague whom
they believe deserves to be sanctioned for substandard performance. 4" This failure of physicians to participate in peer-review activities has resulted in a widely acknowledged failure of the medical
profession to get rid of its incompetent members,4 4 despite the consensus that the profession itself is the body most qualified to identify
39. 132 CONG. REC. H9957 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
See also id. at H9962 (statement of Rep. Madigan), id at H9963 (statements of Rep.
Tauke and Rep. Wyden); H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 3, 9, 15 (purpose of
reporting requirements is to discourage "plea bargains").
40. Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 192 (statement of Rep. Wyden); 132
CONG. REC. H9963 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep. Wyden).
41. Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 66 (statement of Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe,
Director, Public Citizen Health Research Group).
42. Although there was considerable testimony about the chilling effect that litigation was thought to have on peer review, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text,
some vigorously disputed both the fact of and the basis for such deterrence. See Hearings
on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 96-99, 121-23 (no evidence that legislation is needed); 132
CONG. REC. H9961 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (Rep. Edwards stated that "peer review
participants' fear of damage claims is unfounded ....The view of several witnesses was,
'if it ain't broke, don't fix it.' ").
43. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
44. See Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 106, 127, 144-45; Hearings on H.R.
5110, supra note 1, at 278, 298, 327, 358, 368; supra notes 35-36.
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and discipline bad doctors.4 5
During congressional consideration of HCQIA,the most often
invoked example of peer-review litigation run amok-and of the
chilling effect such litigation was said to have on legitimate peerreview activities-was the federal district court's damage award in
Patrick v. Burget.4 6 The district court awarded Dr. Timothy Patrick
nearly two million dollars in a successful treble-damage antitrust action against his former physician colleagues based upon peer-review
proceedings instituted against him.4 7 The substantial award in this
case was frequently cited to demonstrate the need for legal immunity for participants in peer-review activities.4"
The invocation of the Patrick case as a principal argument for
granting immunity is ironic, for as Congressman Henry Waxman, a
sponsor of the legislation, made clear at the close of the debates, the
peer-review activities in the Patrick case would never obtain immunity under HCQIA.4 9 Regardless of the outcome of the Patrick case,
however, the sponsors of the legislation were prepared to provide
some sort of immunity from liability for physicians who participate
in good-faith peer review, in the belief that such immunity would
encourage doctors to engage in professional self-policing.5"

45. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
46. 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
47. See id. at 98.
48. See, e.g., Hearingson H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 27 (Rep. Edwards observed that a
"primary impetus for [HCQIA's] immunity [provision] was the substantial damage
award, including treble damages, made by an Oregon Federal district court jury in the
case of Patrick v. Astoria Clinic [sic]"); id. at 66 (discipline of physicians threatened by the
"Oregon case" and others like it); Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1,at 279 (Patrick
case was just one of many recent rulings that have "amplified the litigation concerns of
those who participate in peer review"); id. at 333, 340-41 (noting the chilling effect that
cases like Patrick and others have had on the medical profession); id. at 337-38 (Patrick
helped "to heighten the anxiety experienced by many physicians"); 132 CONG. REC.
H9962 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (as a result of the Patrick decision, doctors "began to
mute their criticism of fellow physicians or to refuse to participate in peer reviews").
49. 132 CONG. REC. Hi 1,590 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) ("Bad faith peer review activities permitted by the Patrick case could never obtain immunity under H.R. 5540.").
50. See, e.g., Hearingson H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 193 (statement of Rep. Wyden);
132 CONG. REC. H9963 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (Rep. Wyden testified that the legislation "encourages physicians' [sic] to blow the whistle on malpracticing colleagues by
protecting them from individual damage suits that might result from honest, fair peer
review."). See also H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 9 ("Because the reporting system
required under this legislation will most likely increase the volume of such suits, the
Committee feels that some immunity for the peer review process is necessary."); 132
CONG. REC. H 11,590 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (Rep. Waxman explaining the effect on
immunity whether Patrick is upheld, modified, or overruled); supra note 29. The Patrick
case is discussed infra at notes 194-205 and accompanying text.
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The Narrow Scope of the Immunity Provisions

During the course of congressional consideration, numerous
revisions substantially narrowed the scope of immunity granted by
the Act. Congressman Waxman observed that "[t]he immunity left
after these modifications is extremely limited, but essential."'" To
qualify for protection under HCQA, subsection 11112(a) requires
the peer reviewers to have acted:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance of quality health care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the
matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are
afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable effort to
obtain facts and after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).2

References to the limited nature of the immunity were made repeatedly during the hearings and debates, evidently to quell strong criticisms of the grant of immunity in the first place. 53 The principal
objection to the immunity was that it could be used to shield not just
legitimate peer-review actions against a malpracticing physician, but
also illegitimate peer reviews motivated by prejudice, anticompetitive purposes, personal vindictiveness, or by some other concern4
wholly unrelated to the quality of the physician's medical care.51. 132 CONG. REC. H 11,589 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
See also infra note 53 and accompanying text.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (1988).
53. See H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 3 ("limited, but essential, immunity");
132 CONG. REC. H9957 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (Rep. Waxman, "limited immunity");
id at H9962 (Rep. Madigan, "very limited immunity," "carefully drawn immunity"); id.
at H9963 (Rep. Tauke, "limited immunity"). Congressman Don Edwards of the Judiciary Committee was among the principal opponents of the grant of immunity. He urged
that HCQIA be enacted with just the reporting provisions and without the immunity
provisions of the Act. See id. at H9960. Many of his objections are enumerated in a
letter dated October 10, 1986, to Rep. Waxman. See 132 CONG. REC. H9960-61 (daily
ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (letter reprinted).
54. See Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 95 (it cannot be presumed that peerreview actions are necessarily for the betterment of health care, but to the contrary, in
light of increased competition among physicians, it is likely that the process will be
abused for anticompetitive or antisocial purposes); 132 CONG. REC. H9960 (daily ed.
Oct. 14, 1986) (Rep. Edwards stated that "the bill fails to adequately protect competent
[T]he fundamental
physicians from abusive actions by illegal professional review ....
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Examples of abuse of the peer-review process include adverse peerreview decisions made, not because of any incompetence or misconduct on the physicians' part, but because of their race or origin 55 or
the race or origin of their patients;5 6 because the physicians served
poor, uninsured, or underinsured patients; 57 because they posed an
economic threat to other physicians; 58 because of some other "turf
battle" among medical specialists; 59 or because they blew the whistle on other colleagues who were incompetent.60
Congressman Waxman frequently took the opportunity to assure the critics that HCQIA was not intended to protect such

abuses:
I want to make it clear, however, that we fully agree
that we cannot tolerate abuses of the peer review system,
and that H.R. 5540 was never intended to protect any such
abuses.
This is true whether the concern is with anti-competitive activities, with actions based on race, or any other prejudicial or discriminatory factors. We have emphasized this
throughout our discussions of this bill within the Energy
and Commerce Committee and with the staff of the Judiciary Committee.
To reiterate: nothing in H.R. 5540, as currently drafted,
would protect the type of abuse that I have referred to. 6 '
flaw of the bill in its present form continues to be that the immunities shield professional
actions which are fair as well as actions which are illegal.").
55. See Hearingson H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 68, 71-72, 108-111, 137-38; 132 CONG.
REC. H9961 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) ("The testimony presented to the Judiciary Committee shows that peer review often has the result if not the intent of discriminating
against minority and foreign born doctors.").
56. See Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 74-76.
57. See id. at 65-66, 74-75, 77, 125-26.
58. E.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988); see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. See also infra note 61 and accompanying text.
59. See Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 346, 348-49.
60. See Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 56, 60.
61. Id. at 47 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 49 (legislation "could not possibly
bar a doctor victimized because of his or her race, age or sex from pursuing all remedies
currently available under our civil rights laws. Nor could it be used to shield actions to
harass physicians who are willing to blow the whistle on their incompetent colleagues.")
(emphasis in original); Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 192 (Rep. Wyden stated:
"There is one thing this bill will not do. It will not shield doctors from liability for what
are truly anticompetitive business practices. The only protected activities are those dealing with the professional behavior and competence of individual practitioners."); 132
CONG. REC. H9957 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (Rep. Waxman stated: "The immunity provisions have been restricted so as not to protect illegitimate actions taken under the
guise of furthering the quality of health care. Actions that violate civil rights laws or
actions that are really taken for anticompetitive purposes will not be protected under

1991]

MEDICAL PEER REVIEW AND ANTITRUST

331

In order to protect physicians who participate in a good-faith
effort to weed out their incompetent colleagues, without shielding
abuses of the peer-review process, the immunity provisions were
substantially redrafted."2 In particular, they apply only to actions
based on "the competence or professional conduct of an individual
physician (which conduct affects or could affect adversely the health
or welfare of a patient or patients)." 6" The aim was to protect only
peer reviews motivated by concerns about an individual physician's
ability to provide quality health care."' To emphasize this point, the
drafters of the Act specifically defined circumstances that would not
be considered to be based on competence or professional conduct.
These would include, for example, decisions based on a physician's
joining or not joining a professional society, on a physician's fees or
advertising, on the economic organization of a medical practice, or
on a physician's activities with other non-physician health-care professionals. 6 5 This list was not meant to be all-inclusive, and in case
the drafters overlooked any similar circumstance, they excluded immunity "for any other matter that does not relate to the competence
or professional conduct of a physician." '
Moreover, the Act protects only decisions based on the professional performance of an
individual physician; "actions against a class of physicians do not fall
"

this bill."); id at H9959 ("For example, an action taken against a physician because of a
style of practice or a pattern of patients that does not generate sufficient revenue for a
hospital would not be covered by this bill.").
62. Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 52 (Rep. Wyden stated that "[w]e have
taken great care to insure that the protections offered under this legislation cannot be
used to shelter anti-competitive or discriminatory behavior."); H.R. REP. No. 903, supra
note 24, at 3 ("The bill protects innocent and often helpless consumers from abuses by
bad doctors without insulating improper anticompetitive behavior from redress."); id at
9 ("Initially, the Committee considered establishing a very broad protection from suit
for professional review actions. In response to concerns that such protection might be
abused and serve as a shield for anti-competitive economic actions under the guise of
quality controls, however, the Committee restricted the broad protection.").
63. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (1988).
64. Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 49 (Rep. Waxman stated: "[W]e have
made it perfectly clear that the only matter at issue under our bill is the ability of doctors- one by one-to practice medicine competently and professionally."); Hearings on
H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 192 ("The only protected activities are those dealing with the
professional behavior and competence of individual practitioners.").
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 11 151(9)(A)-(D) (1988); H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 21.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9)(E) (1988). See also 132 CONG. REC. H11,591 (daily ed. Oct.
17, 1986) (Rep. Waxman termed the listed exceptions as "illustrative, not exhaustive.");
132 CONG. REC. H9959 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (Rep. Waxman observed that the "list
of exclusions is not exhaustive .... The purpose of [§ 11151 (9)(E)] is simply to avoid
the inference that any matters not listed in this subsection are necessarily ones related to
competence or professional conduct.").
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within the purview of this legislation."67
Criticism prompted other limitations on the scope of immunity.' The immunity applies only to damage actions, not to suits
for declaratory or injunctive relief (for example, suits for reinstatement of privileges).6 9 Presumably, a prevailing plaintiff in any such
equitable antitrust action would still be entitled both to the requested equitable relief and to costs and attorney's fees. 7 ° HCQIA's
protection also does not extend to civil rights suits 7 or to suits by
public enforcement agencies, such as the Department ofJustice, the
Federal Trade Commission, or state attorneys general.7 2 Further,
the immunity applies only to peer-review actions involving physicians, not to those involving nurses or other health professionals. 7
In addition, a health-care facility that fails to comply with the reporting requirements of the Act will not be entitled to immunity.7 4
II.
A.

HCQIA

AND PEER-REVIEW LITIGATION

Peer-Review Litigation Under the Antitrust Laws Before HCQIA

Of all the possible claims that can be advanced in peer-review
litigation, federal antitrust claims seem to have posed the biggest
threat to the medical profession and to have been the major factor
behind its demand for legal immunity from liability for peer-review
activity.7 Doubtless, the threat of treble-damage liability as well as
67. See H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 21 (for example, a hospital's requirement
that physicians have a specific type or level of specialty training to qualify for hospital
privileges does not fall within the Act).
68. See Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 48-49 (statement of Rep. Waxman
noting that the scope of immunity has been narrowed); 132 CONG. REC. H 11,589 (daily
ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (same); 132 CONG. REC. H9963 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of
Rep. Tauke emphasizing the careful definition of immunity and the centralized data
bank as limitation on immunity).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 1 llII(a)(l) (1988) (limitation on liability for damages); H.R.
REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 9 ("In addition, the bill does not restrict the rights of
physicians who are disciplined to bring private causes of action for injunctive or declaratory relief.").
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § Illl(a)(1) (1988). See also 132 CONG. REC. H9958 (daily ed.
Oct. 14, 1986) (Rep. Waxman stated: "This amendment changes the bill to limit its
protections... to laws other than civil rights laws. The bill was never intended to shield
racist disciplinary actions couched as intended to promote the quality of care.").
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 1111 l(a)(l) (1988). See also H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at
9 ("The bill leaves completely intact the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission,
the Justice Department, and State Attorneys General to bring antitrust actions.").
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 11115(c) (1988).
74. See id. § 11133(c).
75. See supra notes 16 and 46-48 and accompanying text.
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the frequent absence of insurance coverage for such claims 76 have
diminished many physicians' enthusiasm for participating in professional peer review.
Nonetheless, the notion that antitrust immunity is necessary to
encourage active peer review is somewhat belied by the cool reception that the federal judiciary has generally given lawsuits over staff
privileges. In fact, the antitrust laws have rarely been used successfully to overturn peer-review decisions. Not only do defendants win
most cases, 77 but the federal courts have historically been reluctant
to entertain such claims, if not downright antagonistic towards
them.

This judicial coolness seems to come from several sources.
First, some courts have implicitly analogized medical staff decisions
by a hospital to the decisions of a public agency, thus according
them considerable deference. 78 Such courts are avowedly reluctant
to "second-guess" what they perceive to be expert professional
judgment.7 9 Second, on the assumption that antitrust lawsuits deter
good-faith peer review, some courts are reluctant to contribute to
this perceived "chilling effect." 8 Third, some courts are undoubt76. See Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 326 (insurance does not cover peerreview activities), 358-59; 132 CONG. REC. HI 1,590 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (Rep. Waxman noting the problem of lack of insurance).
77. See cases collected in Annotation, Denial by Hospital of Staff Privileges or Referrals to
Physician or Other Health Care Practitioneras Violation of Sherman Act (15 USCS §§ 1 et seq.), 89
A.L.R. FED. 419, 456-76 (1988). Most peer-review litigation is resolved pre-trial in the
defendants' favor on either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. See
cases collected infra at note 452.
,78. See Hayden v. Bracey, 744 F.2d 1338, 1345 (8th Cir. 1984) (judicial review limited to ensuring that peer reviewers acted within their area of professional expertise,
that they acted reasonably in imposing sanctions, and that the proceedings were fair);
Williams v. Kleaveland, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,486, at 68,367-68 (W.D. Mich.
1983) (judicial review is not de novo and is limited to insuring that the process was bona
fide and that decisions were premised on valid medical concerns); Pontius v. Children's
Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1372 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (judicial review of medical staff privilege questions in federal antitrust lawsuit is not de novo); Sosa v. Board of Managers of
Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971) (limited judicial surveillance). See also Havighurst, ProfessionalPeer Review and the Antitrst Laws, 36 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1117, 1130 (1986) ("The actions of peer-review bodies are typically defended
... in the same way that the actions of public regulatory agencies are defended-as
actions taken in the public interest with due process and the support of substantial evidence."). Such judicial deference in federal antitrust litigation over medical staff privi-

leges is inappropriate. See infra notes 438-440 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Everhart v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 757 F.2d 1567, 1572-73

(5th Cir. 1985) (decision of hospital's governing body concerning granting of hospital
privileges is to be accorded great deference because of the court's lack of medical exper-

tise); Sosa, 437 F.2d at 177 ("evaluation of professional proficiency of doctors is best left
to the specialized expertise of their peers, subject only to limited judicial surveillance").
80. See, e.g., Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 391 (7th Cir. 1984) (physicians
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edly daunted by the complex, time-consuming, and costly nature of
antitrust litigation in general."' Not only are discovery and trial
likely to be lengthy and burdensome, 2 but antitrust jurisprudence
itself is not a model of clarity or consistency. There is notorious and
widespread disagreement among jurists and legal scholars even over

the goals that the antitrust laws are designed to achieve.8 "
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there appears to be an
undercurrent of judicial concern that the antitrust laws were never
faced with the threat of treble damages for alleged antitrust violations "will either dilute
their peer-review reports" or will discontinue their participation in the peer-review process), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); Pontius, 552 F. Supp. at 1362, 1376 (referring to
the chilling effect of potential damages for participation in peer review).
81. See, e.g., Marrese, 748 F.2d at 393-94 (expressing reluctance to allow further burdening of federal courts with antitrust litigation where state law mandates peer review),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); Pontius, 552 F. Supp. at 1361 (describes "the pressing
need to avoid the expense of antitrust litigation in an 'industry' already highly regulated
and fraught with serious problems of cost and quality control").
82. See, e.g., McMorris v. Williamsport Hosp., 597 F. Supp. 899, 901 (M.D. Pa. 1984)
(extensive discovery during five year-old case); Williams, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at
68,360 ("The discovery process in this four and a half year old anti-trust suit has been
tedious, cumbersome, and expensive."); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 848
(W.D. Pa. 1981) (three years of discovery and motions accompanied by ten weeks of
trial), aff'd, 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
83. Numerous antitrust commentators subscribe to the "Chicago School," which
posits that the exclusive goal of antitrust laws is to advance consumer welfare by promoting economic efficiency. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANrrrtusT PARADox: A PoLIcv AT
WAR WITH ITSELF 51, 81-89 (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 20-22 (1976); Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 24 (1984) ("The

fundamental premise of antitrust is the ability of competitive markets to drive firms toward efficient operation") (emphasis in original). Numerous other commentators have
challenged the primacy of consumer welfare and economic efficiency and have advanced
other goals of antitrust. See, e.g., Flynn, The Reagan Administration'sAntitrust Policy, "Original Intent" and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 265-90
(1988) (criticizing Bork's "efficiency only" analysis of antitrust); Fox, The Modernization of
Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1182, 1191 (1981) (proposing
that antitrust serves consumers' interests and discussing other historical goals);
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985) (general critique
of the Chicago School's neoclassical efficiency model of antitrust); Kissam, Antitrust Boycott Doctrine, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1165, 1178-84 (1984) (a suggested goal of antitrust law is
to ensure commercial fairness); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Originaland Primary Concern
of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L. REV. 65, 68-70 (1982)
(goal is to prevent unfair wealth transfers from consumers to producers with market
power); Peritz, A Counter-Histosy of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 317 (antitrust law is
"public interest law designed to regulate the exercise of private economic power");
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1052-58 (1979) (emphasizing goals of preventing excessive concentrations of economic power and of enhancing small business opportunities); Wiley, "After Chicago': An Exaggerated Demise?,
1986 DUKE LJ. 1003, 1012-13 (goal of antitrust is to maximize consumer surplus). See
generally Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1437-51, 1460-71 (1990) (discussing generally Judge Bork's and other commentators' debates over the goals of antitrust).
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intended to apply to disputes over medical staff privileges.8 4 This
sentiment is perhaps founded on a lurking judicial suspicion that
many, if not most, such cases are illegitimate: just a sore loser trying
to turn his losses into a federal case.8 5 Representative of this judicial attitude is the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit's observation that a cause of action under the Sherman Act is
not created "every time a lawyer, accountant, or architect is denied
partnership status in a national firm, a business executive is fired or
denied a promotion by a national corporation, or a physician, surgeon, or specialist has hospital staff privileges denied or revoked." 6
A number of courts have charged, or come close to charging, that
medical staff privileges cases brought under the antitrust laws are
7
"frivolous."
On the other hand, the federal courts have not been willing to
dismiss such cases out of hand. One of the principal reasons for the
judiciary's stopping short of announcing a blanket hands-off policy
seems to be its concern that if peer-review actions are to be exempt
from antitrust scrutiny, then such an exemption should rightfully

84. See, e.g.,Jaffee v. Horton Memorial Hosp., 680 F. Supp. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
("This case presents an almost classic example of use of the antitrust laws to obtain
relief of doubtful social or economic value, which was never contemplated by the 19th
Century trustbusters who drafted these laws."); Pontius, 552 F. Supp. at 1361 (expressing
grave doubts that the Sherman Act was ever intended to provide federal courts with
jurisdiction over hospital staff-privileges cases).
85. See, e.g., Husain v. Helene Fuld Medical Center, 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,905, at 62,858 (D.NJ. 1989) ("not every act that causes a person to suffer a personal
or professional set-back can be turned into a Sherman Act matter"); Thompson v. Wise
Gen. Hosp., 707 F. Supp. 849, 855 (W.D. Va. 1989) ("courts should not allow plaintiffs,
by charging conspiracies in restraint of trade, to turn every case into a Sherman Act
matter"), aff'd, 896 F.2d 547 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 132 (1990); Rosenberg v.
Healthcorp Affiliates, 663 F. Supp. 222, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (not every hospital staff
exclusion case is significant enough to warrant the concern of the federal antitrust laws);
Seglin v. Esau, 769 F.2d 1274, 1280 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985) (hard to ignore a suspicion that
the facts of the case have been forced into an antitrust mold to achieve federal
jurisdiction).
86. Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 393 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1027 (1985). See also Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 891 (W.D. Pa. 1981)
("Congress did not pass the antitrust laws in order to insure that every young surgeon
can perform the type and number of procedures that he considers to be most satisfying."), af'd, 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
87. See, e.g., Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Corp., 800 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1986)
(future antitrust challenges regarding staff privileges under Indiana medical peer review
process may be deemed "frivolous" because of clear bar of state action doctrine); Harron v. United Hosp. Center, Inc., 522 F.2d 1133, 1134 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
("frivolous to urge that employment of a single doctor to operate the radiology department of a hospital invokes the Sherman Act"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976).
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come from Congress."8
Another reason the courts have continued, at least nominally,
to entertain such cases is that, as discussed earlier, peer-review decisions by their very nature are fraught with the potential for anticompetitive abuse.8 9 The peer-review decision is typically made on the
recommendation of numerous members and committees of the
medical staff of the hospital who individually, while they are peers,
are also direct or indirect competitors of the plaintiff physician. The
denial or termination of medical staff privileges necessarily has the
effect of eliminating a competitor and thus, at least arguably, of reducing competition for the remaining medical staff members. The
very act of denying or terminating privileges can thus raise antitrust
concerns: superficially, it can be argued to look like a classic group
boycott. 9 As one court has observed of medical staff privileges
cases: "The antitrust laws are at least arguably implicated because
by preventing a plaintiff physician from furnishing medical services
to patients within a specified market, the conspirators insulate themselves to that extent from potential competition and thereby distort
the normal market mechanism."'" Abuse of the peer-review process
is not just hypothetically possible but has been found to have occurred in a small but significant number of cases.92 Because of this
potential for abuse, neither the courts, nor Congress, have been
88. See Pontius, 552 F. Supp. at 1361 ("further jurisdictional limitations ought to
come from Congress rather than district courts").
89. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text; see also Miles & Philp, supra note 13,
at 504 (observing that to some extent, peer review puts the "fox in the chicken coop").
90. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1984) (hospital's denial of
staff privileges to osteopaths was sufficiently close to traditional boycott that the characterization is appropriate), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985); McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121, 132 (E.D. Ky. 1982) (adopting the position that a classic
group boycott is a "concerted attempt by a group of competitors at one level to protect
themselves from non-group members who seek to compete at that level"). See also L.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITusT 229-32 (1977) (describing characteristics of boycotts); supra note 12 and accompanying text.
91. Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
92. A few plaintiffs have prevailed at trial. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94
(1988) (respondents determined to have violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by
initiating and participating in peer-review proceedings in order to reduce competition);
Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff damaged
by unlawful conspiracy among anesthesia service providers designed to eliminate competition); Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., Inc., No. 88-1867-CIV-T-17B (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 12, 1991) (unpublished), reported at 60 ANrrrtusT & TRADE REG. RVrR. 277
(1991) (physician suspended by hospital was awarded $450,000 treble damage judgment, having allegedly been "subjected to 'anticompetitive exclusion' through acts of
intimidation, coercion, harassment, extortion, and threats"). See also supra notes 55-60
and accompanying text (describing abuses of peer review).
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ready to exempt medical peer review completely from antitrust
scrutiny.
B. HCQIA's Weak Disincentives to Litigate
As discussed earlier, one of the principal goals of the Act was to
encourage active, good-faith peer review by discouraging peer-review litigation.93 Congress chose several means to create disincentives for potential plaintiff physicians to bring such lawsuits. First,
there is a cost-shifting provision, which requires the court to award
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to the defendants if the
plaintiff's claim or conduct during the litigation was unreasonable
or groundless. 4 Second, the Act creates a presumption that the defendants acted reasonably and provided fair procedures when they
undertook their peer-review activities.9 5 Third, the Act grants what
has been termed limited "immunity" to peer-review participants. 9 6
These provisions were lauded as providing a needed deterrent
to peer-review litigation.9 7 The following discussion suggests that
these highly touted changes effect no real procedural or substantive
change in antitrust law, and thus that HCQIA's bark is decidedly
fiercer than its bite.
1. The Cost-Shifting Provision.-The Act requires a court to
award costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to a substantially
prevailing defendant if the plaintiff's claim or conduct during the
litigation "was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in
bad faith." 9 8 While this provision may serve to emphasize Congress's concern over frivolous litigation in the peer-review arena,
the sanctions provided by it were already available under either rule
93. See supra notes 36-38, 40-48, and accompanying text.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 11113 (1988); infra subsection II(B)(1).
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (1988); infra subsection II(B)(2).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 1111 l(a)(1) (1988); infra subsection II(B)(3).
97. See 132 CONG. REC. HI 1,590-91 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (Rep. Waxman discussing evidence in support of immunity, the need for immunity, and the attorney's fees
provision). See also supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 11113 (1988).
In any suit brought against a defendant, to the extent that a defendant has met
the standards set forth under section 11112(a) of this title and the defendant
substantially prevails, the court shall, at the conclusion of the action, award to a
substantially prevailing party defending against any such claim the cost of the
suit attributable to such claim, including a reasonable attorney's fee, if the
claim, or the claimant's conduct during the litigation of the claim, was frivolous,
unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith.

338

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

50:316

11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9 9 or some other provision governing frivolous litigation and abusive practices in the federal courts.'oo
The culpability standard in HCQIA that triggers this cost-shifting sanction-that plaintiff's claim or conduct be "frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith"-is identical to that in
the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984.'0' That language
in turn was directly based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the cost-shifting provision of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.'02 In ChristianburgGarment Co. v. EEOC,10 3 the Supreme Court
99. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a court to impose a
sanction, which may include an order to pay reasonable expenses including a reasonable
attorney's fee, upon a party or attorney who by signing a document falsely certifies that:
to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry [the document] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.

100. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (governing schedulings and pretrial conferences);
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (governing discovery abuses); FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (providing for
sanctions for failure to conduct discovery); APP. R. CIv. P. 38 (allowing damages and
costs for frivolous appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988) (sanctions against attorney who
"unreasonably and vexatiously" multiplies proceedings in a case).
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988). The cost-shifting section of this statute provides that:
the court shall ... award to a substantially prevailing party defending against
any claim [under the federal antitrust laws or similar state statutes] the cost of
suit attributable to such claim, including a reasonable attorney's fee, if the
claim, or the claimant's conduct during the litigation of the claim, was frivolous,
unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith.
Id. § 4304(a)(2). Congressman Waxman stated that HCQIA's cost-shifting provision
was taken from this language. See 132 CONG. REC. H11,591 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986).
102. Section 706(k) of tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1988), provides: "In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
Explaining this provision, a congressional committee on the Cooperative Research Act
stated:
The Conferees believe that the Supreme Court's Christianburgstandard, [see infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text] as further explicated by the lower
courts, is an appropriate one to adopt in the context of suits against joint R&D
ventures, and that it will achieve the desired goal of protecting law-abiding defendants from baseless and bad faith attacks while ensuring that private enforcement of the antitrust laws is not deterred. By adopting a well-established
and well-understood standard, Congress can provide the greatest certainty to
litigants about the standard by which their conduct of litigation will be
measured.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3131, 3140. While the committee did not expressly discuss the
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held that an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a
title VII case may be made upon a finding that the plaintiff's action
was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though
not brought in subjective bad faith."'" Although a finding that the
plaintiff acted in subjective bad faith is thus not a necessary condition prior to imposing the sanctions on a title VII plaintiff, it is certainly a sufficient one: "needless to say, if a plaintiff is found to have
brought or continued such a claim in badfaith, there will be an even
stronger basis for charging him with the attorney's fees incurred by
the defense."'
Thus, HCQIA's culpability standard for shifting the defendant's
costs to the plaintiff is ultimately derived from and identical to title
VII's culpability standard. The significance of this observation is
that title VII's standard has been found as a practical matter to be
substantially the same as the culpability standard for imposing costs
and attorney's fees under rule 11. o6 Logically, it follows that, if the
standards of title VII and rule 11 for imposing sanctions are effectively the same, and the standards of title VII and HCQIA are
largely identical, then the standards of rule 11 and HCQIA must
likewise be the same.
This last proposition has more than syllogistic appeal. It has
the support of both common sense and the cases. Both provisions
are rooted in the goal of deterring groundless litigation. 0 7 Neither
construction of this provision with rule 11, it did note that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(g) and 37 already provided for strong sanctions against discovery abuse, along
with 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988), providing for sanctions for unreasonable and vexatious
multiplication of court proceedings. The Committee observed: "The present legislation is entirely consistent with the vigorous enforcement of these important revisions [to
these rules]."

1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3141.

103. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
104. Id. at 421.
105. Id. at 422 (emphasis in original).
106. This proposition is supported by the title VII cases where the culpability standards of title VII ("frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation") and of rule 11 are
used interchangeably in the decision to award or not to award attorney's fees to a defendant. See, e.g., Forsberg v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 840 F.2d 1409,
1422 (9th Cir. 1988) (under either rule 11 or title VII, the district court must find that
the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though
not brought in subjective bad faith); Tall v. Town of Cortlandt, 709 F. Supp. 401, 409
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Second Circuit's objective interpretation of Rule 11 ... is virtually
identical to the standard set forth in Christianburg."). While the culpability standards for
rule 11 and title VII may be the same, it is not necessarily true that sanctions may be
appropriate under both in any given case. For example, sanctions under title VII are
appropriate only if the plaintiff's action itself is frivolous or unreasonable; sanctions may
be awarded under rule 11 for particular conduct. See infra note 110.
107. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir. 1988) (goals of
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provision makes a finding of plaintiff's subjective bad faith a necessary precondition to defendant's recovery,10 8 and upon a finding of
culpability, both make the imposition of sanctions mandatory.' 0 9
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a case where a sanction would be
appropriate under the Act, but not similarly available under rule 11
or the other provisions permitting sanctions for abusive litigation

practices."o
rule 11 are deterrence, punishment, and compensation); Amendments to the FederalRules of
Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983) (advisory committee notes to rule 11 amendment) ("imposition of sanctions when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or
defenses").
108. HCQIA's use of the disjunctive "or in bad faith" indicates that a finding of subjective bad faith will justify an award of fees, but is not required. This interpretation is
bolstered by Christianburg, from which HCQIA's standard was ultimately derived. See
supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text (Supreme Court made clear that subjective
bad faith was not required under tide VII's fee shifting provision). Similarly, a finding of
subjective bad faith is not a necessary condition prior to imposing sanctions under rule
11. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985)
("Simply put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did
[under rule 11]."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); 2A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
11.02[3], at 11-15 (2d ed. 1990) ("The 'objective test' for sanctionable conduct announced in Eastway has now been universally adopted."); Note, The Demise of a Subjective
Bad Faith Standard Under Amended Rule 11, 59 TEMPLE L.Q. 107 (1986) (discussing how
Eastway removed the requirement of subjective bad faith).
109. Like rule 11, HCQIA provides that the court "shall impose" sanctions if the requirements are met. This language has been interpreted as imposing mandatory sanctions under rule 11. See Thomas, 836 F.2d at 876 (mandatory sanctions for violation of
rule 11); ABA Standards and Guidelinesfor Practice Under Rule 11 of the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure, 121 F.R.D. 101, 122 (1988) (mandatory nature of sanctions).
110. In one sense, HCOIA's cost-shifting provision arguably could be "tougher" than
rule 11 because a court under rule 11 could impose a lesser sanction than attorney's fees
and costs, while HCQIA mandates this sanction. See, e.g., Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878 (appropriate sanction for violation of rule 11 may be "a warm friendly discussion on the
record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open court, compulsory legal education, monetary
sanctions, or other measures appropriate to circumstances"). However, the lack of discretion in HCQIA could cut the other way if a court declined to characterize arguably
inappropriate conduct as "frivolous" or "unreasonable" because of the severity of the
single available sanction. On the other hand, it is arguable that rule 11 is broader or
"tougher" than HCQIA's cost-shifting sanction. One reason is that while HCQIA (like
title VII) seems to allow an award of attorney's fees only against a party, rule 11 allows
an award against "counsel, a party, or both." Eastway Constr., 821 F.2d at 124. In title
VII cases, some courts have hesitated to assess sanctions solely against a party under
title VII's cost-shifting provision (which is analogous to HCQIA's), but have assessed
sanctions under rule 11 against the attorney alone or against the attorney and the party.
See, e.g., Johnson v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 823 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(fees awarded against attorney and party); Witzsche v. Jaeger & Haynes, Inc., 707 F.
Supp. 407, 412 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (fees assessed against plaintiff and attorney, jointly and
severally); Brownlow v. General Serv. Employees Union, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
34,886 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (fee assessed against attorney alone). Moreover, HCQIA is like
the title VII cost-shifting provision in that it is outcome based. This is because awards
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Moreover, prior to HCQIA's effective date, the federal courts
had not hesitated to impose sanctions under rule 11 or other provisions against peer-review plaintiffs in appropriate cases,"' or to
threaten invoking the rule: "In this very expensive area of litigation,
we must require that attorneys think before they file." ' " 2 Thus, any
additional deterrence promised by HCQIA's cost-shifting provision
is probably more imaginary than real.
2. The Presumption in the Defendants' Favor.-HCQIA limits the
liability of peer-review participants who meet the four standards of
reasonableness and due process set forth in subsection 11112(a)."
HCQIA further provides that the peer reviewers' actions shall be
presumed to have met these standards "unless the presumption is
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence."' " HCQIA thus creates a presumption of nonliability for peer reviewers who sanction
doctors and specifies the burden of proof required to rebut that
presumption.
A comparable rebuttable presumption and allocation of the
burden of proof exist without HCQIA. As discussed below, peer
can only be made to a prevailing party (prevailing defendant only under HCQIA), while
rule 11 "expressly gives the Court flexibility to sanction particularpleadings or motions
that it finds wantonly or vexatiously asserted." Paul v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n,
697 F. Supp. 547, 551 (D.D.C. 1988). See also Schrock v. Altru Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d
658, 661 (7th Cir. 1987) (even if the plaintiff's suit was not frivolous under title VII, the
plaintiff's failure to investigate the claim prior to filing may permit sanctions under rule
11); Bynum v. Michigan State Univ., 117 F.R.D. 94, 99-100 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (costs and
fees were denied under tide VII because the claims could not be characterized as "frivolous, unreasonable or completely groundless," but sanctions were permitted under rule
11 for certifying false statements in a complaint); Ruffin v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
636 F. Supp. 857, 859-60 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (cost and fees were denied under tide VII
because the claim was not necessarily "frivolous" or "unreasonable," but they were allowed under rule 11 for failure to make a reasonable inquiry). Despite the arguable
distinctions that could be made between the cost-shifting provision of HCQIA, rule 11,
and other similar provisions, it is unlikely such distinctions will result in any appreciable
difference in deterrence value.
111. See, e.g., Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying rule 11 to determine sanctions); Litman v. A. Barton Hepburn Hosp., 679 F.
Supp. 196, 206 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (costs and fees assessed under rules 11 and 37); Colorado Chiropractic Council v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 650 F. Supp. 231, 240 (D. Colo.
1986) (sanctions imposed under rule 11); Damiani v. Rhode Island Hosp., 1982-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 64,790 (D.R.I. 1982) (defendants granted attorneys' fees under rule 37);
cf. Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1514-16 (10th Cir. 1987) (attorney relieved of
sanctions under rule 38 because of lack of notice).
112. Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 800 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1986)
(peer-review litigation in Indiana may be deemed "frivolous" because of the clear bar of
the state action doctrine).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 1l112(a) (1988); supra text accompanying note 52.
114. Id.
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review fits within the category of commercial conduct that the
Supreme Court has dealt with as presumptively lawful in the absence of additional, rebuttal evidence from the plaintiff.t 5 Moreover, a burden of proof requiring the plaintiff to establish the
illegality of the defendant's conduct by a preponderance of the evidence is already well established under antitrust law." 6
a. Presumptionof Nonliability.-To prove a violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must prove that the defendants engaged in a "contract, combination . . .or conspiracy" to restrain
trade unreasonably." 7 Proving such a conspiratorial agreement can
be difficult. Frequently the plaintiff has no direct evidence of it, but
must rely on circumstantial evidence of the defendants' conduct,
which arguably gives rise to an inference of unlawful agreement.
The Supreme Court has not required the plaintiff to produce direct
evidence of a formal agreement, but rather has allowed the agreement to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances." l8 However, at what point the factfinder will be permitted to draw that
inference from the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence has become a
critical and controversial issue in section 1 cases." t9
With the observation that "antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a § 1 case,"' 2 ° the
Supreme Court appears increasingly ready to prohibit an inference
of illegality in the absence of direct or strong circumstantial evidence. This Article contends that a judicial rule that prevents the
factfinder from inferring illegality in certain kinds of circumstantial
cases is tantamount to a congressional rule, such as HCQIA, which
requires the factfinder to presume the nonliability of the defendants
in certain kinds of cases. In both cases, comparable burdens are
placed on the plaintiff to come forward with affirmative evidence to
overcome the operation of the rule.
115. See infra subsection II(B)(2)(a).
116. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
118. See Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540
(1954) (business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the
factfinder may infer agreement); Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440,
1450 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Because direct evidence of concerted action ...is so rare, the
Supreme Court has traditionally granted fact finders some latitude to find collusion or
conspiracy from parallel conduct and inferences drawn from the circumstances.").
119. 6 P. AREEDA, ANrrMusT LAw

1405, at 22 (1986) ("most frequent operational

question encountered by antitrust courts is whether a conspiracy claim is sufficiently
supported to require a trial").
120. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
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Courts have not permitted the factfinder to infer illegality in
some cases of parallel business conduct among competitors. While
evidence that the defendants pursued parallel or identical courses of
conduct may be relevant to a finding of illegal conspiracy, the
factfinder may not infer illegality from evidence of such "conscious
parallelism" alone. 12 1 Something more is needed-a so-called
"plus factor"-which would make the inference of unlawful conspir12 2
acy stronger than the inference of lawful independent action.
The practical effect of this plus-factor approach is to create a judicial
presumption of legality for consciously parallel conduct among
competitors, a presumption that can be rebutted by additional evidence-something more in the way of motive to conspire or conduct
consistent with conspiracy-that supports an inference of illegality.
A similar rebuttable presumption of legality exists for a manufacturer who terminates one of its distributors after receiving complaints about the distributor from its other distributors. In Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. ,123 several of defendant Monsanto's distributors had complained to it that another distributor, plaintiff
Spray-Rite, was "price-cutting" by not adhering to Monsanto's contractual resale prices. Subsequent to receiving these complaints,
Monsanto terminated Spray-Rite, which in turn filed an antitrust action alleging that Monsanto and the complaining distributors had
engaged in a vertical price-fixing conspiracy.

24

The Supreme Court decided that evidence that a manufacturer
had terminated a price-cutting distributor following complaints by
other competitor distributors was, by itself, not sufficient to support
an inference of illegal concerted action.'2 5 The Court observed that
on such evidence alone a manufacturer could simply be unilaterally
exercising either its legal rights under United States v. Colgate & Co. 126
to refuse to deal with those who do not comply with its previously
announced resale prices,' 2 7 or its prerogatives under Continental
121. Theatre Enters., 346 U.S. at 541.
122. See 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 119, 1434; L. SULLIVAN, SUpra note 90, at 317-22
(1977). For example, four filling stations may all charge identical prices for gasoline.
Because such price parallelism may logically be the result either of intense, lawful price
competition or of unlawful collusion to fix prices, a court would be reluctant to allow a
factfinder to conclude the latter without some additional evidence beyond the price uniformity that favored that inference.
123. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
124. Id. at 757.
125. See id. at 759, 763-64.
126. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
127. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761-63 (under Colgate, the manufacturer can announce its
resale prices in advance and refuse to deal with those who fail to comply).
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T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 128 to devise an appropriate marketing
strategy through reasonable nonprice restrictions on its distributors. 2 9 The Court reasoned that "[p]ermitting an agreement to be
inferred merely from the existence of complaints, or even from the
fact that termination came about 'in response to' complaints, could
deter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct"' ° and "create an ir3
rational dislocation of the market."' '
In light of this danger, the Court announced that, as a matter of
substantive antitrust law, "something more than evidence of
complaints is needed"'' 3 2 to permit an inference that the manufacturer's behavior was unlawful. According to the Court, the "correct
standard is that there must be evidence that tends to exclude the
possibility of independent action by the manufacturer and distributor."' 3 3 The potential for chilling procompetitive conduct justified
creating, in effect, a presumption that a post-complaint dealer termination was, by itself, a lawful, independent exercise of business
judgment. The plaintiff could rebut this presumption by coming
forward with something more that "tends to exclude" the possibility
that defendants were engaged in lawful conduct and supports the
34
inference of unlawful conspiracy.
The Supreme Court similarly found the plaintiffs' evidence in
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. '31 to be insufficient to support an inference of a horizontal conspiracy to engage in
predatory price-cutting among twenty-one Japanese-affiliated manufacturers of consumer electronic products. The Court rejected as
largely irrelevant most of the plaintiffs' evidence that supported the
inference of illegal conspiracy, S6 and further found that the defendants had no rational economic motive to conspire to price predatorially.' 37 The Court observed that the "[lhack of motive bears on the
range of permissible conclusions that might be drawn from ambigu128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-63.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 764.
Id.
Id. at 768.
See Note, The Evolving Summaiy Judgment StandardforAntitrust Conspiracy Cases, 12 J.
CORP. LAw 503, 521 (1987) (termination of a price-cutting distributor in response to
other distributor complaints is presumptively legitimate, and only additional evidence
can rebut the presumption).
135. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
136. See id. at 595-97.
137. See id. at 588-93.
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ous evidence,"' l 8 and that "if the factual context renders [the plaintiffs'] claim implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no
economic sense-[plaintiffs] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary."' 3 9 The Court in effect found the alleged conspiracy to be so
economically 14irrational that, presumptively, the defendants did not
engage init. 0
Even if the defendants' rebates and price-cutting activities had
been consistent with a plausible inference of a conspiracy to suppress prices, the activities were also consistent with an inference of
independent conduct that was the very essence of competition,
namely, cutting prices in order to increase business.' 4 1 Citing Monsanto, the Court required additional evidence to support the inference of illegality in order not to deter lawful procompetitive
conduct: "Thus, mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are
especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust
14 2
laws are designed to protect."'
While the Supreme Court has spoken in terms of permissible
inferences in the foregoing cases, the practical effect of preventing
the jury from inferring illegality from circumstantial evidence of certain kinds of commercial conduct is to create a rebuttable presumption of legality for such conduct. 14 What kind of conduct gives rise
to this presumption? Broad language in Matsushita might suggest
that any conduct consistent with the possibility of legality will be
presumed to be legal in the absence of further evidence tending to
exclude the possibility of legality. This is premised on the Court's
characterization of the Monsanto holding "that conduct as consistent
with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not,
144
standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy."'
This language is a misinterpretation of Monsanto, which has unfortu1 45
nately been uncritically adopted by a number of courts.
Although the post-complaint conduct at issue in Monsanto was
138. Id. at 596.
139. Id. at 587.
140. Note, supra note 134, at 533.
141. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594.
142. Id.
143. Note, supra note 134, at 533-34 (Monsanto-Matsushitaapproach creates presumptions that must be resisted by the parties).
144. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588, 597 n.21.
145. See Note, Summary Judgment and CircumstantialEvidence, 40 STAN. L. REV. 491, 500
nn.53-55 (1988) (observing also that Monsanto made no reference to whether competing
inferences were "equally plausible" or whether evidence was "as consistent" with one
inference as with the other); see also id. at 508-509.
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consistent with inferences of both legal business conduct and illegal
price-fixing, such consistency by itself was not the basis for presuming the conduct lawful (by preventing the jury from inferring it was
unlawful) in the absence of additional contrary evidence.' 46 The
conduct at issue in Monsanto (and, indeed, in Matsushita and the conscious parallelism cases) failed to give rise to an inference of conspiracy not simply because it was consistent with the possibility that
the defendants were engaging in lawful conduct, but rather because
such conduct would almost invariably be undertaken by defendants
who were behaving lawfully. 4 In other words, "any company engaged in the innocent conduct could not help but do the very thing
which plaintiff suggested should be proof of illegal conduct."' 148
Thus, the presumption of legality is created not for conduct that is
simply consistent with an explanation of innocence or lawfulness,
but rather for conduct that innocent defendants must or are highly
likely to engage in if acting lawfully. 14' Faced solely with evidence
of such conduct, a factfinder could not rationally favor a conclusion
that such conduct was unlawful over the conclusion that it was lawful, and to permit a factfinder to draw a conclusion of illegality could
potentially "chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to
146. Simple consistency with an inference of innocence is too broad a basis for
preventing the jury from inferring guilt. In every circumstantial case where the defendant puts on any defense at all, the defendant's conduct will always be consistent with the
competing inferences of legality and illegality. See Note, supra note 145, at 494, 500 n.53
("Because indirect evidence is, by definition, always susceptible to alternative interpretations, the defendant will always be able to [interpret circumstantial evidence in an innocent light], subject to the constraint that his explanation be a 'plausible' one.").
147. For example, a Monsanto-type manufacturer who was exercising its right unilaterally to terminate a distributor that did not comply with its previously announced resale
price policy, would be likely to terminate a distributor after receiving information about
the distributor's contractual noncompliance. Similarly, Matsushita-type manufacturers
engaged in lawful competition would very probably cut their prices and provide rebates.
Furthermore, competitors are very likely to engage in parallel or uniform business practices when the firms are economically interdependent. See 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 119,
1410, 1423, at 197-98, 237-38 (unfair to impose antitrust liability on oligopolists who
can rationally proceed only by taking actions parallel to those of their competitors).

148. Note, supra note 145, at 508 (emphasis in original). See also Schwarzer, Summary
Judgment Under the FederalRules: Defining Genuine Issues of MaterialFact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 488
(1984) (decision to permit an adverse inference may depend on whether the conduct
from which it is sought to be drawn is likely to be pursued in the absence of a prohibited
purpose or arrangement).
149. Note, supra note 145, at 517 (to persuade a court that its conduct merits such a
presumption of legality, the defendant must show "not that his version of the facts is the
more likely one on the evidence presented, but that anyone engaging in the innocent
conduct he asserts actually took place would be highly likely to perform the very behavior that is the basis of the plaintiff's inference").
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Peer-review litigation is ripe for the application of these principles. A hospital's denial or termination of a doctor's staff privileges
is conduct that is consistent both with an inference of good-faith
peer review to protect patients from an incompetent doctor, and
with an inference of illegal conspiracy to eliminate competition from
a competent doctor. (This consistency is, in fact, the very problem
posed by peer review.) 15 1 Moreover, a hospital in all probability
would in an appropriate case undertake such an adverse action
against the doctor if it was effectively engaging in legitimate peer
review. Thus, as in the conscious parallelism cases, Monsanto and
Matsushita,15 2 peer review is conduct that is highly likely to be engaged in by innocent parties, and hence it justifies the same presumption of legality, which can be rebutted in appropriate cases by
additional evidence that "tends to exclude"' 5 " the possibility of
innocence.
Furthermore, the rationale justifying the presumption of legality in the earlier cases is equally applicable to peer review. Permitting a jury to infer an illegal conspiracy too readily on the basis of
peer-review conduct alone could deter the medical profession from
engaging in legitimate, procompetitive peer review at all. Indeed,
because the threat of antitrust liability through such mistaken inferences already appeared to be deterring the medical profession from
engaging in good-faith peer review,"M Congress expressly created a
rebuttable presumption of nonliability for peer review of doctors in
HCQIA.
Thus, a rebuttable presumption of legality for peer review,
which is comparable to HCQA's presumption of nonliability, was
already justified by existing case law and will obtain in peer-review
cases not covered by the Act. Prior to 1986 some lower courts had
formally established a presumption in peer-review litigation that the
peer-reviewers had acted in good faith.'15 Since Matsushita, several
150. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594.
151. See supra notes 11-13, 89-92, and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 147.
153. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768; see supra note 133 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 35-38, 41-44, and accompanying text.
155. E.g., Williams v. Kleaveland, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,486, at 68,365,
68,367-368 (D. Mich. 1983) (presumption that peer reviewers acted in good faith). See
also Castelli v. Meadville Medical Center, 702 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (citing Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1372 (W.D. Pa. 1982) for the proposition that a hospital's selections of medical staff are presumed to be based on legitimate
medical and business reasons), aff'd, 872 F.2d 411 (1989). These presumptions were
frequently erroneously based on the view that peer-review decisions were to be ac-
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more courts have used the Supreme Court precedent discussed in
this subsection to create such a presumption of legality for peer review of professional competence. 15 6 Although HCQIA was enacted
several months after Matsushita was decided, arguably only a rather
confident legislator would conclude, on the basis of Monsanto and
the earlier conscious-parallelism cases, that expressly tipping the initial balance legislatively in the peer-review defendants' favor was
unnecessary.
b. Burden of Proof.-Another way to understand how HCQIA's
presumption of nonliability does not change the basic antitrust analysis in peer-review litigation is to recognize that the presumption
is not a true presumption at all. A true presumption is a device by
which the proof of one fact (the "basic" fact) must be taken for some
purposes as proof of another fact (the "presumed" fact).' 5 7
HCQIA's presumed facts (that the defendants were acting reasonably to further quality of health care and with fair procedures) do
not depend on the establishment of any basic facts. Instead, the
presumption is really just a way of assigning to the plaintiff the burden of disproving the presumed facts (that is, of proving that the
defendants were not acting reasonably to further quality of care or
were acting without fair procedures).
In this respect, HCQIA's presumption is like the classic "presumption of innocence" in criminal law, which is also not a true
presumption because its existence does not arise from the establishment of any basic facts. 158 The presumption of innocence is, instead, a restatement of the criminal law principle that the
59
prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant guilty.'
Similarly, HCQIA's presumption that the defendants were acting
corded judicial deference. See supra notes 78-79 and infra notes 438-440 and accompanying text.
156. E.g., White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98, 102-103 (4th Cir.
1987); Shah v. Memorial Hosp. [Shah 1],1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,199, at 59,327
(W.D. Va. 1988); Friedman v. Delaware County Memorial Hosp., 672 F. Supp. 171, 18788, 191 (E.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 600, 603 (1988); Mosby v. American Medical
Int'l, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 601, 606-07 (S.D. Tex. 1987). See also Miles & Philp, supra note
13, at 514-18 (discussing and approving the application of Monsanto in the context of
peer review).
157. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
§ 5122, at 561 (1977) (for example, "evidence that a person has not been heard of for
seven years (the basic fact) can be used to show that the person is dead (the presumed
fact)").
158. See id. at 557, 589.
159. See id. (distinguishing presumptions from "assumptions," which are rules for allocating the burden of proof); id. § 5126, at 611 n.30 ("In many cases it is unclear
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reasonably to further the quality of health care is simply another way
of stating that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that they were
not acting in such a manner. Because as a practical matter the plaintiff has this burden anyway under section 1 of the Sherman Act,"6
HCQIA's "presumption" has not affected the allocation of the burdens of proof between the parties in the typical peer-review action
16 1
under the antitrust laws.
A comparison of the allocations of the burdens of proof with
and without HCQIA is helpful to demonstrate this last point. With
or without HCQIA, the plaintiff initially must make out a prima facie
case that the defendants have conspired to restrain trade unreasonably. 62 Under HCQIA, assuming the plaintiff has met this burden,
the defendants may respond by raising the immunity defense.
Although usually the defendants have the ultimate burden of proof
on an affirmative defense,'
HCQIA's presumption that the four
immunity standards have been met automatically shifts back to the
plaintiff the burden of rebuttal. The plaintiff then has both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion to prove that the
defendants were not acting as presumed, that is, that they did not
comply with at least one of the standards of reasonableness or fair
procedure.'64
This shifting of proof burdens closely parallels the shifting of
burdens in a typical antitrust action under the rule of reason 65 without HCQIA. First, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case
that trade has been restrained; second, the burden then shifts to the
defendants to come forward with evidence of a legitimate objective
for their conduct; and third, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
either to disprove the existence or the legitimacy of the claimed obwhether the 'presumption' is a true presumption or is simply an alternate way of stating
the burden of proof.").
160. See infra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
161. Because HCQIA's presumption operates against the party with the burden of
persuasion, it is superfluous: it "is like a handkerchief thrown over something covered
by a blanket." C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 157, § 5126, at 611.
162. See 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 119, 1507, at 397.
163. SeeJ. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.20 (1985) (discussing, generally, affirmative defenses).
164. This pattern of shifting burdens is illustrated in the only case thus far decided on
the merits under HCQIA. See Austin v. McNamara, 731 F. Supp. 934, 942 (C.D. Cal.
1990) (plaintiff failed to address, much less rebut, the defendants' showing of compliance with HCQIA's requirements). See also Loiterman v. Antani, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7955, *23 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (to avoid dismissal, plaintiff must affirmatively plead defendants' noncompliance with the immunity standards).
165. As discussed infra subsection II(C)(2) and subsection II(C)(2)(b), peer-review litigation under § 1 would be accorded rule-of-reason analysis.
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jective or to show that the objective could have been achieved by
less restrictive means.' 66 In a typical peer-review action without
HCQIA, the plaintiff first alleges that the defendants' adverse action
against his staff privileges creates a prima facie case of unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade. The defendants almost invariably
counter with the evidence that their actions were motivated by a
legitimate business or health-care objective, typically (as in the
HCQIA standards) that the peer reviewers were reasonably
prompted by concerns for patient welfare or improving the delivery
of quality medical care. 16 7 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the peer-review defendants were not acting pursuant to their claimed objective, that is, they were not primarily
prompted by concerns over patient welfare or the quality of medical
care provided at their facility. This burden in a non-HCQIA case is,
for all practical purposes, tantamount to the plaintiff's burden
under HCQIA to rebut the presumption that the defendants complied with the four immunity standards of section 11112(a), specifi166. This allocation of proof burdens has been extensively described by Professor
Areeda. See 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 119, 1502, at 371-72 ("Virtually all courts applying the rule of reason follow these three steps."); see also id. § 1507, at 397. It should be
noted that plaintiff's presentation of a prima facie case under § 1 shifts the burden of
production, not of persuasion, to the defendant to come forward with evidence of a
legitimate objective to rebut the plaintiff's initial showing of the unreasonableness of the
defendant's challenged restraint. Id. § 1511, at 429; see Areeda, The Rule of Reason-A
Catechism on Competition, 55 ANTITRUST LJ. 571, 581-82 (1986) (although plaintiff bears
the burden of showing an unreasonable restraint, the burden of introducing evidence
will constantly shift). The burden of persuasion to demonstrate the unreasonableness of
the restraint remains on plaintiff as part of her case in chief. Id. This result is similar to
that achieved by HCQIA, which places the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to show
that the defendants were not acting for reasonable, health-care quality purposes. See
Bhan v. NME Hosp., 929 F.2d 1404, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4685, *11, 21-22 (4th Cir.
1991) (adopting Professor Areeda's description of the shifting burdens in a non-HCQIA
peer-review case).
167. See, e.g., cases cited infra in notes 244 and 367; see also Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810, 819-22 (1 1th Cir.) (health-care quality raised to defeat inference of conspiracy), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990); Shah v. Memorial Hosp. [Shah 1],
1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 68,199, at 59,327-28 (W.D. Va. 1988) (health-care quality
objective raised to defeat inference of conspiracy). The defendant's health-care quality
objectives can be raised also to rebut a prima facie showing of an unreasonable restraint
of trade, e.g., Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 143-45 (3d Cir.) (health-care quality
objective raised to show reasonableness), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988). Once the
defendants raise a legitimate medical or business objective for their adverse action
against her, the plaintiff must produce direct or circumstantial evidence that "tends to
exclude" the possibility that the defendants were engaged in legitimate conduct. See
supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text. Thus, in a non-HCQIA case, the plaintiff
will have similar burdens of production and persuasion to show that the defendants
were not acting to further their asserted legitimate objective, whether such objective is
raised to defeat an inference of conspiracy or to rebut a showing of unreasonableness.

1991]

MEDICAL PEER REVIEW AND ANTITRUST

cally that they were acting reasonably to further the quality of health
care. 168
Furthermore, the plaintiff's burden on a motion for summary
judgment without HCQIA is discharged with exactly the same kind
and amount of evidence necessary under HCQIA: the plaintiff must
produce sufficient evidence supporting the claim to allow a rational
factfinder to find in her favor. 169 With or without HCQIA, the standard of proof for the plaintiff to prevail at trial is a preponderance of
the evidence.'" 0 Hence, in either case the plaintiff will have to produce enough evidence for the factfinder to conclude that, more
probably than not, the defendants were not acting as claimed (or as
presumed under HCQIA) in the legitimate interests of quality
health care, but were engaged in the unlawful elimination of competition. Thus, HCQIA's express presumption of the reasonableness
of the defendants' conduct, which can be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence, does not as a practical matter change the usual
antitrust presumptions or burdens of proof at all.

168. One possible difference HCQIA may make is to lighten, as a theoretical matter,
the defendants' initial burden of production on the issue of justification for their peerreview action. Without HCQIA, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of an
unreasonable restraint of trade, the defendants have the burden of going forward with
evidence of a legitimate objective. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
Under HCQIA, arguably the defendants need not introduce any evidence to show proof
of compliance with the reasonable-belief immunity standards. But see infra note 315 and
accompanying text. This theoretical difference may have little practical significance at
trial, because assuming the plaintiff has met her burden of production to rebut the presumption (and show an illegitimate purpose behind the defendants' action), the defendants will probably not choose to risk relying on a jury instruction that they have the
benefit of the presumption, but rather will put forward evidence to show compliance
(and hence a proper purpose for their action). See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
169. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
170. It is well settled that a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies in civil
antitrust actions. See Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302, 309-11 (1971);
Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1303 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3241 (1989). As originally drafted, HCQIA's presumption in the defendants' favor applied only to the first immunity provision and could be overcome only by "clear and
convincing evidence." H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 10. Critics objected that this
draft would create a multi-tiered set of presumptions and burdens of proof, would thus
frustrate the purpose of the bill to lessen litigation complexity, see 132 CONG. REC.
H9961 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep. Edwards), and would work an unfairness on plaintiffs. See Hearings on H.R. 5540, supra note 9, at 78, 109, 124. To "simplify
the immunity provisions and make them easier to understand and apply," 132 CONG.
REC. HI 1,590-91 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Rep. Waxman), the drafters
ultimately substituted the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for the clear-andconvincing standard, and applied it uniformly to all four immunity provisions.
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3. The Limited Immunity Provisions.- The immunity provisions of
the Act are very narrow.' 7 What is left after all the exclusions and
limitations is immunity from antitrust damages in any case where:
(1) the defendant peer-review participants acted reasonably to exclude someone from the medical staff on the grounds of professional incompetence or misconduct, where such incompetence or
misconduct affects or could affect the health or welfare of patients, 1 72 (2) prior to excluding a physician, they provided her with
due process protections that were fair and appropriate under the
circumstances,' 7" and (3) the subject of the peer review was an individual physician.' 74 The irony is that antitrust liability would not
attach in such a case in any event, with or without HCQIA.
No court, commentator, or enforcement agency has ever suggested that, in such a case, peer-review participants potentially face
antitrust liability. Courts have consistently held that medical centers
may exclude individual doctors on the basis of lack of professional
competence or unprofessional conduct.' 75 The Sherman Act does
not prevent, as one court put it, "a hospital from discharging a physician that it believes is incompetent regardless of any collateral effect on 'competition.' ",176 On the contrary, the courts 1 77 and
enforcement agencies have emphasized that peer review undertaken
to eliminate medical incompetence is procompetitive rather than anticompetitive and is fully consistent with the goals of the antitrust
laws. As Charles F. Rule, former acting assistant Attorney General
in the Department of Justice, once stated:
Put simply, there is no reason to expect a clash between the
antitrust laws and peer review conducted to eliminate incompetence in the delivery of health care service. Quite to
the contrary, the greatest potential of peer review is its
ability to foster the basic goals of the antitrust laws in the
171. See supra subsection I(C).
172. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11112(a), 11151(9) (1988).
173. See id. § 11112(a)(3).
174. See id. § 11151(9), 11115(c).
175. See Husain v. Helene Fuld Medical Center, 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,905, at
62,859 (D.NJ. 1989); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 820 (1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1060 (1985).
176. Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1372 (W.D. Pa. 1982). See also
65,486, at 68,358 (W.D. Mich.
Williams v. Kleaveland, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1983) ("[Tlhe threat of anti-trust litigation does not require the hospital, acting through
its medical staff and executive committee, to vacate its collective professional judgment
as to the propriety of medical care rendered in the hospital, nor to refrain from acting to
insure that that standard is maintained.").
177. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
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health care industry-the efficient delivery of quality services in a competitive market place."' s
Moreover, recent developments in tort law have imposed an affirmative duty on hospitals and other health-care organizations to
select physicians and monitor their performance according to criteria of medical competence and quality patient care. It would be
highly anomalous for courts to suggest that hospitals which dili-

gently fulfill that tort duty would face potential antitrust charges.
79

The landmark decision of Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital 1
established that a hospital may be found independently negligent
for failing to monitor the performance of a physician on its staff,
even though the physician is an independent contractor and not an
employee.' 80 The court in Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital'8' recognized a duty for hospitals to exercise reasonable care in
the selection of their medical staffs through the granting of staff
privileges.'8 2 It is now well established in tort law that hospitals,
under the theory of corporate negligence, have a direct duty to pa178. Letter from Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States Dept. ofJustice, to Kirk B. Johnson, Esq., American Medical Association (Dec. 2, 1986); see also infra note 276 (quoting letter further).
179. 33 I11.2d 326, 211 N.E. 2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
180. See id. at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258; see also Oehler v. Humana, Inc., 775 P.2d 1271,
1272 (Nev. 1989) (hospital has duty to monitor treatment of patients by nonemployee
physicians with staff privileges under corporate negligence theory of liability); Blanton v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 319 N.C. 372, 377, 354 S.E.2d 455, 458 (1987) (hospital has a duty to monitor on an on-going basis the performance of physicians on its
medical staff); Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 370 Pa. Super. 115, 124, 535 A.2d 1177, 1182
(1988) (hospital may be charged with negligence for failing to supervise the quality of
care or competence of its staff if it has actual or constructive knowledge of procedures
utilized); Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 673 (Wyo. 1988) (hospital has a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising and reviewing the treatment of patients by members
of medical staff, as well as a duty of care in determining whether to extend or continue
staff privileges).
181. 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
182. See id. at 723, 301 N.W.2d at 164; see also Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214
(Fla. 1989) (because it is in a superior position to supervise and monitor physician performance, a hospital has an independent duty to a patient to detect and retain competent physicians seeking staff privileges); Bush v. Dolan, 149 A.D.2d 799, 799, 540
N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1989) (hospital may be liable for breach of duty to a patient by permitting an unqualified physician to exercise staff privileges); Albain v. Flower Hosp., 50
Ohio St. 3d 251, 257-58, 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1045-46 (1990) (hospital has a duty only to
grant and to continue staff privileges of the hospital to competent physicians); Douglas
v. Freeman, 57 Wash. App. 183, 188, 787 P.2d 76, 79 (1990) (hospital owes a nondelegable duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure that only competent physicians are selected as members of hospital medical staff and to intervene in patient treatment if there
is obvious negligence); Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1088 (Wyo. 1987)
(hospital has a duty of reasonable care in the extension and continuation of medical staff
privileges).
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tients to exercise care and independent judgment in evaluating the
competence of their medical staff members, both at the time of initial appointment to the medical staff and on a continuing basis.' 8 3
Because under principles of tort law "[h]ospital administrations ignore physician incompetence at their own risk," ' 4 courts should
not interpret the antitrust laws to mean that hospitals also police
physician incompetence at their own risk.
State statutes and the national hospital accrediting body also
oblige hospitals to engage in peer review. All fifty states have enacted statutes that to some extent provide immunity to those who
participate in medical peer review,"15 and that define the statutory
responsibilities of the peer reviewers.' 8 6 The Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) specifies the
must
peer-review procedures that hospitals in order to be accredited
8 7
follow in the granting and renewal of staff privileges.'
If the common law, state statutes, and accreditation standards
have all created obligations for hospitals to ensure that they grant
and renew staff privileges only to competent doctors, it would be
unthinkable to interpret the antitrust laws to impose liability on parties who fulfill those obligations: Because HCQIA grants immunity
to those who, in effect, are simply fulfilling those duties,' 8 8 it grants
immunity for conduct that would not be actionable under the anti89
trust laws. Thus, insofar as antitrust liability is concerned,
HCQIA's grant of immunity is as meaningful as a hypothetical statutory grant of immunity under tort law to anyone who conducts her183. Insinga, 543 So. 2d at 214 (at least 17 other states have accepted the corporate
negligence doctrine in the context of a hospital's selection and retention of its medical
staff). See generally A. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 565-78 (2d ed. 1988); Hardy, When Doctrines Collide: Corporate Negligence and Respon-

deat Superior when Hospital Employees Fail to Speak Up, 61 TUL. L. REV. 85, 90-105 (1986)
(discussing the doctrine of corporate negligence in cases where a hospital employee fails
to report a private physician's negligence).
184. Williams v. Kleaveland, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,486, at 68,358 (W.D.
Mich. 1983); see also Albain, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 258, 553 N.E.2d at 1045 (where a previously competent physician with staff privileges develops a pattern of incompetence that
the hospital should become aware of through its peer-review process, the hospital must
answer for its retention of the physician).
185. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, A COMPENDIUM OF STATE PEER REVIEW IMMUNITY LAWS vi (1988).
186. See id. at 98-100.
187. SeeJoINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, 1991
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 99-120 (1991).

188. See supra notes 172-174 and accompanying text.
189. The threat of antitrust liability was a primary impetus for enacting HCQIA. See
supra notes 46-48, 75, and accompanying text.
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self as a reasonable person under the circumstances. 90
An illustration of this contention may be found in antitrust litigation where the peer-review plaintiff has prevailed, if only on a preliminary motion. In those cases the plaintiff was prepared to show
an antitrust violation with allegations and supporting evidence that
would overcome one or more of the Act's immunity provisions.
Such evidence, if proven, would have demonstrated or did demonstrate: (1) that economic considerations rather than considerations
of the plaintiff's professional competence or conduct prompted the
peer-review action,' 9 1 (2) that the action lacked fair notice and hearing procedures, 9 2 or (3) that the case involved a non-physician
plaintiff. 193 In each of these cases, HCQIA's immunity would have
been inapplicable, and hence the Act would have provided no more
protection from antitrust liability than was provided without it.
The principal example of this contention is Patrick v. Burget. Dr.
Timothy Patrick was a surgeon in Astoria, Oregon, which had only
one hospital.' 9 4 A private, group medical practice in town, the Astoria Clinic, whose professional members made up a majority of the
medical staff at the hospital, employed him for a year, after which
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (the standard of conduct to
which an actor must conform in order to avoid negligence is that of a reasonable man
under the circumstances).
191. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 98 (1988) (jury found specific intent to
injure or destroy competition); Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810, 821
(11 th Cir.) (summary judgment denied because a factfinder could infer that the defendants intended to enter into an agreement designed to achieve an end not dictated by
legitimate business concerns), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990); Miller v. Indiana
Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 144-45 (3d Cir.) (summary judgment denied because a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether the reason for revoking the plaintiff's privileges was his incompetence or an anticompetitive motivation), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870
(1988); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 815, 820 (3d Cir. 1984) (jury found that
defendants engaged in policy of discrimination against the plaintiff and the plaintiff's
exclusion was not based on competence or qualification), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060
(1985); Shah v. Memorial Hosp. [Shah 1], 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,199, at 59,328
(W.D. Va. 1988) (summary judgment denied where the plaintiff's evidence tended to
exclude the possibility that defendants were acting for procompetitive reasons).
192. See, e.g., Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1988) (evidence
existed of irregularities and possible conflicts of interest in the hearing process as well as
evidence of motivation to destroy the plaintiff as a competitor), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 178
(1988); Jiricko v. Coffeyville Memorial Hosp. Medical Center, 700 F. Supp. 1559, 1561
(D. Kan. 1988) (formal letter of reprimand placed in plaintiff's file without notice to him
or a hearing of any kind).
193. See, e.g., Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988)
(plaintiff was a nurse anesthetist); Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center, 709 F.
Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (plaintiff was a nurse midwife); Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v.
Hibbett, 689 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (plaintiffs were nurse midwives), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990), modified on reh'g, 927 F.2d 904 (1991).
194. 486 U.S. 94, 96 (1988).
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they invited him to become a partner at the clinic. Dr. Patrick declined, and subsequently set up an independent practice that competed with the clinic.'
Thereafter, the clinic physicians engaged in a series of actions
against Dr. Patrick that ultimately led, after peer-review proceedings
at the hospital, to his termination from the medical staff at the hospital.' 9 6 Dr. Patrick filed an antitrust lawsuit against the clinic partners, contending that they had used the hospital's peer-review
proceedings anticompetitively in an unlawful effort to reduce competition from him, rather than out of any legitimate concern for the
quality of his patient care. The jury agreed with Dr. Patrick and
19 7
awarded him $650,000, which the district court then trebled.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit characterized the
clinic partners' conduct as "shabby, unprincipled and unprofessional,"' 9 8 and found substantial evidence that the clinic doctors
had acted in bad faith in the hospital's peer-review process.'" The
court nevertheless reversed the district court's judgment and held
that the peer reviewers were immune from the antitrust laws under
the state-action doctrine. 0°
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Concluding that no state actor in Oregon actively supervised
hospital peer-review decisions, the Court held that the state-action
doctrine did not protect these peer-review activities from antitrust
scrutiny, and reinstated the district court's verdict and treble damage award. 20 '
While the Court found that the peer-review participants in Pat22
rick were subject to antitrust liability before HCQIA was enacted, 0
Congressman Waxman asserted during congressional debates that
they would not have been immunized from antitrust liability even if
195. Id.
196. Id. at 96-97 (defendant physicians consistently refused to have professional dealings with the plaintiff, complained of the plaintiff's medical practices to the State Board
of Medical Examiners, which retracted its letter of reprimand, and despite conflicts of
interest, sat on an ad hoc peer-review committee that voted to recommend termination
of the plaintiff's privileges).
197. Id. at 98.
198. 800 F.2d 1498, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
199. See id.at 1507.

200. See id.
at 1505-1507 (state action doctrine exempts from the antitrust laws actions
taken by the state or by private parties pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy and subject to active supervision by the state).
201. See Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105.
202. See id.at 105 n.8.
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HCQIA had been in effect.2 " This is so because they would not
have been able to meet the reasonable belief and the due process
requirements for immunity. There was evidence not only that the
defendants' purpose was predominately to exclude competition
rather than to promote quality health care, but also that the members of the staff committees reviewing the matter were not sufficiently impartial to qualify for the Act's protection. 2" Ironically,
the physicians who participated in Patrick's peer-review proceedings-the very case that helped to spark the medical profession's
demands for immunity from antitrust scrutiny for participants in
peer review2 0 -would themselves not have been immune from such
scrutiny under the Act.
Congressman Waxman made it clear during the congressional
hearings that "[t]here is one thing [HCQIA] will not do. It will not
shield doctors from liability for what are truly anticompetitive business practices. '"206 "Truly anticompetitive business practices"
would seem by definition to be antitrust violations. The sponsors
thus seem to be saying that the Act provides no immunity for peerreview participants who violate the antitrust laws. If so, then the
implication is inevitable that "immunity" is granted only to peerreview conduct that would not constitute a violation of the antitrust
laws in the first place. Thus, in the context of antitrust litigation,
HCQIA's immunity is so "limited" as to be virtually nonexistent.
C. HCQIA's Reinforcement of TraditionalAntitrust Principles
As argued to this point, certain key provisions of HCQA will
effect no real substantive change in antitrust peer-review litigation.
The Act does, however, implicitly reinforce the application of cer203. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
204. To meet HCQIA's "adequate notice and hearing" requirement, the hearing
must be before a hearing officer and panel of individuals who "are not in direct economic competition with the physician involved." 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b)(3)(A)(ii), (iii)
(1988). Not only were the defendant physicians in direct economic competition with Dr.
Patrick, there was evidence of specific personal bias on the part of at least the hearing
chairman, Dr. Boelling, who had previously instituted an abortive complaint before the
State Board of Medical Examiners against Dr. Patrick. Such evidence would also seem
to disqualify the hearing from meeting the "such other procedures as are fair to the
physician under the circumstances" standard for immunity. Id. § 111 12(a)(3) (1988).
205. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
206. Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 1, at 192; see also 132 CONG. REc. H9959 (daily
ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (Rep. Waxman stated that peer-review decisions "based solely on
competitive considerations other than the ones enumerated in the bill would not qualify
as being based on professional conduct or competence," and hence would not be protected by the Act); supra note 61.
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tain traditional antitrust concepts to peer-review litigation. The Act
provides, either expressly or by implication, that for peer-review litigation involving the professional competence of doctors: (1) the antitrust laws extend to such litigation; 0 7 (2) the rule of reason applies
in such litigation under section 1 of the Sherman Act;2 0 and (3) the
defendants' motive or purpose is a primary determinant of antitrust
° However, except perhaps for the third
liability in such litigation. 209
proposition, none of these was open to significant scholarly orjudicial debate before HCQIA's enactment. Moreover, because these
principles may be derived independently of HCQIA, they apply to
all peer-review litigation, and are not limited (as is HCQIA) to peer
review of physician competence.
1. The Extension of the Antitrust Laws to Medical Peer Review.Over the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has affirmed that the
antitrust laws apply to the health-care industry in general. The
Supreme Court has held that the professions are not exempt from
antitrust liability21 0 and that the activities of health-care providers
like hospitals, which had been thought to be purely local activities,
may affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come within the antitrust ambit. 2 1 In the face of arguments that the health-care market
is sufficiently different from other commercial markets to justify a
relaxation of antitrust scrutiny, the Supreme Court has thus far declined to carve out special exceptions or exemptions from the antitrust laws for the health-care profession.21 2
HCQIA serves to emphasize that, except for the "extremely
limited" 21 3 immunity granted by it, the full reach of the antitrust
laws extends to medical peer review. Expressly providing for a narrow construction of the Act, Congress declared that, except as specifically provided by its terms, the Act did not change other
liabilities and immunities under law, or preempt or override any
state law that gives incentives, immunities, or protections for those
engaged in a professional review action. 14
207. See infra subsection II(C)(1).
208. See infra subsection II(C)(2).
209. See infra subsection II(C)(3).
210. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787-88 (1975).
211. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 739-40 (1976).
212. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-50 (1982) (with
regard to price-fixing agreements, the Sherman Act establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries).
213. See supra notes 51, 53, and accompanying text.
214. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 11115(a) (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1990).
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2. The Application of the Rule of Reason to Peer-Review Actions.While the proposition that the antitrust laws apply to medical peer
review is not controversial, a somewhat more debatable proposition
is that the so-called rule of reason applies to peer-review litigation
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Despite its literal language declaring "every" collective effort to restrain trade illegal,2" 5 section 1
has been interpreted to prohibit only those practices that unreasonably restrain trade.2 1 Under the rule of reason, all of the circumstances surrounding a restrictive practice-industry conditions, the
actual and potential effects of the restraint, the reasons for its adoption-are considered in determining its reasonableness. 21 7 The
central test of the reasonableness of a challenged restraint, and
therefore of its legality, is whether it promotes or suppresses
competition. 1 8
Occasionally, the courts have condemned under section 1 an
entire category of restraints without analyzing on an individual basis
their effects on competition as required under the rule of reason.
Because they are perceived to be plainly anticompetitive, such restraints are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business reason for adopting them.21 9 Restraints that
have been condemned categorically as per se illegal include pricefixing agreements, group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal, divisions of markets, and tying arrangements. 2
. Although commentators have argued that the line between per215. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
216. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-64
(1911).
217. To determine the legality of a restraint:
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be obtained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or
the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret
facts and to predict consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917).
218. See id.
219. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see also National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 103-04 ("Per se rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render
unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct.").
220. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 n.15 (1982).
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se analysis and rule-of-reason analysis is blurred,2 2 ' as a practical
matter plaintiffs usually argue strenuously for, and defendants vigorously contest, the application of the per se rule to any challenged
restraint in an antitrust lawsuit.2 2 2 Peer-review litigation is no exception. As discussed below, defendants have thus far always succeeded in convincing the courts to adopt the rule-of-reason analysis
when peer review of an individual physician's professional competence or conduct was at issue. 22 3 HCQJA implicitly also adopts this
approach.
a. HCQIA's Adoption of the Rule of Reason.-Under the rule of
reason, courts necessarily examine whether the defendants undertook their challenged conduct in order to achieve a legitimate objective. 2 4 Under the traditional per se approach, once a court finds
the challenged restraint to fit within a category of restraints previously condemned as per se unreasonable, the court will condemn
the particular one at issue without analyzing the defendants' claimed
justification for their conduct. 2
HCQIA not only permits an inquiry into the peer-review defendants' purpose behind their action, it also presumes that their
objective was legitimate. 22 6' Although scholars have debated
whether the pursuit of quality health care -should be recognized as a
legitimate objective under the antitrust laws, 227 Congress impliedly
established its legitimacy in the peer review of a doctor's competence or professional conduct by presumptively protecting such activity from antitrust damage liability. Because peer-review litigation
221. Professor Areeda has argued that the distinctions between the per se approach
and the rule of reason are not as sharp as litigants and courts frequently treat them, and
that they may be collapsed into a single inquiry about a restraint's competitive significance with varying presumptions. See 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 119, at 1511; see also
National CollegiateAthletic Ass 'n, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26 ("there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis"). See generally Piraino, Reconciling the Per Se and
Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 So. CAL. L. REV. 685, 688 (per se rule and
rule of reason should be viewed "not as opposite approaches to antitrust analysis but as
related parts of a continuum"), 709-17 (1991).
222. If a per se rule is applied, not only does the plaintiff not have to establish how the
restraint harmed the public or adversely affected competition, but the defendants may
not introduce evidence justifying their conduct. See Koefoot v. American College of Surgeons, 652 F. Supp. 882, 886 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1986). See infra note 229 and accompanying
text.
223. See infra subsection II(C)(2)(b).
224. See 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 119,

1504.

225. See id. 1509, at 409 ("In fullest flower, a per se rule condemns conduct without
proof of power, effect, or purpose and without hearing claims of legitimate objectives.").
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (1988).
227. See infra notes 250-254 and accompanying text.

1991]

MEDICAL PEER REVIEW AND ANTITRUST

361

under HCQIA will closely parallel peer-review litigation under the
rule of reason, 228 HCQIA can be viewed as an endorsement of the
latter approach when peer review of the professional competence of
other medical practitioners is scrutinized under section 1.
b. JudicialAdoption of the Rule of Reason.-In peer-review litigation to date, courts have almost uniformly found the rule of reason
to be the appropriate analytical standard. 2 29 Reasons for rejecting
the per se rule have varied. Sometimes courts have said that they
lack sufficient experience with restraints of trade in the health-care
industry to justify per se condemnation of them. 230 Other courts
have found the per se rule inappropriate because the anticompetitive consequences of defendants' peer-review activities were unclear.2 3 ' Some courts have adopted the rule of reason on the
ground that peer-review activities simply do not fit the classic group
23 2
boycott paradigm.
A primary reason for choosing the rule of reason in peer-review
litigation has been the Supreme Court's dictum in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar,23 3 suggesting that the "public service aspect" of a profes228. See supra notes 162-168 and accompanying text.
229. See Loiterman v. Antani, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7955, (N.D. Ill. 1990) * 18-22
(collecting cases). Two cases are exceptions that tend to prove this general rule. In
Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 820 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985),
the Third Circuit applied the per se rule to a hospital's discriminatory denial of privileges to osteopaths. The court noted that the per se rule was appropriate because the
defendants' defense was simply a flat denial that they discriminated against osteopaths.
Had their defense been, not a denial of their alleged discriminatory conduct, but a justification for it on the grounds either that they were motivated by concerns of the osteopaths' professional competence or conduct, or that they were acting in accordance with
public service or ethical norms of the profession, the court said it would have adopted a
rule of reason approach. In Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center, 709 F. Supp.
1563, 1573 n.4 (M.D. Ga. 1989), although the district court tentatively ruled for purposes of summary judgment that the per se test applied, the court said it would reconsider at trial the appropriateness of charging the jury on the rule of reason in light of the
Supreme Court's admonition in United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 60708 (1972), to accord business relationships per se treatment only after considerable judicial experience with them.
230. See, e.g., Sweeney, 709 F. Supp. at 1573 n.4; Wright v. Southern Mono Hosp. Dist.,
631 F. Supp. 1294, 1322-23 (E.D. Cal. 1986); Everhart v.Jane C. Stormont Hosp., 19821 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,703, at 73,897 (D. Kan. 1982).
231. See, e.g., Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1445 n.1 (9th Cir.
1988) (economic impact of arrangement was not obvious); Goss v. Memorial Hosp. Sys.,
789 F.2d 353, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1986) (defendants' lack of market power made proof of
anticompetitive effects sufficiently uncertain to conclude that the per se rule is not
applicable).
232. See, e.g., McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121, 131-32 (E.D.
Ky. 1982), renanded on other grounds, 738 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1984).
233. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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sion may warrant treating professional conduct differently under the
antitrust laws from ordinary commercial or business activities. 3 4
Relying on Goldfarb, peer-review defendants have typically characterized their purpose in curtailing or eliminating the plaintiff's opportunity for membership on a medical staff as an effort to improve
the quality of health-care services at the institution. Where the defendants have justified their actions in these terms, the lower courts
have consistently found the rule of reason to be the appropriate
standard.23 5
The lower courts' adoption of the rule of reason in staff privileges cases is supported by Supreme Court precedent. Historically
reluctant to condemn the standards of a professional group as unreasonable per se,23 6 the Court has observed that judicial inexperience with a particular restraint cautions against extending the per se
approach. 2 37 Furthermore, like the lower courts, the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to extend per se condemnation to conduct
whose economic impact is not immediately obvious.2 38 In light of a
growing acknowledgement that peer review can be procompetitive, 2 39 the overall economic effects of a given peer-review action
would usually not be immediately apparent.
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed its adherence to the view
expressed in Goldfarb that professional services may differ significantly from other business services. It has observed that when professional conduct involves public service or ethical norms of the
profession, the conduct may serve to regulate and promote competition and thus should be judged under the rule of reason. 240 The
Court has made clear, however, that when the activities of medical
professionals are not different from ordinary commercial activities,
24
the usual per se rule should apply. 1
Peer review is not ordinary commercial activity and has no analog in the daily activities of most commercial enterprises. Although
234. Id. at 788-89 n.17.
235. E.g., Matin v. Citizens Memorial Hosp., 700 F. Supp. 354, 360-61 (S.D. Tex.
1988); Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1368-70 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Everhart, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 73,897; McElhinney, 549 F. Supp. at 133.
236. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986).
237. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1984).
238. See Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458-59.
239. See infra notes 272-279 and accompanying text.
240. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696
(1978).
241. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26 n.42 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-50 (1982).
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peer review can be used to suppress competition, 24 2 its primary purpose-as acknowledged by Congress through HCQIA-is to ensure
quality in the provision of medical services. In light of such a purpose, peer review can fairly be characterized as premised on the
"public service aspect" of the medical profession and hence entitled
to the rule of reason.
Thus, it is likely that the Supreme Court would have judged the
rule of reason to be appropriate in peer-review litigation even
before HCQIA's enactment. Certainly, it should also be the standard for analysis in cases not covered by the Act.
3. Quality of Care As a Legitimate Objective.-The Supreme Court
has stated that a good intention will not save an otherwise objectionable restraint. 243 Nevertheless, some lower courts have expressly
accepted defendant medical professionals' concerns for patient welfare and the quality of medical services as a justification for the application of the rule of reason to their conduct as well as a defense
to liability under the antitrust laws. 24 4 Similarly Congress appears
to have favored an intent-based test for the disposition of peer-review cases involving a physician's staff privileges, for HCQIA estab242. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
243. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917) (quoted
supra note 217); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 n.23 (1984) ("good motives will not validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice").
244. See, e.g., Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1494
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (patient-care motivejustifies the rule of reason); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465, 1481-84 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (recognizing in principle a patient-care defense), aff'd, 895 F.2d 352, 362 (7th Cir.) (observing that although Supreme
Court's decisions "may cast doubt on the patient care defense's continuing vitality,"
appellate court need not revisit this issue because the district court's finding that the
defendant did not satisfy its burden of persuasion under the defense was not clearly
erroneous"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2621 (1990). But see Sweeney v. Athens Regional
Medical Center, 709 F. Supp. 1563, 1575 n.5 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (questioning the validity
of the patient-care defense). Evidence of the defendants' patient-care objectives has
been relevant to two issues in peer-review litigation. Most frequently, such evidence is
used to determine the plausibility of an inference of conspiracy among the defendants.
See, e.g., Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810, 820-22 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990); Shah v. Memorial Hosp. [Shah 1], 1988-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 68,199, at 59,328-329 (W.D. Va. 1988); Drs. Steuer & Latham v. National Medical Enters., 672 F. Supp. 1489, 1517-18 (D.S.C. 1987), aft'd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.
1988); Friedman v. Delaware County Memorial Hosp., 672 F. Supp. 171, 190-91 (E.D.
Pa. 1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 600 (3rd Cir. 1988); Mosby v. American Medical Int'l, 656 F.
Supp. 601, 607 (S.D. Tex. 1987). Evidence of concerns over quality of medical care has
also been used to evaluate the reasonableness of the challenged restraint. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 144-45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988);
Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 789 F.2d 278, 282 n.14 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 972 (1986).
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lishes the peer reviewers' purpose as the litmus test for protection
from antitrust liability.
Under HCQIA, the peer reviewers' "good intention"-that is,
their reasonable belief that they were acting to further quality health
care 24 5 will "save" the restraint, at least to the extent that it ends
the antitrust inquiry in a suit for damages. Because, independently
of HCQIA, peer-review litigation that survived dismissal on some
other ground frequently focused on whether the defendants were
acting out of concerns for quality medical care or out of concerns
for economic self-interest, 2 46 HCQIA's focus on the defendants'
purpose in acting adversely to the plaintiff will, by itself, make little
practical difference in the disposition of this litigation.
Two Supreme Court cases analyzing the antitrust liability of
professionals may, however, have called into question whether peer
reviewers' concern with the quality of patient care is a legitimate
objective and thus a valid defense under the Sherman Act, arguably
making HCQIA's grant of immunity for such peer review necessary.
In National Society of ProfessionalEngineersv. United States2 4 7 and Federal
Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,2 4 the Supreme
Court flatly rejected the arguments of two professional groups that
their conduct did not violate the antitrust laws because their purpose was to promote the quality of their respective professional
services and thereby to protect public health, safety, and welfare.2 49
Moreover, several commentators have criticized the lower
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 111 12(a)(1), (4) (1988); see also supra text accompanying note 52.
246. See, e.g., Bolt, 891 F.2d at 819-22 (evidence of anticompetitive motivation precluded grant of directed verdict); Miller, 843 F.2d. at 144-45 (genuine issue was raised
by the evidence as to whether defendants revoked plaintiff's staff privileges because of
his incompetence or because of anticompetitive motivation); Sweeney, 709 F. Supp. at
1575 (material factual questions exist over whether defendants were motivated by concern for the patients or by a desire to eliminate the plaintiff as a competitor); Nurse
Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 689 F. Supp. 799, 808-09 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (material
issues of fact exist with regard to the defendants' motivations for their conduct), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 918 F.2d 605, (6th Cir. 1990), modified on reh'g, 927 F.2d 904 (1991);
Shah I, 1988-2 Trade Cas. at 59,328-29 (summary judgment denied where disputed evidence existed with regard to the defendants' motive for excluding the plaintiff from the
medical staff).
247. 435 U.S. 679 (1978); see infra notes 261-264 and accompanying text.
248. 476 U.S. 447 (1986); see infra notes 265-267 and accompanying text.
249. In dictum in a third case, Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2
(1984), the Supreme Court also seemed to dismiss as irrelevant the defendant hospital's
asserted quality of care concerns in analyzing the reasonableness of an exclusive contract between the hospital and a group of anesthesiologists: "Thus, we reject the view of
the District Court that the legality of an arrangement of this kind turns on whether it was
adopted for the purpose of improving patient care." Id. at 25, n.41. Contrast id. at 44
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that the exclusive contract, "which has little an-
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courts that have focused on the defendants' purpose or motive in
order to determine whether they have violated the antitrust laws.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that civil liability
under section 1 may be established by proof of either an unlawful
purpose or an anticompetitive effect,2 5 ° courts and commentators
have suggested that the competitive effects of the challenged activity
should be the primary measure of reasonableness, and that an inquiry into the actors' purpose is secondarily important and useful
only to assess the likely competitive effects of the activity. 25 ' Thus,
the lower courts' focus on the defendants' state of mind has been
challenged as inconsistent with the proper antitrust focus on the effects of their conduct on competition.2 5 2
Even if some purpose-based inquiry is conceded to be appropriate, some commentators have argued that the defendants' claim
to be ensuring or promoting patient welfare and the quality of professional services at their institution could not alone legitimate their
conduct under the antitrust laws. 253 Finally, the defendants' motives or intent have been viewed as so difficult to ascertain that anti254
trust liability should not be made to depend upon it.
ticompetitive effect and achieves substantial benefits in the provision of care to patients,
is hardly one that the antitrust law should condemn.").
250. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 242-43 (1980).
251. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103-104 (1984); Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology,
735 F.2d 1479, 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (defendant's intent, no matter how genuinely
held, is not the determinative factor in an analysis under the rule of reason; the effects of
a boycott are not necessarily dependent on the purpose of the boycott); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 225 (7th Cir. 1983) ("effect or consequence... controls, not intent or motive"); see also 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 119,
1506, at 390-92.
252. See Greaney, Quality of Care and Market FailureDefenses in Antitrust Health Care Litigation, 21 CONN. L. REV. 605, 614 (1989) (proper focus of antitrust attention is on effects,
not purposes); Havighurst, supra note 78, at 1167 (rule of reason analysis should focus
on identifying the net harm to competition and "should reject worthy-purposes defenses
when such harm is found"); Miles & Philp, supra note 13, at 521-22 (urging a focus on
competitive effects). Other commentators have stressed the importance of a purposebased inquiry in antitrust analysis. See, e.g., Kissam, supra note 83, at 1187-89; Kissam,
Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 660-63 (1982); Wirtz, Purposeand Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies, 57 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5, 8-16 (1981).
253. See Areeda, supra note 166, at 577-78 (noting that the Supreme Court in Indiana
Dentists rejected the purpose of improving patient care as illegitimate); Greaney, supra
note 252, at 608-13 (arguing that the Supreme Court has rejected quality-based justifications in antitrust analysis); Kissam, supra note 83, at 1215-16 (patient-care defense is
inconsistent with ProfessionalEngineers' mandate to analyze challenged restraints solely by

their competitive impact).
254. See Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338-39

(7th Cir. 1986) (Judge Easterbrook has questioned the utility of trying to determine
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This section contends that peer reviewers' reasonable concerns
with patient welfare and the quality of medical services provided at
their institutions are legitimate objectives under the antitrust laws,
and that HCQIA was not necessary to establish them as such. The
lower courts' acceptance of these concerns both as a justification for
employing the rule of reason and as a defense to liability can be
justified on either of two grounds. First, the pursuit of quality
medical services through the peer-review process is a legitimate antitrust objective in its own right.2 5 Second, the peer reviewers' actions are necessary to make the market for medical services more
25 6
competitive.
a. Quality of Care as a Legitimate Objective in Its Own Right.Courts have recognized that ensuring the safety of a product or service can be a legitimate justification for certain restraints, provided
that the restraints are reasonably ancillary to a main purpose of protecting the public from harm or avoiding liability.2 5 7 Peer review is
this sort of conduct. While the effect of an adverse peer-review action is to eliminate a competitor by preventing that physician from
practicing at the institution, 25' it is typically ancillary to the hospital's main purpose of protecting the public from inferior medical
care or protecting itself from liability under the corporate negligence doctrine.
These purposes should be viewed as legitimate objectives
under the antitrust laws because they are prompted by legal and
professional duties imposed on institutional providers. As discussed earlier, a hospital must engage in peer review not only to
maintain its accreditation from theJCAHO, but also to discharge its
obligations under state statutes and tort law to ensure the professional competence of its medical staff. 5 9 Hospitals would be put in
anticompetitive intent); Havighurst, supra note 78, at 1155 (anticompetitive intent raises
subjective issues incapable of definitive proof).
255. See infra subsection II(C)(3)(a). See generally Ross, The Traditional Rule of Reason
Analysis and the Importance of a Quality Defense in Health Care Cases, in ABA, ArrIRusT IsSUES IN HELTH CARE tab D (Oct. 1990) (reviewing Supreme Court cases and concluding
that whether a quality defense exists in health care antitrust cases is unresolved).
256. See infra subsection II(C)(3)(b).
257. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696
n.22 (1978); see also 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 119, at 369, 383-89.
258. The elimination of a competitor is not necessarily an unreasonable suppression
of competition. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (antitrust laws were enacted for "the protection of competition, not competitors") (emphasis in

original).
259. See supra notes 179-187 and accompanying text.
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an untenable position if, on the one hand, state common law or statutes required them to engage in conduct for the purpose of ensuring quality of care and promoting patient welfare on their premises,
and yet on the other hand, the antitrust laws were interpreted to
make such a purpose not sufficiently legitimate to avoid antitrust
liability. Inasmuch as section 1 prohibits only "unreasonable" restraints of trade, an objective that is mandated by law should not be
deemed irrelevant to the assessment of reasonableness. 2 6°
Nevertheless, language in Supreme Court precedent might
seem to imply such an anomalous result. Properly analyzed, however, these cases do not preclude the conclusion that concerns for
patient welfare effectuated through peer review are legitimate objectives under antitrust laws.
National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States involved a
canon of a professional engineering association that prohibited its
members from soliciting or submitting engineering proposals on
the basis of competitive bidding. 26 ' The Supreme Court upheld the
lower courts' invalidation of the canon as unlawful on its face. The
Court flatly rejected, as inconsistent with the Sherman Act, the Society's defense that the restraint was justified because competitive bidding "would lead to deceptively low bids, and would thereby tempt
individual engineers to do inferior work with consequent risk to
public safety and health. '2 62 Characterizing this defense as "nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman
Act, ' 12 6 the Court found the defendants' appeals to promoting the
public interest to be irrelevant. It declared that the focus of antitrust analysis was on the challenged restraint's impact on competition, not on its claims to promoting the public interest despite its
adverse effects on competition. 2€
260. Noneconomic justifications for challenged restraints have been urged as legitimate. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 134-35 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (legitimate noneconomic goals
should not be ignored); NationalSoc'y of ProfessionalEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 699-701, (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("there may be ethical rules which have a more than de minimus
anticompetitive effect and yet are important in a profession's proper ordering"); Wilk v.
American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 227 (7th Cir. 1983) (value independent of values
attributed to unrestrained competition must enter the rule of reason analysis in the context of patient care). But see 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 119, 1504, at 381 (noting the
Supreme Court's hostility to noncompetitive justifications).
261. See 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
262. Id. at 693 (footnote omitted).
263. Id. at 695.
264. See id. ("Exceptions to the Sherman Act for potentially dangerous goods and
services would be tantamount to a repeal of the statute.").
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The Supreme Court was equally unsympathetic to similar quality-protection and public interest arguments made by the dental
profession in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federationof Dentists.
At issue was the lawfulness of a "work rule" promulgated by an association of dentists.2 6 5 The rule prohibited member dentists from
submitting x-rays to dental insurance companies along with claim
forms. As had the engineers, the dentists defended their rule in
terms of ensuring the quality of their professional services: providing x-rays to insurers might lead insurers to determine inaccurately
proper levels of dental care, and thus injure the health of
patients. 26
The Supreme Court made short work of this defense. Drawing
an analogy between the withholding of x-ray information in this case
and the withholding of price information in ProfessionalEngineers, the
Court rejected as another "frontal assault" on the Sherman Act the
argument that giving to consumers (or insurers acting on their behalf) information they deemed relevant would lead consumers to
make unwise or dangerous choices. The Court reasoned that because it had found that noncompetitive, quality-of-service arguments did not justify the denial of information in the market for
engineering services, it would find equally unavailing similar justifications for the suppression of information in the dental services
market.2 6 7
If the engineers' claim of promoting the public's health and
safety by protecting it from deceit and inferior engineering work
was an illegitimate defense under antitrust law, why should the
Sherman Act countenance the claim of medical professionals that
their peer-review actions, which hamper or destroy a doctor's ability
to practice her profession, are legitimate because they promote patient welfare or improve the quality of health care? How can the
Court's rejection of the dentists' noncompetitive, quality-of-service
justifications be reconciled with acceptance of peer reviewers' claim
of promoting the quality of medical care? Why is it not equally a
"frontal assault" on the basic policy of the Sherman Act to argue
that peer review is not an unreasonable restraint because it eliminates inferior medical practice and therefore promotes the public
interest?
These two Supreme Court cases can be distinguished from the
265. See 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
266. See id. at 452, 462-63.
267. See id. at 463.
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typical peer-review case on several grounds. First, the engineers'
ethical canon and the dentists' "work rule" were not legally mandated, as is peer review. No affirmative public policy or positive law
required the engineers or dentists to engage in their respective challenged activities. Unlike peer review, which discharges specific affirmative legal obligations, the dentists' work rule and engineers'
canon were promulgated out of more vague, generalized concern
for public welfare.2 6 Second, both the engineers and the dentists
engaged in withholding information about their services from consumers (or from insurers who were acting on behalf of consumers).
As opposed to suppressing information, peer review actively generates information about the service provided by medical practitioners
to consumers. Although such information might not be given directly to patients, it is provided to those who purport to act on their
behalf, such as institutional providers and state medical review
boards. Increasing information in the marketplace is a well-recognized, legitimate objective under the antitrust laws. 269
Finally, in Indiana Dentists and Professional Engineers, there was a
weak nexus between the alleged ends sought to be achieved (ensuring quality) and the means chosen (suppression of information) for
achieving those ends. 270 The engineers claimed that suppressing
price information was a means to prevent price-cutting in order to
promote quality engineering work. The dentists argued that suppressing x-ray information was a means to prevent consumers' misuse of the information in order to promote quality dental services.
Not only is the nexus weak between ends and means, but the linking
activities in both cases are favored activities under the antitrust laws:
both the lowering of prices (as in ProfessionalEngineers) and the use of
information by consumers as they see fit (as in Indiana Dentists) are
activities classically viewed as facilitating or promoting competition.2 7 ' By contrast, peer review directly achieves its goals of pro268. See Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 228 (7th Cir. 1983) ("generalized concern for public health, safety, and welfare... affords no legal justification for
economic measures to diminish competition"); Areeda, supra note 166, at 579-80
(Supreme Court has rejected generalized claims that a restraint serves the public
interest).
269. See infra notes 274-275 and accompanying text.
270. Indeed, the nexus was so tenuous in each case as possibly to give rise to a suspicion that the claimed justifications were not the true ones.
271. See Havighurst, supra note 78, at 1157-60. See also Kreuzer v. American Academy
of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (where the rational nexus between a professional rule and public protection is close, courts are more willing to uphold the challenged restraint of the profession). Professor Areeda has suggested that
the "dentists cloaked their restraint with the garb of improving patient care. The Court
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moting quality medical care by reviewing the actual services of
medical practitioners so that hospitals and state medical review
boards can take steps to prevent incompetent or unprofessional
practitioners from providing those services.
b. EnsuringQuality of Care as Improving Competition.-Even if peer
review's claim to promoting patient welfare or the quality of medical
care is not viewed as a legitimate objective in its own right under the
antitrust laws, on the ground that it is tantamount to the generalized
public interest claims that were rejected in ProfessionalEngineers and
Indiana Dentists, peer review's goals may be recognized as legitimate
if they are cast, not in terms of promoting the public interest, but
rather in terms of promoting competition.
Peer review can be argued to promote competition because by
correcting a market failure, peer review improves the efficiency of
the health-care marketplace.2 7 While competition among sellers of
then rejected that purpose as illegitimate, stripping away the "cloak" and leaving a "naked restraint." Areeda, supra note 166, at 578. This author believes the Court's rejection of a patient-care concern in Indiana Dentists is best explained as a skepticism about
the sincerity of the concern, that is, a recognition of the weak nexus between the dentists' claimed goals and their chosen means, rather than as a general condemnation of
patient-care concerns for all cases. See Indiana Dentists, 476 U.S. at 464 ("even if concern
for the quality of patient care could under some circumstances serve as a justification for
a restraint of the sort imposed here, the evidence did not support a finding that the
careful use of x rays as a basis for evaluating insurance claims is in fact destructive of
proper standards of dental care"). Along this same line, Professor Areeda has argued
that despite the Court's hostility in ProfessionalEngineers to public safety justifications, he
doubts that the Court meant to condemn a restraint that actually saves lives. See 7 P.
AREEDA, supra note 119,
1504, at 381.
272. See Main v. Citizens Memorial Hosp., 700 F. Supp. 354, 361 (S.D. Tex. 1988)
("restricting staff privileges to doctors who maintain a basic level of medical competence
is ultimately pro-competitive not anti-competitive"); Friedman v. Delaware County Memorial Hosp., 672 F. Supp. 171, 190 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (exclusion of a doctor who refuses
to follow established procedures to protect patients from unnecessary surgery is
procompetitive); Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 617 F. Supp. 1226, 1239 (D.C. Del. 1985)
("peer review process is arguably procompetitive, for by monitoring the qualifications
and performance of physicians it may compensate for the relative lack of information
about these matters by consumers."). Professor Areeda has advanced the argument that
"many claims of redeeming virtue expressed by laymen in 'public interest' terms can be
reformulated in terms of promoting competition," and that rather than suppressing
competition, actions that offset a "market failure" can promote competition. See 7 P.
AREEDA, supra note 119, at 383. Professor Havighurst has advanced a similar argument
in the context of profession-sponsored peer review:
Indeed, it can be argued that if the law does no more than make allowance for
the reality that markets are imperfect, it leaves the underlying paradigm of
competition unchallenged. Unlike the public-safety claims offered in [Professional Engineers], a narrow market-failure defense for an agreement to adhere to
a profession's official practice standards might escape being characterized as "a
frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act."
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a given service or product is traditionally thought to bring about the
273
best mix of price, output, and quality for that service or product,

several factors prevent the health-care market from achieving this
competitive ideal. Among the factors that have been identified as

impeding the free operation of market mechanisms in the healthcare industry is the consumers' lack of information about the cost
and quality of medical services. 274 Peer review serves to correct this
market imperfection by generating information about the quality of
medical care provided by individual practitioners. 275 In addition, it
is procompetitive to the extent that it improves the quality of medical services by preventing incompetent or unprofessional doctors
from providing them.2 7 6
This analysis is bolstered by HCQIA itself, for its legislative history is a lengthy testimony to the overwhelming failure of the
health-care marketplace to eliminate bad quality medical care.2 77 In
its findings, Congress bluntly identified this market failure as the
"increasing occurrence of medical malpractice, ' ' 2 78 which "can be
remedied through effective professional peer review. '"279 Thus,
Congress itself has acknowledged the competitive imperfections of
the health-care marketplace as well as the procompetitive benefits
that good-faith peer review can provide to offset these imperfections. Concerned that the threat of antitrust litigation would chill
desirable competitive conduct in the form of good-faith peer review,
Congress legislatively declared it to be protected conduct under the
antitrust laws. In effect, HCQIA reflects a legislative judgment that
Havighurst, supra note 78, at 1143 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, Professor Greaney has

expanded on the view that peer review corrects market failure. See Greaney, supra note
252, at 627-49. While some courts have adopted this approach, e.g., Kremer, 735 F.2d at
1491-92, other courts have rejected it, e.g., Koefoot v. American College of Surgeons,
1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,509, at 60,151 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("An argument that im-

proving patient care is patently procompetitive is nothing more than a reformulation of
the defendants' argument that their conduct is justified because it is motivated by a gen-

eral concern for patient welfare.").
273. See Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695 ("The Sherman Act reflects a legislative
judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better
goods and services.").

274. See Greaney, supra note 252, at 633-35.
275. See Havighurst, supra note 78, at 1157-60, 1168.
276. See Letter from Charles F. Rule, supra note 178 (although denial of privileges to
an incompetent practitioner may make it difficult or impossible for him to practice his
profession, "such a denial does not impair competition. Rather, because the denial will
enhance the quality and efficiency of health care and thereby strengthen the hospital's
competitive position, peer review serves the underlying goals of the antitrust laws.").
277. See supra notes 24-35, 42-45, and accompanying text.
278. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1) (1988).
279. Id. § 11101(3).
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effective peer review helps to eliminate medical malpractice and
hence to improve the functioning of the health-care marketplace.
By choosing to test the facial legitimacy of a peer-review action
in terms of the purposes for which it was undertaken, Congress approved the way most lower courts have approached peer review
under the antitrust laws. Even before HCQIA's enactment, in staff
privileges cases that survived summary judgment, the reasons why
the defendants denied or revoked the plaintiff's privileges were critical to the outcome. This approach was justified either because improving the quality of medical care and promoting patient welfare
are legitimate objectives in their own rights under the antitrust laws,
or because improving the quality of health-care delivery by preventing incompetent or unprofessional doctors from practicing improves competition in the health-care market.
III.

PEER-REVIEW LITIGATION ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
WITH OR WITHOUT

HCQIA

Thus far, this Article has contended that the rules for establishing antitrust liability of defendants in a peer-review lawsuit are virtually unchanged by HCQIA as a matter of substantive law. Although
an avowed purpose of the drafters was to provide limited immunity
from antitrust liability, the Act appears to immunize only conduct
that would not be actionable under the antitrust laws in the first
place. 28 0 Moreover, the cost-shifting and presumption provisions
effect no practical difference in the procedural handling of these
lawsuits, 2 8 ' and therefore provide little of the promised disincentives to initiating suit.
What then, if anything, does HCQIA do? One final goal espoused by the drafters was that the Act would expedite the disposition of peer-review litigation.28 2 Even if the Act did not provide any
new protection from ultimate liability in otherwise meritorious
cases, it would be an affirmative change if it provided new protection from lengthy and costly litigation in nonmeritorious ones. Because defendants won the vast majority of peer-review cases prior to
280. See supra subsection II(B)(3).
281. See supra subsections II(B)(I), (2).
282. See H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 12 (noting Committee's intention to
"allow defendants to file motions to resolve the issue of immunity in as expeditious a
manner as possible"); 132 CONG. REC. H9959 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (emphasizing
"the importance of resolving the issue of immunity in as expeditious a manner as
possible").
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HCQIA,28 the so-called chilling effect of peer-review litigation may
be due less to the perceived risk that defendants will ultimately lose
the case and incur treble damages than to the perceived risk that
even if they win they will have undergone pointless, expensive, and
time-consuming litigation. Indeed, the legislative history reveals
were as signifithat concerns over the threat of protracted litigation
284
liability.
actual
of
threat
the
over
cant as those
Had it not been for a recent trilogy of cases from the Supreme
Court, 28 5 HCQIA might have made a difference in the procedural
handling of peer-review litigation at the summary judgment stage.
Traditionally courts considered the ascertainment of a party's state
of mind to be a factual question properly within the province of the
jury and hence inappropriate for summary disposition.2 8 6 HCQIA
made the defendants' purpose dispositive, and thus arguably, the
Act could have been interpreted to give judges new license to assess
on a motion for summary judgment evidence of the legitimacy of
the peer-review defendants' asserted purpose, thereby avoiding, if
the issue were resolved in the defendants' favor, both judicial conissues typically raised for summary
sideration of a multitude of other
28 7
trial.
a
as
well
as
disposition
The trilogy of Supreme Court cases has independently accomplished this same result. Part III discusses how the inquiry into the
defendants' purpose should be handled on a motion for summary
judgment both under HCQIA and independently of the Act. Because nearly all peer-review litigation has been disposed of at the
summary judgment stage in the defendants' favor, a careful analysis
of summary judgment principles in the context of this litigation is
critical. Part III concludes that inquiry into the defendants' purpose
should be handled the same way with HCQIA as without it.
A.

A Perspective on Summary Judgment

One approaches the topic of summary judgment with consider283. See supra note 77 and infra note 452, and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 36.
285. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986).
286. The leading case is Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473
(1962) ("summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation
where motive and intent play leading roles"). See also 10A C. WRIGTrr, A. MILLER & M.
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2730 (2d ed. 1983) (summary judgment
often is inappropriate to resolve the issue of a party's state of mind).
287. See infra note 452 and accompanying text.
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able trepidation. The general rule is easy to state. Rule 56 provides
that summary judgment shall be granted if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact." 2 ' From there, interpretation of the
rule is characterized by ambiguous principles and judicial inconsistency, and the field is fraught with criticism, disagreement, and
2 89
frustration.
Prior to the trilogy, conventional wisdom under Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System 29 0 dictated that summary judgment procedures should be used "sparingly" 29 t in antitrust litigation, and more
generally that summary judgment should not be granted if there was
the "slightest doubt ' 2 9 2 as to the facts. Critics challenged this pretrilogy conventional wisdom, arguing against the talismanic invocations of caution 29" and pointing out that lower courts did not uniformly practice the judicial hesitancy Poller preached.2 94
288. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
289. See, e.g., Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEo. LJ. 1065, 1110 (1986) ("Buried within
the unpretentious words of [Rule 56] lie some of the most troublesome issues in the
law"); Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in, Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770, 781-82 (1988) (courts "have found it awkward to
articulate a specific positive standard for sufficiency" of the nonmoving party's showing
that the dispute is genuine); Harmon & Fore, SummaryJudgment in Complex Antitrust Cases,
31 So. TEx. L. REV. 381, 392 (1990) ("there are no standards for determining genuineness of issues or materiality of facts"); Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A
SummaryJudgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to SummayJudgment, 54 BROOK.YN L.
REV. 35, 38 n. 17 (1988) (discussing the indeterminacy of summary judgment tests).
290. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
291. Id. at 473; see C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 286, § 2732.1, at 313
(antitrust cases are "by their very nature poorly suited for disposition by summary
judgment").
292. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Childress, A New
Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987) (observing that the "Fifth Circuit has traditionally been seen as so quick to reverse grants
[of summary judgment] that one district judge in New Orleans posted the sign, 'No
Spitting, No Summary Judgments' "); Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's
Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 95, 140-41 (1988) (discussing the Second Circuit's "slightest doubt" test).
293. See, e.g., Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A CriticalAnalysis, 83 YALE L.J.
745, 746 (1974) (most decisions "simply draw from the available cliches, which are selected in classic cut-and-paste style to support whatever result the court feels is proper.
In reality most judges are simply muddling through and denying the motion whenever
they are in doubt."); Schwarzer, supra note 148, at 466-67 (rule 56 "has become encumbered with an impressionistic and dogmatic overlay that obstructs sound analysis....
Discussions of summary judgment generally consist of formalistic rhetoric and often reflect a hostility toward summary procedures .. ");Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in the SummaryJudgment Context: A Better Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 774, 787-88 (1983)
(criticizing "talismanic" invocation of Poller).
294. See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 289, at 1067, 1104, 1120 (noting assault on Poller);
Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional Defamation Cases,
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The trilogy appeared to reject the conventional wisdom. Without reference to Poller, the Supreme Court in Matstuhita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. stated that there must be more than
"some metaphysical doubt"2'9 5 as to facts to defeat a summary judgment motion. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,29 the Court found
that if the evidence is "merely colorable" or is "not significantly
probative,"2'9 7 summary judgment may be granted; the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" would not defeat the motion. 298 In
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,29 the Supreme Court declared that summary
judgment procedure was not a disfavored procedural shortcut in
federal litigation.3 0 0 Given that each case in the trilogy was a 5-4
decision, it should come as no surprise that some of the jurists
themselves3 0 ' and numerous commentators3 0 2 have found little improvement since the trilogy in the state of summary judgment jurisprudence. One commentator has lamented that there has been no
replacement of the underlying legal doctrines since Poller's restrictive approach to summary judgment; rather, the courts "have simply
developed a set of countervailing cliches in support of granting the
motion.13 0 3 Even if the trilogy has failed to bring needed clarification to the law itself, most agree that it has created a judicial atmos-

57 S. CAL. L. REV. 707, 709-11 (1984) (observing that courts increasingly granted summary judgment in apparent violation of traditional doctrine); Note, No More Litigation
Gambles: Toward a New Summaty Judgment, 28 B.C.L. REV. 747, 754-55 (1988).
295. 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
296. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
297. Id. at 249-50.
298. Id. at 252.
299. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
300. See id.at 327.
301. See id. at 257-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Court's analysis "is deeply flawed, and
rests on a shaky foundation of unconnected and unsupported observations, assertions,
and conclusions"); id. at 269 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Court "contents itself with abstractions and paraphrases of abstractions, so that its opinion sounds much like a treatise about cooking by someone who has never cooked before and has no intention of
starting now"); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 599 (White, J., dissenting) (complaining of the
Court's "confusing and inconsistent statements about the appropriate standard for
granting summary judgment").
302. See, e.g., Mullenix, Summary Judgment: Taming the Beast of Burdens, 37 DEFENSE LJ.
529, 533, 546, 556 (1988) (criticizing the trilogy for making summary judgment procedures less clear and more inefficient). A couple of commentators have felt the need to
create charts just to follow the Court's summary judgment pronouncements. See, e.g., id.
at 561-62; Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: SummaryJudgment After Celotex, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 53, 84 (1988).
303. Louis, Intercepting and DiscouragingDoubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of
Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
67 N.C.L. REV. 1023, 1042 (1989).
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phere more conducive to the granting of summary judgment.3 °
B.

Guidelinesfor Summary Judgment in Peer-Review Cases

Each case in the trilogy addressed the general question of how,
on a motion for summary judgment, a court determines whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists requiring trial. Analysis of this
question involves two steps.3 0 5 First, the court must determine
whether the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production to show the lack of a genuine dispute. Celotex was primarily concerned with this question. 0 6 Second, assuming the movant meets
this burden, the burden now shifts to the nonmoving party, and the
court must determine whether the nonmovant has satisfied its burden to come forward with evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue.3 0 7 Matsushita and Liberty Lobby were primarily concerned
with this question.
While this two-step analysis applies to every issue that can be
raised on summary judgment, this section limits its analysis to the
peer-review plaintiff's burden on summary judgment on the issue of
whether the defendants conspired or engaged in concerted action
(without HCQIA) and the issue of whether the defendants qualify
for immunity (with HCQIA). These issues are largely the same because they both raise the problem of ascertaining the defendants'
purpose in acting adversely to the plaintiff. HCQJA makes the peer
reviewers' purpose dispositive for immunity, and cases not under
HCQJA have focused on evidence of the defendants' purpose in determining whether a conspiracy could reasonably be inferred by the
factfinder. In cases not under HCQIA, plaintiffs have avoided summary judgment or a directed verdict on the conspiracy issue by
showing a genuine dispute as to the peer reviewers' purpose.3 08 As
304. See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 289, at 1119; Friedenthal, supra note 289, at 771, 787;
Harmon & Fore, supra note 289, at 382, 388-91, 395; Note, Summary Judgment in Federal
Court: New Maxims for a FamiliarRule, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 213 n.99, 218 n.125
(1989) (most libel and antitrust cases since the trilogy have resulted in summary judgment for defendants).
305. See Louis, supra note 303, at 1044 n.147.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See, e.g., Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810, 821-23 (1 1th Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990); Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440,
1450-51 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding jury verdict); Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical
Center, 709 F. Supp. 1563, 1571-73 (M.D. Ga. 1989); Shah v. Memorial Hosp. [Shah 1],
1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,199, at 59,328-29 (W.D. Va. 1988). Cf. Miller v. Indiana
Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 144-45 (3d Cir.) (considering defendants' purpose in connection
with the reasonableness of their action), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).

1991]

MEDICAL PEER REVIEW AND ANTITRUST

377

discussed below, virtually the same showing will have to be made
309
'
under HCQIA for the plaintiff to avoid summary judgment.
Stated another way, the same evidence can be used to avoid
summary judgment in non-HCQIA cases as in cases under the Act,
because evidence that in non-HCQIA cases successfully establishes
a genuine issue over the fact of a conspiracy would also successfully
create a genuine issue over whether the reasonable-belief immunity
standards were met. Understanding how these cases should be handled both under HCQIA and without it remains important, for peerreview cases will continue to arise in which the defendants might not
qualify for immunity under HCQIA,31 0 and yet they could still rely
on their claim of a legitimate purpose to avoid antitrust liability.
1. The Moving Party'sBurden.-In a peer-review case not under
HCQIA, Celotex has made the burden on the parties moving for summary judgment (assumed throughout to be the defendant peer reviewers) relatively light. They may satisfy their initial burden of
production to show a genuine issue of material fact in one of two
ways: first, by simply pointing out an absence in the discovery record of any evidence that supports one or more of the elements of
the plaintiff's prima facie case, or second, by presenting affirmative
evidence that disproves or negates one or more of the elements of
the plaintiff's claim.3 1 ' If they choose the second alternative, their
burden may be satisfied by offering evidence of a legitimate objec309. See infra notes 318-322 and accompanying text. To the extent that there is any
difference between the two showings, arguably less may be required to demonstrate a
genuine issue over whether defendants complied with the immunity standards than to
demonstrate a genuine issue over whether the defendants engaged in an unlawful conspiracy. To rebut the immunity claim under HCQIA, the plaintiff should be able simply
to offer evidence that negates the defendants' assertion (or presumption) of compliance.
Rebuttal evidence that raises defendants' bias, untruthfulness, or lack of credibility
ought to suffice to create a genuine issue over whether the immunity standards were
met. However, such evidence may not suffice to create a genuine issue over whether the
defendants conspired. Plaintiff must offer some evidence, direct or circumstantial, that
affirmatively supports a finding of conspiracy, and cannot simply rely on impeaching the
defendants' denials of conspiracy. See infra notes 332-333 and accompanying text. What
this means is, to the extent HCQIA may permit a different level of proof for plaintiff to
avoid summary judgment on the issue of immunity, it arguably provides an evidentiary
threshold that is lower than is required of the plaintiff on the issue of conspiracy. Thus,
the Act does not increase the potential for expediting review of this litigation.
310. For example, the peer reviewers' claim for immunity may fail because the plaintiff is not a physician, because the action does not concern the plaintiff's competence or
professional conduct, or because the defendants failed to provide appropriate due process procedures. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
311. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-255 (1986). See also id. at 331-32
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing two alternatives).
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tive for their action."1 2 If they have met their burden in this second
fashion, the burden of production now shifts to the plaintiff to show
a genuine dispute over the peer reviewers' true objectives, although
the burden of persuasion on whether a genuine dispute exists remains on the moving parties. 3 3
In a case to which HCQIA may apply, the moving parties may
satisfy their initial burden of production in similar ways. Under the
first alternative described above, the movants may, under Celotex and
without even raising HCQIA, simply point out an absence of evidence to support one or more of the elements of the plaintiff's
prima facie case. Under the second alternative, the movants may
raise the immunity provision of HCQIA and obtain the statutory
presumption that, in acting adversely to the plaintiff, they were acting reasonably in the pursuit of quality health care, which is tantamount in a non-HCQIA case to offering evidence of a legitimate
objective."1 4 Whether the movants must offer affirmative evidence
on a motion for summary judgment to support the presumption that
they were so acting, or whether they may simply rely on the statute's
presumption that they were, is an open question. 1 5 If they must
come forward with some affirmative supporting evidence of their
reasonable health-care quality concerns, their burden would seem
to be no heavier than in a non-HCQIA case to establish a legitimate
312. Typically, this legitimate objective relates to health-care concerns. See supra
notes 166-167 and accompanying text. The peer reviewers may also choose to negate
any one of several elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case. For example, they may
satisfy their production burden by offering a sworn affidavit denying the plaintiff's allegation of conspiracy. See Louis, supra note 293, at 755.
313. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (movant has burden of showing no genuine issue of fact).
314. See infra notes 321-322 and accompanying text.
315. An argument that the defendant peer reviewers need not come forward at the
summary judgment stage with any evidence that supports proof of their compliance with
the immunity standards is that, as a general proposition, the effect of a rebuttable presumption is to relieve the party with the benefit of the presumption from having to introduce evidence on the presumed facts. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 157,
§ 5122, at 563 (effect of presumption is to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of producing
evidence on presumed fact); G. SHREVE & P. RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE (1989) § 86, at 350 ("rebuttable presumption thus operates to satisfy the proponent's burden of production"). An argument that, despite the statutory presumption of
compliance, the peer reviewers must nevertheless offer some evidence of compliance at
the summary judgment stage is that, as a general matter, rule 56 imposes the initial and
ultimate burden on the moving party to show the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, even as to those issues on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See supra note 313 and accompanying text; Louis, supra note 303, at 1045
nn. 150-151 (proposition that if moving party will not face burden of proof at trial, then
moving party should not face any burden of production on summary judgment, "has
been uniformly rejected by the federal courts").
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objective. If they need not offer such affirmative evidence at the
summary judgment stage, then the burden of production will shift
automatically to the plaintiff to show a genuine dispute over the
peer reviewers' true reasons for acting adversely to the plaintiff.
Thus, HCQIA makes either no difference to the movants' burden of production on a summary judgment motion, or at most it
arguably makes a mild difference by relieving the peer reviewers of
an obligation to offer some evidence at the summary judgment stage
that they were acting in the reasonable belief that they were furthering health-care quality. Because as a practical matter the peer reviewers will want to offer evidence on this issue in any event s16 this
arguable technical difference in procedural burdens will probably
make little practical difference in the resolution of summary judgment motions in peer-review disputes under the antitrust laws.
2. The Nonmoving Party's Burden Under HCQIA.-HCQIA does
not specify, on a motion for summary judgment, what procedural
effect is to be given the statutory presumption that defendants acted
in accordance with the four immunity standards of subsection
11112(a). Specifically, the Act does not explicitly state what effect
the plaintiff's failure to produce any rebuttal evidence would have.
Secondly, if the plaintiff has come forward with some evidence, the
Act .provides no test for determining whether such evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption and avoid summary judgment.
If the plaintiff produces no evidence to rebut the defendants'
presumptive compliance with the four immunity standards, the
court should grant summary judgment in the defendants' favor on
the immunity question. Because the Act states that compliance with
the standards shall be presumed "unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, ' 31 7 the implication is
316. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 157, § 5122, at 558-59 ("Hence, from a
practical point of view, the weight of these burdens is of little concern; the party must
attempt to introduce as much evidence as he can to support his factual contentions.").
In Austin v. McNamara, 731 F. Supp. 934, 939-42 (C.D. Cal. 1990), the defendants did
introduce evidence supporting their compliance with the immunity standards on a motion for summary judgment.
317. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (1988). In Austin, 731 F. Supp. at 942, where the plaintiff
made no attempt to refute or contest the defendants' compliance with the immunity
standards, the court found the plaintiff's allegations of conspiracy insufficient to withstand summary judgment. The conclusion that the plaintiff must come forward with
some affirmative evidence to rebut the presumption of compliance is supported by
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (in a case under
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, if the employer is silent in face of a presumption,
the court must enter judgment for the party with the benefit of the presumption). In
addition, scholars generally agree that an unrebutted presumption would justify a jury
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strong that some affirmative rebuttal is required to avoid summary
judgment.
Assuming that the plaintiff does come forward with some rebuttal evidence, the tougher question is whether it is enough to defeat a
motion for summary judgment on the immunity defense. By providing that compliance with the immunity standards is presumed unless
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, the Act suggests that,
once the litigation has reached the trial phase, the burden rests on
the plaintiff to persuade the factfinder that, more probably than not,
the defendants did not comply with the four standards. The Act
does not suggest that, on a motion for summary judgment, the
judge is to assess whether the plaintiff has met this burden of persuasion. 1i Proof of noncompliance with the immunity standards at
finding on the presumed fact in favor of the proponent of the presumption. See C.
& K. GRAHM, supra note 157, § 5122, at 563 (unless opponent makes some
attack on the presumption, the jury is required to find against him on the issue of presumed fact). See also infra note 326. But see C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, Supra note 157,
§ 5122, at 571 (contrasting the effect of an unrebutted presumption under rule 301).
318. The Act does not provide that compliance with the immunity standards is a factual issue to be determined any differently from other factual issues in the case. The
Committee Report, however, ambiguously states that the Act "would allow a court to
make a determination that the defendant has or has not met the [immunity] standards..." H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 24, at 12. For several reasons, this ambiguous
language in the report should be read, not as permitting the judge to make the factual
determination of compliance (that is, whether the plaintiff has met her burden of persuasion on the issue of noncompliance), but rather as permitting the judge on an early
motion to decide whether the plaintiff has come forward with sufficient evidence for a
jury to find noncompliance by a preponderance of the evidence (that is, whether the
plaintiff has satisfied the burden of production on the issue of noncompliance). First,
this interpretation is consistent with other legislative history describing the rationale for
imposing a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a clear and convincing
standard. The former was favored to determine noncompliance with the immunity provisions because it was the same standard applied to the determination of other factual
issues in an antitrust case. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. Second, the Act
does not expressly provide for judicial factfinding on compliance with the immunity
standards. Third, judicial factfinding on the issue of noncompliance with HCQIA could
create a conflict with the jury's factfinding on the underlying antitrust claims at trial.
However, there is no indication in the legislative history that, for example, a judge's
factual determination of noncompliance (for example, that the defendants' actions were
not taken in the reasonable belief that they furthered quality of care) should affect or
displace the jury's factual determination of the issues of conspiracy or the reasonableness of the restraint, both of which often depend on a factual determination of the defendants' purposes for their actions. See supra notes 244, 308, and accompanying text.
Finally, this interpretation that compliance with HCQIA's immunity standards is a jury
question where the evidence shows a genuine dispute of material fact over the defendants' purposes, is consistent with the allocation of decision-making functions between
judge and jury on an analogous immunity question that raises factual issues of the defendants' "reasonable beliefs," namely, the issue of qualified immunity for executive
officials in a civil rights action. See Note, Qualified Immunity and the Allocation of DecisionWRIGHT
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the summary judgment stage should thus be treated as is proof of
every other factual issue on which the plaintiff bears the burden of
persuasion at trial: to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a rational factfinder to
return a verdict in her favor.3 1 9 On a motion for summary judgment, the judge must decide, not whether she believes that the defendants more probably than not did not comply with the four
immunity standards, but rather whether a rational jury could so find
on the evidence presented by the plaintiff.32 ° If it could, then summary judgment should be denied.
Because inquiry into compliance with the four standards (particularly inquiry into the reasonableness of the peer reviewers' actions and their concerns about the quality of health care) closely
parallels the inquiry made in cases not under HCQLA into the legitimacy of the defendants' claimed objectives (usually also related to
quality-of-care concerns) ,21 it follows that the standards for determining whether a "genuine issue" exists are also parallel, if not
identical.3 2 2 At least in the absence of a countervailing standard in
the Act, the general standards for assessing the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence on a motion for summary judgment should apply to
cases both under HCQIA and independent of it, as analyzed below.

Making Functions Between Judge andJury, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1045, 1051-56 (1990) (majority of courts hold that, to resolve the issue of qualified immunity, the judge must submit
to the jury all genuine issues of fact as to what actually happened). For all these reasons,
the court's inquiry under HCQIA on a motion for summary judgment should not be to
determine facts, but rather to assess the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence to permit
the jury to do so, that is, to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants have not complied with the immunity standards of the Act. Obviously, if the
plaintiff has not come forward with sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to so con-

clude, then summary judgment may be entered against her on any damages claim.
319. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.
320. See id. at 252 ("judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict
for the plaintiff on the evidence presented"). See also Note, supra note 304, at 225 ("critical inquiry is not whether the judge finds one party's evidence more convincing than
another's, but whether a jury could legally so find"); Note, The Effect of Presumptions on
Motions for Summary Judgment in Federal Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1115 (1984) ("A
court should not grant summary judgment simply because it feels that the opposing
party is unlikely to prevail at the trial. To make such an assessment is essentially to try
the case.") (citations omitted)); infra notes 434-435 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 162-170 and accompanying text.
322. This conclusion follows not only in logic but from policy, for the same policy
considerations that gave rise to HCQIA's express presumption of reasonableness and
due process by the peer reviewers also have created a practical presumption in their
favor of the legitimacy of their actions in non-HCQIA cases. See supra notes 151-156 and
accompanying text.
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3. The Nonmoving Party's Burden Without HCQIA.-Once the defendants have moved for summary judgment on the issue of conspiracy-in-fact-supporting the motion adequately under Celotex and
offering a legitimate objective for undertaking the adverse peer-review action against the plaintiff (such as her incompetence or professional misconduct)-the burden of production now shifts to the
plaintiff. At this point, the Monsanto-Matsushita principles apply. 2
Because the defendants' adverse action against the plaintiff is not
only consistent with inferences of lawful peer review and illegal conspiracy, but also is conduct that innocent peer reviewers would be
likely to engage in if undertaking lawful peer review, the plaintiff
must come forward with affirmative evidence that tends to exclude
the possibility of lawful conduct.3 24 In other words, to avoid summary judgment in a non-HCQIA case, the plaintiff must come forward with affirmative evidence "such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict" 2 5 in her favor on the existence of an illegal
conspiracy.
What evidence will suffice to meet this burden? As with cases
under the Act, if the plaintiff comes forward with no evidence, she
has obviously not met her burden. 2 6 If the plaintiff puts forth direct evidence of a conspiracy, then she has met her burden, and the
court must deny the motion. 2 7 The harder, and far more typical,
case is the plaintiff who is relying on circumstantial evidence to support an inference of conspiracy.
The courts have been reluctant to articulate precise standards
for testing when the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence provides a
sufficient basis for a jury verdict in her favor in large part because
323. See supra notes 123-150 and accompanying text.
324. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986);
supra notes 151-156 and accompanying text.
325. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.
326. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1986) (nonmoving party cannot resist proper summary judgment motion by relying on allegations in pleadings
alone); Popofsky & Goodwin, The "Hard-Boiled" Rule of Reason Revisited, 56 ANrrrRuST
L.J. 193, 207-08 (1987) (where the defendant moves for summary judgment on the
ground that no conspiracy exists and presents a plausible procompetitive explanation,
the plaintiff must present evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the defendant engaged in the conduct for legitimate reasons); Schwarzer, supra note 148, at 484-85
("if the movant comes forward with a lawful explanation of its conduct and the opponent offers no opposing evidence, the motion must be granted if entry of judgment is
otherwise appropriate.").
327. See Friedenthal, supra note 289, at 781 ("opposing party will always be able to
defeat the motion by putting in direct evidentiary material supporting its side of the
case"); Note, supra note 145, at 491, 517 ("If all of the elements are supported by direct
evidence, summary judgment must be denied").
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this determination is at bottom a matter of judgment.3 28 Although
there may be no "magic formula ' 3 29 for testing the sufficiency of the
nonmoving party's response, the courts have developed some general guidelines, which at least create an atmosphere in which this
judicial judgment is to be exercised.
The remainder of Part III analyzes peer-review litigation in the
context of five issues that have traditionally guided the courts in
testing the sufficiency of evidence on a motion for summary judgment. Although admittedly some of these issues might be characterized as "maxims" or "rules" or perhaps even "cliches," 3 3 the
issues have served to focus the courts' inquiry on motions for summaryjudgment. Specific peer-review cases will be examined to illustrate the application of these guidelines. If because of their
generality the guidelines do not ordain the outcome of every case,
they are nonetheless useful in providing a feeling for the judicial
role in assessing the sufficiency of the nonmoving party's response
to a motion for summary judgment.
a. Specific Evidence.-Rule 56(e) provides that the nonmoving
party's response must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.""' It is usually not sufficient for the plaintiff
simply to attack the credibility of the defendants' witnesses; on issues on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, the plaintiff
must come forward with affirmative facts of her own. 3 2 Thus, in a
conspiracy case, the plaintiff cannot simply argue that the defendants' denials of conspiracy should not be credited.33 3
328. See Friedenthal, supra note 289, at 781-82.
329. Id. at 782.
330. Professor Louis has consistently characterized the standards for summary judgment as cliches. See Louis, supra note 293, at 746; Louis, supra note 303, at 1042.
331. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
332. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 ("discredited testimony is not [normally] considered a sufficient basis for drawing a contrary conclusion")
(quoting Base Corp. v. Consumer Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 485, 572
(1984)); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTRrUST LAw § 316, at 61 (1978) ("mere disbelief

by one party of another's testimony is not usually sufficient ground for rejecting it");
Schwarzer, supra note 148, at 485 (attacking the credibility of the movant's witness is
insufficient).
333. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256 (plaintiff may not defeat a summary judgment
motion in a conspiracy case by merely asserting that the jury might disbelieve the defendant's denial of conspiracy); Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 689 F. Supp. 799,
808 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) ("While the jury was free to disregard the defendants' testimony
that no agreement of any kind was formulated during the course of these contacts, mere
disbelief could not rise to the level of positive proof of an agreement to sustain the
plaintiffs' burden of proving conspiracy."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 918 F.2d 605 (6th
Cir. 1990), modified on reh 'g, 927 F.2d 904 (1991). See also Sonenshein, supra note 293, at
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Cases not under HCQIA have been summarily disposed of on
the ground that the plaintiff came forward with no specific, affirmative evidence that could support an inference of conspiracy by showing that the defendants were acting otherwise than as they claimed
they were, namely, out of a legitimate concern over the plaintiff's
competence or professional conduct.33 4 Courts are properly reluctant to entertain allegations they perceive to have been fabricated
5
33
out of "whole cloth."-

These cases would be treated the same way under HCQIA.
Under the Act, the plaintiff is required to rebut the presumption of
compliance with the immunity standards by a preponderance of the
evidence. If the plaintiff offers no evidence at all to show that the
defendants were not acting out of a reasonable concern over quality
of care in light of the plaintiff's competence or professional conduct, then summary judgment for the defendants would appropriately be granted. 3 6 Indeed, this result occurred in the only case
thus far to be decided on the merits under HCQIA. 3 7
On the other hand, in non-HCQIA cases where the plaintiff has
come forward with specific evidence that undercuts the defendants'
claimed procompetitive or health-care concerns, the plaintiff has
successfully avoided summary judgment or a directed verdict. Typically, such evidence consisted of the defendants' overt expressions
of concern about the competition posed by the plaintiff's practice.
For example, in Miller v. Indiana Hospital,338 the plaintiff had evidence that members of the hospital's board and administration had
789 ("It is axiomatic that a party is not permitted to prove a positive proposition by first
offering a witness who refutes the proposition, and then impeaching that witness.").
334. See, e.g., Nurse Midwifery, 689 F. Supp. at 808 (as to conspiracy among a hospital
and members of its medical staff); Drs. Steuer & Latham, P.A. v. National Medical Enters., 672 F. Supp. 1489, 1517-18 (D.S.C. 1987) (record devoid of evidence of unlawful
conspiracy); Wright v. Southern Mono Hosp. Dist., 631 F. Supp. 1294, 1321 (E.D. Cal.
1986) (plaintiff's beliefs, characterized by the court as "mere inklings, innuendos, and
conclusory statements," are not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that a
conspiracy existed among the defendants); see also Clough v. Adventist Health Sys., 108
N.M. 801, 804-05, 780 P.2d 627, 630-31 (1989) (no evidence of conspiracy under comparable state's antitrust statute); Nafrawi v. Hendrick Medical Center, 676 F. Supp. 770,
774 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (no evidence at trial introduced to show anticompetitive purpose
or effect).
335. See Friedman v. Delaware County Memorial Hosp., 672 F. Supp. 171, 192-93
(E.D. Pa. 1987).
336. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
337. See Austin v. McNamara, 731 F. Supp. 934, 942 (C.D. Ca. 1990) (plaintiff did not
attempt to refute or contest any of the defendants' efforts to apply HCQIA immunity
provisions to case).
338. 843 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).

1991]

MEDICAL PEER REVIEW AND ANTITRUST

385

expressed concerns that the plaintiff's expansion of his medical
center posed a competitive threat to the hospital, and that they
wanted to gather sufficient support among the medical staff of the
hospital to prevent the plaintiff from hiring good doctors to staff his
medical center.3 3 9 In Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center,3 4 ° the
plaintiff produced evidence that, among other things, the chiefs of
the obstetrics departments at two hospitals had written a joint letter
to the hospitals that the plaintiff nurse-midwife's home-birth practice "must be eliminated. ' - 4 ' In other cases, the defendants had
expressed the opinion that there were already enough of a certain
3 42
class of practitioners in the community without the plaintiff.
Although in Bolt v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center3 43 there was no evidence of an overt expression of anticompetitive purpose, the court
would permit an inference of such purpose from evidence that the
defendants' allegations of the plaintiff's professional incompetence
were so baseless as to constitute a pretext for their anticompetitive
3 44

purpose.

Evidence of these types of conduct (sometimes in conjunction
with other evidence) sufficiently undercut the defendants' claims to
be acting for legitimate, medical care reasons to create a genuine
issue as to their true purpose and hence to avoid summary judgment
or a directed verdict in a non-HCQIA case. By the same token, such
evidence would also be sufficient to create a factual dispute for the
jury over whether the reasonable-belief immunity standards were
met under HCQIA.

339. Id. at 141, 144.
340. 709 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
341. Id. at 1572. While a desire to "eliminate" the plaintiff's practice could be
prompted either by economic self-interest or a genuine concern over the medical care
that the plaintiff provided to patients, there was other evidence in this case that tended
to exclude the possibility of independent action.
342. See, e.g., Shah v. Memorial Hosp. [Shah 1], 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,199, at
59,328 (W.D. Va. 1988) (affidavit of a witness stated that he was refused an application
for privileges at the defendant hospital "because Danville didn't need any more urologists"); see also Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1988)
(defendant anesthesiologists presented a report outlining the impact of nurse anesthetists (of which plaintiff was one) on anesthesiologist incomes); Medical Staff of Memorial
Medical Center, 110 F.T.C. 541, 544 (1988) (a consent decree was obtained where an FTC
complaint alleged that objections to granting nurse midwives privileges were that it
would create an "'economic problem" for obstetricians and that there was "no need in
the community" for the services of nurse midwives).
343. 891 F.2d 810 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990).
344. Id. at 821-22. See also discussion of case infra at notes 350-355 and accompanying
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b. Probative Evidence.-To carry her burden of producing evidence that there is a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving
party's evidence must be "probative., 3 4 5 Unfortunately, the courts
have characterized this burden with vague phrases,3 4 6 and in measuring the sufficiency or probative value of the evidence, have engaged in somewhat circular restatements of the basic issue. Under
Liberty Lobby's formulation, whether the nonmoving party's evidence
is sufficiently probative to demonstrate a genuine factual issue depends on whether the evidence presents a "sufficient disagreement"
to require submission to the jury. 3 4 7 This otherwise unhelpful formulation at least focuses on the need for conflict or contradiction in
the evidence or in the reasonable inferences from the evidence. Indeed, an alternative characterization is whether "reasonable minds
could differ as to the import of the evidence. ' 348 About the best
that can be urged in the application of this sufficiently-probative evidence standard to find a genuine dispute is the court's impartiality
and good faith. In the end, the judge is to decide not whether a
verdict ought to be returned in the nonmoving party's favor, but
rather whether a reasonable jury could return one. 4 9
345. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
346. "Probative" evidence is not "merely colorable" evidence, id. at 249; or "mere
inklings, innuendos, and conclusory statements," Wright v. Southern Mono Hosp. Dist.,
631 F. Supp. 1294, 1321 (E.D. Cal. 1986), af'd sub nom. Stehlik v. Southern Mono Hosp.
Dist., 924 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1991); or "groundless speculation," Friedman v. Delaware
County Memorial Hosp., 672 F. Supp. 171, 194, (E.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 600 (3d
Cir. 1988); or "speculative assertions," Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9,
15 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932 (1987). Professor Donald Turner has suggested that summary judgment should be granted in an antitrust case whenever the jury
could find in plaintiff's favor "only by speculation." Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and
Future of Anwrican Antitrust Policy, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 815 (1987). This suggestion
comes dangerously close to proposing that all circumstantial cases of conspiracy be resolved in defendants' favor, for by definition a plaintiff who has no direct proof of the
conspiracy must rely on the jury's inference of it. Thus, contrasting "probative" evidence with "speculative" proof begs the question of the sufficiency of the evidence.
347. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52.

348. Id. at 250.
349. See id. at 249; see supra note 320 and infra notes 421-435 and accompanying text.
This determination takes considerable detachment and objectivity. One wonders
whether the five justices in the Matsushita majority-who by remanding in effect found
that reasonable minds could not disagree about the import of the evidence thus far in
the record-meant to imply that the four dissenting justices, who disagreed heartily
about the import of the evidence, did not have reasonable minds. Indeed, the majority's
conclusion that there was insufficient factual evidence to support an inference of conspiracy has been sharply criticized. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 292, at 108-14 (the
Court assessed the probative value of each side's evidence in a manner inappropriate for
deciding summary judgment motions). The 5-4 split in Celotex poses the same irony,
leading one commentator to observe that such "hair-splitting" on the issue of the suffi-

1991]

MEDICAL PEER REVIEW AND ANTITRUST

387

Bolt v. Halifax HospitalMedical Center 35 0 provides a careful analysis of which evidence is, and which evidence is not, probative on the
issue of conspiracy in a peer-review case. In that case, the plaintiff
alleged that a conspiracy existed among three Florida hospitals to
deprive him of medical staff privileges. Of particular interest is the
evidence that the district court did not permit the plaintiff to introduce at trial.3 5 ' The plaintiff proposed to show that the proceedings
and conclusion of an investigatory committee at one hospital, on
which the other two hospitals also relied, were a sham and a pretext
for their actions.3 52 Excluding this evidence from trial, the district
court found it to have no probative value as a matter of law, because
the court believed that proof of a jealous intent was not relevant to
reasonableness of the competitive effects of the
an evaluation of the
35 3
action.
challenged
The circuit court disagreed with the exclusion of the evidence,
value on the issue of conspiracy was
and found that its '5probative
"extremely high." 4 The circuit court's position seems eminently
correct for the reasons it stated:
If the evidence showed that the [conclusions of the hospital's investigations] were so baseless that no reasonable
medical practitioner ...could have reached those concluciency of the evidence is more confusing than constructive in guiding the lower courts'
analyses of summary judgment motions. See Friedenthal, supra note 289, at 778.
350. 891 F.2d 810 (lith Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990).
351. The circuit court also described three categories of evidence that were introduced by the plaintiff at trial, and explained why each was not sufficiently probative of a
conspiracy among the hospitals to withstand the defendants' motions for directed verdict. See id. at 826-27. The court found the following evidence insufficiently probative to
withstand motions for directed verdict: (1) evidence of consciously parallel actions
among the defendants, because the plaintiff provided no evidence that such actions were
against the defendants' individual, economic self-interests in the absence of mutual assurances to undertake the actions; (2) evidence of inter-hospital communications, because "it is well settled that the mere opportunity to conspire among antitrust
defendants is insufficient to permit the inference of conspiracy"; and (3) statements by
the chief of surgery at one hospital that "because [the] other two hospitals are going to
get rid of [the plaintiff], we've got to seriously think of getting rid of him at [our hospital]," because such statements show only an awareness of the plaintiff's difficulties at the
other hospitals. Id. The court's evaluation of this evidence is consistent with traditional
antitrust analysis, for the plaintiff had established only that the conduct was consciously
parallel, not that it was agreed upon. This evidence, which was admitted at trial, produced no "plus factors" that would have permitted on inference of conspiracy. See supra
note 122 and accompanying text.
352. Id. at 821-22, 827-28. The plaintiff was prepared to offer evidence that members
of the peer-review committees knowingly suborned false and fabricated evidence against
him, and had personal motives for subverting the peer-review proceedings. Id. at 821.
353. See id. at 822.
354. Id.
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sions, then a factfinder could easily infer... that the hospital and its peer review committees intended to enter into
an agreement designed to achieve an end not dictated by
legitimate business concerns.3 5 5
Had Bolt been decided under HCQIA, this same evidence
would have been sufficiently probative to avoid summary judgment
or a directed verdict on the issue of compliance with the immunity
standards of subsection 11112(a). Evidence that the defendants'
conclusions about the plaintiff's competence or professional conduct were groundless, pretextual, or based on knowingly false or
fabricated evidence, would directly refute the defendants' position
(presumed or otherwise) that their actions were taken in the reasonable belief that they were warranted to ensure quality of care, and
hence it would create a genuine issue for trial over whether the defendants had met the immunity standards. Although under the Act
the plaintiff has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the standards are not met, evidence that the peer reviewers' findings were a sham would permit a rational jury, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,35 6 to conclude
that the reasonable-belief immunity standards were not met.
c. State of Mind Evidence.-The defendants' state of mind is frequently a central issue in an antitrust conspiracy action for establishing two elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case. First, in a
circumstantial case the plaintiff must show that the defendants had a
rational motive to conspire in order to raise a plausible inference
that in fact they did conspire.3 5 7 Second, whether the restraint is
deemed reasonable under the rule of reason will often depend on
the defendants' purpose in undertaking it: for a legitimate objective
or an anticompetitive purpose.3 5 8 In accordance with Poller, conventional wisdom dictated that summary judgment be granted "sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play
leading roles ....
355. Id. at 821.
356. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (all justifiable inferences from the evidence are to be drawn in the nonmovant's favor).
357. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596-97
(1986); Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810, 819-20 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990).
358. See 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 119, 1504.
359. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). See also Louis,
supra note 294, at 720 (summary judgment is traditionally denied almost automatically in
cases involving state of mind).
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This traditional approach was effectively discarded by the trilogy. In Matsushita, without even passing reference to Poller, the
Supreme Court majority discussed at length whether the defendants
had a rational motive to conspire, and concluding that they did not,
declared there was no genuine issue for jury resolution on the state
of the record thus far presented.-" In Liberty Lobby, a defamation
action, the Supreme Court treated the issue of the defendant's state
of mind like any other factual inquiry, with the burden on the plaintiff to produce evidence on that issue that would support a jury verdict.3 6 1 There has been general approval for treating state of mind
issues no differently on summary judgment from any other factual
issues. s6 2
Thus, the presence of an issue as to the defendants' motive or
intent will not, by itself, be enough to defeat a motion for summary
judgment either in a non-HCQIA case or in a case under the Act.
Summary judgment analysis in either case must focus on whether
the plaintiff can offer probative evidence that contradicts or undercuts the defendants' evidence of innocent motive or lack of improper intent.3 63 Without HCQIA, the plaintiff's evidence must
tend to exclude the possibility that the defendants were pursuing a
legitimate goal; 3 under HCQIA, the plaintiff's evidence must rebut the presumption that the defendants were acting in the reasonable belief that they were furthering quality of care.3 6' Evidence
3 66
that satisfies one standard will in all likelihood satisfy the other.
Plaintiffs in non-HCQIA cases frequently lost on summary
judgment because their evidence did not refute or undermine in any

360. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-97.
361. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256-57.
362. See, e.g., Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir.) (summary judgment
standard is no different in antitrust litigation than in any other), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870
(1988); Calkins, supra note 289, at 1118; Louis, supra note 293, at 766 (intent, motive,
and other state of mind issues should be treated like other factual questions); Sonenshein, supra note 293, at 792-95 (state of mind cases should be treated no differently
from other cases on summary judgment); Note, supra note 294, at 778-80 (eliminating
special treatment of state of mind cases will allow more efficient operation of summary
judgment).
363. See Harmon & Fore, supra note 289, at 398; Sonenshein, supra note 293, at 795
(summary judgment should be granted when the movant offers evidence demonstrating
innocent motive or lack of intent, unless the non-movant offers substantial probative
evidence contradicting such evidence).
364. See Monsanto v. Spray Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984); see also supra
notes 123-134 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 161-170 and accompanying text.
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way the defendants' innocent explanation for their conduct.3 6 7 On
the other hand, successful plaintiffs presented evidence which collectively tended to show that the defendants' purpose was to reduce
competition rather than to improve patient care as they claimed.3 68
Because plaintiffs will, almost by definition, have only circumstantial
evidence to counter the defendants' own testimony as to their purpose or intent, courts should be wary of too easily dismissing the
inferential import of the plaintiff's evidence in the face of the defendants' denials of illegitimate motivation. The court should consider whether plaintiff's evidence as a whole would permit a rational
jury to infer an unlawful purpose, rather than consider whether each
individual piece of evidence, one by one, contradicts the defendants'
3 69
innocent explanation of their conduct.
For example, the court in Shah v. Memorial Hospital3 70 may have
impermissibly fragmented the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence of
the defendants' purpose. The plaintiff was an anesthesiologist of
Indian origin who, along with her urologist husband,3 7 ' opened up
their respective practices in 1982 in Danville, Virginia. After waiting
367. See, e.g., Potters Medical Center v. City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 573-74 (6th
Cir. 1986) (plaintiff provided no factual basis from which to infer a conspiracy); Cooper
v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 789 F.2d 278, 280-82 (4th Cir.) (plaintiff did not offer
evidence rebutting defendants' affidavits that they acted on quality-of-care grounds),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986); Castelli v. Meadville Medical Center, 702 F. Supp.
1201, 1205-06 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (plaintiff's evidence did not contradict defendants' contention of legitimate reasons for conduct), aff'd, 872 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1989); Friedman
v. Delaware County Memorial Hosp., 672 F. Supp. 171, 193 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (plaintiffs
failed to adduce any evidence that excluded the possibility that the hospital acted for
legitimate purpose), aff'd, 849 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1988); Drs. Steuer & Latham v. National
Medical Enters., 672 F. Supp. 1489, 1518 (D.S.C. 1987) (plaintiff failed to controvert
defendants' assertion that they had legitimate business reasons for their action), aff'd,
846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988); Wright v. Southern Mono Hosp. Dist., 631 F. Supp. 1294,
1320-21 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (plaintiff failed to produce probative evidence to counter the
defendants' assertion of legitimate business reasons for their conduct), aff'd sub nom.
Stehlik v. Southern Mono Hosp. Dist., 924 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1991).
368. See, e.g., Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810, 826-28 (11th Cir.)
(directed verdict for defendants set aside), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990); Miller v.
Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 144-45 (3d Cir.) (summary judgment for defendants reversed), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 870 (1988); Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center,
709 F. Supp. 1563, 1572-73, 1584 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (summary judgment for defendants
denied).
369. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting) (proof of a conspiracy should not be fragmented); Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962) (court should
consider plaintiff's proof as a whole rather than "tightly compartmentalizing the various
factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each").
370. [Shah II], 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,198 (W.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d
316 (4th Cir. 1989).
371. Her husband filed a separate action against the hospital and physicians group for
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almost ten months for the defendant hospital to grant her staff privileges, she became employed part-time by defendant Danville Anesthesiologists (DA), performing anesthesiology at the hospital. After
only a year, the plaintiff resigned from DA. Upon DA's recommendation, the hospital thereafter restricted her privileges. 7 2
Evaluating whether an inference that the defendants had conspired to drive the plaintiff from practice in the area was permissible, the court expressly considered evidence of: (1) the hospital's
delay in granting her privileges; (2) the restriction of her privileges;
(3) the presence of DA members on the hospital peer-review committees; and (4) the timing of the restriction of her privileges one
week after her resignation from DA."' For each piece of evidence,
the defendants had a plausible innocent
explanation, which the
3 74
court appeared, one by one, to accept.
While it is correct that the defendants' adverse actions alone
cannot give rise to an inference of conspiracy, 7 5 the court did not
appear to consider relevant the plaintiff's further evidence that: (1)
the chairman of the ad hoc committee to investigate the restrictions
on her privileges had expressed a distaste for foreign physicians; (2)
there was antagonism between DA and plaintiff; (3) DA had declined to give her full-time employment on the stated ground that a
full-time employee was not needed, and yet less than two months
later DA employed on a full-time basis an anesthesiologist whose
license was under investigation by the State Board of Medical Examiners; and (4) the alleged problems with her medical care were common occurrences in administering various types of anesthesia.3 7 6
The first three pieces of evidence would seem to undercut the defendants' explanations only by undermining their credibility (bias in
the form of personal animus, and possible untruthfulness in their
purported reasons for refusing to hire plaintiff full-time), not by
contradicting them. Mere disbelief in the defendants' testimony,
however, does not suffice to raise an inference of conspiracy.3 7 7
Nonetheless, if plaintiff had evidence to support her contention
that her patient cases had been properly managed, then a reasonable factfinder might infer from that evidence, together with the evisimilar antitrust violations. Id. at 59,321; see Shah v. Memorial Hosp. [Shah 1], 1988-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,199 (W.D. Va. 1988).
372. Shah H, 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 59, 321.
373. See id.
374. See id.
375. See supra notes 143-156 and accompanying text.
376. See Shah H, 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 59,322-323.
377. See supra note 333.
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dence of personal animosity, that the defendants' purported reasons
were a pretext for anticompetitive exclusion. 3 78 From the court's
statement of the facts it is difficult to know whether the plaintiff had
presented evidence to support her contention of proper care, and in
any event the court seems to have been reluctant to evaluate such
evidence at all. 3 79 Not only did the court defer inappropriately to
the defendants' medical findings,38 0 but it seems that the evidence,
if taken collectively rather than individually, could tend to exclude
the possibility that defendants were acting as they claimed.
Although evidence that the defendants did not act for their stated
purposes does not necessarily prove that they acted for anticompetitive purposes, such evidence should raise a sufficiently genuine issue
about their purposes to avoid summary judgment. 38 ' Had Shah
arisen under HCQIA, summary judgment on the issue of compliance with the immunity standards should almost certainly have been
denied. Not only was there a problem with the procedures afforded
the plaintiff,3 8 2 but also evidence of the soured employment relationship as well as the appropriateness of her care (assuming plaintiff had such evidence) would seem to create a genuine issue over
the reasonableness of the defendants' belief that their action was
warranted by patient-care concerns.3 83
378. See discussion of Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, supra notes 350-356 and accompanying text.
379. See Shah H, 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 59,322-323 (court is not competent to
judge the severity of medical problems or to pass on the plaintiff's overall competency).
380. See id.; infra notes 438- 440 and accompanying text (discussing inappropriate judicial deference to peer reviewers' findings).
381. To make out a § 1 violation, plaintiff must prove either an anticompetitive purpose or anticompetitive effect. See Wirtz, supra note 252, at 4-5 (anticompetitive purpose
not essential to § 1 violation).
382. DA members in competition with the plaintiff sat on the peer-review committees
of the hospital. Shah I, 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 59,323. The presence of the DA
members on these committees would raise the question of whether the defendants acted
"after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician or after
such other procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances." 42 U.S.C.
§ 111 12(a)(3). The hospital would not be deemed under § 111 12(b)(3)(A)(iii) to have
met the adequate notice and hearing requirement because the review panel consisted, at
least in part, of direct competitors. Whether the procedures were nonetheless "fair
under the circumstances" would seem to be a genuine issue. The court pointed out that
"[s]ome such overlap is inevitable in a hospital [that size]." 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at
59,323.
383. Similar impermissible fragmenting of evidence on the issue of conspiracy also
may have occurred in Anesthesia Advantage, Inc. v. Metz Group, 759 F. Supp. 638, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3106 (D. Colo. 1991). The district court found the plaintiffs' evidence
of a conspiracy by defendant physician anesthesiologists to exclude plaintiff nurse anesthetists from the hospital insufficient to avoid summary judgment, where such evidence
consisted of evidence that the hospital adopted a call schedule that disadvantaged the
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d. Permissible Inferences.-A frequently recited maxim to guide
the court's assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence on a motion
plaintiffs and additional evidence of (1) contracts among defendants giving them an opportunity to conspire, (2) expulsion of a Metz Group physician who had assigned cases
to plaintiffs, (3) circulation of statements by some of the defendants indicating hostility
to nurse anesthetists, and (4) votes by some of the defendants to require supervision of a
nurse anesthetist by a physician anesthetist. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3106, at *26-32.
Looking at each individual piece of evidence for consistency with inferences of permissible conduct, the district court concluded that "the entire course of conduct by the defendants is consistent with the pursuit of permissible independent business purposes."
Id. at *32.
The problem with this analysis (and that in Shah II, see supra notes 370-382 and
accompanying text) is that the court appears to have classified too broadly the conduct
which is assertedly consistent with conflicting inferences of legality and illegality before
it examined whether there was any evidence that tended to exclude the possibility of
lawful conduct by the defendants. Recall that in Monsanto, the conduct that was consistent with conflicting inferences of legality and illegality was simply a manufacturer's termination of one dealer after receiving complaints about the dealer from other dealers.
See infra notes 123-134 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court found that such
evidence, standing alone, did not support an inference of illegality, but that additional
(albeit ambiguous) evidence did tend to exclude the possibility of independent action by
the manufacturer, or so a jury could reasonably conclude. See Monsanto Co. v. SprayRite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765-68 (1984). The conduct in Metz that is analogous
to the post-complaint dealer termination (and which, standing alone, is insufficient to
support an inference of conspiracy) is the hospital's adoption of the call schedule that
disadvantaged the plaintiffs. Like the plaintiff in Monsanto, however, the plaintiffs in Metz
offered the above four additional items of (albeit ambiguous) evidence that arguably
tended to exclude the possibility of independent business purpose in adopting the call
schedule, or so it would seem a jury could reasonably conclude. Yet instead of examining such additional evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving plaintiffs, see
supra note 356, infra note 384, and accompanying text, to determine whether a jury
could reasonably so conclude, the district court broadly characterized all of the evidence
of conspiracy as "ambiguous" and therefore consistent with the defendants' explanations of permissible independent business purposes. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3106, at
*32. Because nearly all circumstantial evidence is consistent with both a plaintiff's inference of illegality and a defendant's inference of legality, see supra note 146 and accompanying text, the district court's approach poses a nearly insurmountable burden for
plaintiffs who must prove a conspiracy from circumstantial evidence.
The district court in Shah 11 made an analogous error when it analyzed whether each
piece of the plaintiff's evidence was consistent with an inference of legality. See supra
notes 370-382 and accompanying text. The proper analytical framework would have
been to recognize that the defendants' adverse action against the plaintiff's staff privilege in Shah II was, standing alone, consistent with an inference of legality and of illegality, and hence was insufficient evidence by itself from which to infer a conspiracy. The
court should then have gone on, however, to ask whether the plaintiff's additionalevidence of conspiracy, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, tended to
exclude the possibility of lawful conduct. See infra notes 418-419, 436-437, and accompanying text.
By contrast, summary judgment in the defendants' favor seems to have been properly granted in Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438 (1 1th Cir. 1991),
where the plaintiff's only evidence of an unlawful conspiracy was evidence of the hospital's denial of his application for medical staff privileges and of a possible anticompetitive motive of other staff members who recommended that the plaintiff's application be
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for summary judgment is that the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence "must be viewed in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party. 384 Matsushita appears to contradict this maxim by
suggesting that if the plaintiff's evidence of the defendants' conduct
is "as consistent" ' 5 with an inference of innocence as with an inference of illegality under section 1, or if these competing inferences
are "equally plausible, '" ' 6 then the court must reject the plaintiff's
inference.
This apparent contradiction can be reconciled. The traditional
rule is only a general rule; three limitations to it have been recognized. First, the traditional rule does not apply when the inferences
urged by the plaintiff are unreasonable. 8 7 Second, even if the
plaintiff's inferences are reasonable, the underlying substantive law
in the case may, for policy reasons, limit the range of inferences that
a jury may be permitted to draw. 8 8 Third, the court may keep a
case that gives rise to conflicting inferences from the jury if there is
simply no rational way for the jury to choose between them.38 9 As
discussed in this section, caution must be exercised in applying both
the traditional rule and the limitations on it in the context of peerreview litigation with or without the Act.
The first limitation on the traditional rule is that only reasonable inferences must be drawn in the nonmovant's favor. The Matsushita majority stated that "courts should not permit factfinders to

denied. See id.
at 1456. The hospital's denial of staff privileges to the plaintiff in Todorov
after receiving a negative recommendation from other medical staff members is analogous to the manufacturer's termination of the plaintiff in Monsanto after receiving complaints about the plaintiff from its competitors: both adverse actions against the plaintiffs
constitute insufficient evidence, standing alone, from which to infer an unlawful conspiracy, and the court may properly require the plaintiffs to come forward with "something
more" that tends to exclude the possibility of lawful action. See supra notes 123-134,
151-154, and accompanying text. Because the plaintiff in Todorov offered no such additional evidence that tended to exclude this possibility, summary judgment was properly
granted. "To infer a conspiracy solely from the radiologists' anticompetitive conduct
and the board's denial of privileges would be, in effect, to criminalize perfectly legitimate conduct." Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1458.
384. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
385. 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) ("conduct as consistent with permissible competition
as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust
conspiracy").
386. Id. at 596-97 ("if petitioners had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if
their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations, the conduct does
not give rise to an inference of conspiracy").
387. See infra notes 390-404 and accompanying text.
388. See infra notes 405-417 and accompanying text.
389. See infra notes 418-419 and accompanying text.
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infer conspiracies when such inferences are implausible ....
Although there is a danger that the Matsushita reference to the relative plausibility of inferences could be interpreted as a license for
the court to engage in impermissible weighing of the evidence and
evaluation of the strength of the plaintiff's case,"9 ' it need not (and
should not) be so interpreted. Implausibility in this context ought
to border on the frivolous. Perhaps the clearest test of implausibility has been couched in terms of reasonable doubt: "If the plaintiff's burden is a preponderance standard, then summary judgment
may be granted to the defendant only if the judge finds beyond39 a2
reasonable doubt that the inference does not follow in this case."
In the context of peer-review litigation, the question of the
plausibility of the plaintiff's inference of conspiracy has been raised
in relation to the defendants' perceived motive, or lack of motive, to
conspire. Some courts have found no conspiracy because the defendants appeared to have no rational motive to conspire, thus making the inference of conspiracy implausible.3 93 In Weiss v. York
Hospital,3 4 the court reasoned that because the hospital administration makes the ultimate decision on the plaintiff's privileges, and
because it would benefit from having more rather than fewer qualified members on the medical staff in order to bring more patients to
the hospital, the hospital had no motive to conspire because a conspiracy to deny staff privileges to qualified medical practitioners
would have been against its own self-interest. 39 5 Through oversimplification, this argument has the potential to eliminate automatically every staff privileges plaintiff who has no direct evidence of
conspiracy among the defendants.
Motive to conspire should be analyzed more closely in individual cases. A finding that an action is against an alleged co-conspirator's apparent self-interest if undertaken unilaterally is frequently
interpreted as proper evidence of a conspiracy rather than as lack of
a motive to conspire. 9 6 For the members of the medical staff, the
390. 475 U.S. at 593.
391. See infra notes 421-437 and accompanying text.
392. Note, supra note 145, at 517.
393. See, e.g., Mosby v. American Medical Int'l, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 601, 607 (S.D. Tex.
1987) (elimination of an on-call roster was not rationally related to a plan to eliminate
the plaintiff's practice at the hospital because the hospital's bylaws required an open
staff policy).
394. 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).
395. See id. at 828-29.
396. See Ratino v. Medical Serv. of D.C., 718 F.2d 1260, 1271 n.28 (4th Cir. 1983)
(inference of conspiracy is appropriate "where the actions taken are in apparent contradiction to the party's economic self-interest"); Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 689
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motive to conspire may be economic. For example, in Bolt v. Halifax
Hospital Medical Center, the court concluded that the defendant doctors had a rational economic motive to conspire because by excluding other doctors from the hospital, they could charge higher prices
for their services. 9 7 Likewise in Quinn v. Kent General Hospital, 9 ' the
court observed that the members of a hospital's medical staff, regardless of their specialty, "have a financial interest in limiting the
number of physicians admitted to active staff privileges at the Hospital, for all admitting staff members compete with one another for
operating room facilities and the limited number of beds." '
Similarly, the appellate court in Nurse Midwifery Associates v. Hibbett4 ° ° observed that there "is certainly some danger of anticompetitive
decision-making when a group of physicians recommends to the
hospital that an applicant who is in competition with those physicians be denied privileges at the hospital."' '
For the hospitals, however, the motive to conspire may not be
directly economic. Rather, a hospital may act to further the anticompetitive objectives of some of the members of its medical
staff.4 0 2 For example, the district court in Nurse Midwifery Associates
found sufficient evidence from which to infer a conspiracy between
two hospitals to exclude nurse midwives from their staffs.4 °3 In that
case, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the hospitals had a motive to
F. Supp. 799, 808-09 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (evidence that defendants' actions were contrary to their individual self-interests in the absence of concerted action supports an
inference of conspiracy), aff'd in part, rev'd inpart, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990), modified
on reh'g, 927 F.2d 904 (1991); 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 119, 1434. See also Ponsoldt &
Lewyn, Judicial Activism, Economic Theory and the Role of Summary Judgment in Sherman Act
Conspiracy Cases: The Illogic of Matsushita, 33 Antitrust Bull. 575, 577 n.9, 604-08 (1988)
(MatsushitaCourt should have found an inference of conspiracy from evidence that defendants acted contrary to their economic self-interests if acting unilaterally).
397. See 891 F.2d 810, 820 (11 th Cir.) (citing Blumstein & Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital
Peer Review, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs., Spring 1988, at 9, 15), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960
(1990). See also Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 815-16 (3d Cir. 1984), (describing
the competitive economic interests of the members of a medical staff), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1060 (1985).
398. 617 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Del. 1985).
399. Id. at 1242.
400. 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990), modified on reh'g, 927 F.2d 904 (1991).
401. Id. at 614.
402. See, e.g., Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1451 (9th Cir.
1988) (evidence showed that the hospital was coerced by medical staff members who
threatened to leave the hospital unless the plaintiff's staff privileges were terminated);
see also Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 712-24 (discussing the stakes in a hospital's staff
privileges decision).
403. See 689 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 918 F.2d 605
(6th Cir. 1990), modified on reh'g, 927 F.2d 904 (1991).
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conspire in order to satisfy the objectives of certain members of
their medical staffs who wanted to eliminate the competition that
the plaintiffs posed to local physicians, and the plaintiffs also
showed that it was against the hospitals' self-interest to deny the
nurse midwives privileges, because the hospitals could have improved their occupancy rates and revenues if they granted the
privileges."
For these reasons, with or without HCQIA, courts should carefully analyze the practical as well as financial dynamics among the
hospital and members of the medical staff before concluding that an
inference of conspiracy is implausible (or that the HCQIA presumption is not rebutted) on the ground that the defendants appear to
have no anticompetitive motive or reason to act adversely to the
plaintiff.
The second limitation on the traditional rule that requires the
plaintiff to be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences occurs
when the policies underlying the substantive law of the case are implicated. Because in a section I case "antitrust law limits the range
of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence, "405 a court
must sometimes refuse to permit a jury to draw an inference of conspiracy from the evidence, even when the inference is a reasonable
one.4 °6 As has been discussed earlier,40 7 this limitation typically occurs when the evidence from which the plaintiff urges that an adverse inference be drawn is of conduct that is likely to be engaged in
by innocent actors as well as guilty ones. In order to avoid deterring
innocent procompetitive conduct in the marketplace generally, the
court in such a case requires the plaintiff to produce additional evidence which tends to exclude the possibility that the particular conduct of these defendants was undertaken anticompetitively. 40
In a circumstantial section 1 case in which the plaintiff urges an
inference of conspiracy based on defendants' conduct, evidence that
the defendants had a motive to conspire will not, by itself, support
404. See id. at 809. Contrast Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 145659 (11 th Cir. 1991) (finding insufficient evidence to infer that hospital was acting to
advance anticompetitive purposes of members of medical staff by denying the plaintiff's
application for staff privileges).
405. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
406. For example, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 n.8
(1984), the Court acknowledged that evidence of a post-complaint dealer termination
was probative on the issue of conspiracy, but because of the policy reasons, discussed
supra at notes 123-134 and accompanying text, the Court required that plaintiff introduce additional evidence to avoid a directed verdict.
407. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
408. See id.
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an inference that they did conspire.4 0 9 Moreover, the mere opportunity to conspire, through contacts and communications among the
defendants, does not alone give rise to an inference of conspiracy.4" ° Similarly under HCQIA, evidence that peer reviewers had a
motive or the opportunity to act otherwise than in the reasonable
belief that patient-care concerns justified their actions should not,
by itself, rebut the presumption of compliance with the reasonablebelief standards.4 1 '
In peer-review cases where an inference of conspiracy has been
permitted, the plaintiff typically has produced additional evidence of
affirmative actions by the defendants that tended to exclude the possibility that the defendants were acting as they claimed. Such additional evidence has sometimes shown a pattern of exclusionary
actions by the defendants,41 2 or actions taken by the defendants ostensibly pursuant to health-care concerns but when such concerns
had no factual support.4 ti Such evidence would also rebut the presumptions under HCQIA.
Evidence of coercion by some of the defendants against other
defendants has also been offered to exclude the possibility of unilateral action. A conspiracy may be inferred when one party acquiesces in the anticompetitive demand of another, even if the
acquiescence is obtained through coercion.41 4 In Oltz v. St. Peter's
409. See 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 119,
1412.
410. See id. 1417(b).
411. In a case not under HCQIA, the court refused to permit an inference that the
hospital was acting anticompetitively solely from evidence that the individual peer reviewers had an anticompetitive motive to exclude the plaintiff. See Todorov v. DCH
Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456-59 (11th Cir. 1991).
412. Such exclusionary conduct has included systematic refusals by doctors to make
patient referrals to the plaintiff's patients, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 96-97
(1988); Shah v. Memorial Hosp. [Shah 1], 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,199, at 59,328
(W.D. Va. 1988); a variety of increasing limitations on the plaintiff's practice, e.g., Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center, 709 F. Supp. 1563, 1572 (M.D. Ga. 1989); and
unusual treatment of the plaintiff, e.g., Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 144 (3d
Cir.) (evidence of hospital's interference in the plaintiff's recruitment of medical staff;
hospital's more lenient treatment of poorer physicians; and irregularities and conflicts of
interest in the hearing), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
413. See, e.g., Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810, 821 (11th Cir.)
(inference of conspiracy is proper if evidence showed that the peer reviewers' conclusions were so baseless that no reasonable medical practitioner could have reached
them), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990); see also Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth.,
Inc., 789 F.2d 278, 282 (4th Cir.) (Motz,J., concurring) (absence of demonstrably sound
reasons relating to the quality of patient care in conjunction with threats of mass resignations from the medical staff is sufficient basis from which a jury might infer an unlawful conspiracy), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986).
414. See Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 689 F. Supp. 799, 807 (M.D. Tenn.
1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990), modified on reh'g, 927 F.2d
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Community Hospital,4"' all of the anesthesiologists threatened to resign from the hospital's medical staff unless the hospital terminated
its billing contract with the plaintiff, a nurse anesthetist. From evidence that the board of trustees knew about the threat and feared
that the quality of the hospital might deteriorate if the threat were
carried out, the court found that the jury justifiably could conclude
that the trustees submitted to pressure from the anesthesiologists,
thereby joining the conspiracy.41 6 Similarly under HCQIA, evidence that a hospital was pressured by its medical staff to act adversely to the plaintiff should be sufficient evidence on a motion for
summary judgment to create a genuine issue over whether the defendants were acting out of reasonable, patient-care concerns. This
is true even where, as in Oltz, the hospital acts to prevent the quality
of medical care from deteriorating at the facility. HCQIA's immunity applies only when the defendants' quality-of-care concerns arise
out of the plaintiff's competence or professional conduct, not when
the defendants' own course of conduct necessitates such
concerns.417

The third circumstance in which the court may keep a case with
competing inferences away from the jury is when the jury would
have no rational way to choose between them. This situation is like
asking a jury to choose between the competing inferences 4of
18
"heads" or "tails" to decide what the outcome was of a coin toss.

904 (1991);see also Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (manufacturer's response to an ultimatum that one dealer would terminate his dealership
unless the manufacturer terminated its relationship with a second, price-cutting dealer
can constitute an agreement under § 1, although not necessarily a per se illegal restraint
of trade). See generally 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 119, 1457.
415. 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988).
416. See id. at 1451;see also Cooper, 789 F.2d at 282 (Motz,J., concurring) (§ 1 prohibits
medical staff members from agreeing to coerce hospital's trustees to deny privileges to a
competitor in order to further their economic self-interest), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972
(1986); McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121, 130 (E.D. Ky. 1982)
(evidence of coercive choices given to a hospital by doctors ("it's either him or me") was
sufficient, along with other evidence, to permit an inference of an agreement to effect a
concerted refusal to deal with the plaintiff), remanded on other grounds, 738 F.2d 439 (6th
Cir. 1984).
417. See 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (1988) ("professional review action" that qualifies for
immunity must be "based in the competence or professional conduct of an individual
physician"). Peer reviewers should not be able to bootstrap an argument that they were
motivated by legitimate medical care concerns if it is their own actions, or threats to act,
that jeopardize the quality of care in the first instance. Query whether such bootstrapping was permitted in Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center, 705 F. Supp. 1556,
1564-65 (M.D. Ga. 1989) ("The undisputed evidence is that [the hospital] was presented
with a demand from the doctors which it thought prudent to grant.").
418. Dean Friedenthal gives the example of two cars that collide at right angles in an
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In the context of peer review, the analogous case would consist
solely of evidence of an adverse action against a physician's privileges. Caution should be exercised, however, to confine this limitation on the traditional rule to cases in which the plaintiff has no
evidence to support the inference of the defendants' fault or illegality beyond evidence that the defendants' conduct harmed the plaintiff by excluding her from the staff or otherwise restricting her
privileges. A court should not grant the defendants' motion for
summary judgment simply because, despite additional evidence
supporting the plaintiff's inference, the judge believes the parties'
competing inferences are still equally plausible. After all, if a judge
finds the inferences to be equally plausible, a reasonable jury could
find that one inference was more plausible than the other.4" 9
Finally, it should be stressed that what has been said about the
judge's role in assessing plausibility and permissibility of inferences
applies only to circumstantial cases. Where the plaintiff presents
credible direct evidence of a conspiracy, summaryjudgment against
her is not available, despite the defendants' protests that they had
no motive to conspire.4 2 °
e. No Weighing of Evidence.-Another traditional maxim of summary judgment procedure is that "the judge's function is not him4 21
self to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter.
The majority in Liberty Lobby carefully reiterated that "[c]redibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge. ' 4 22 The dissents in Matsushitaand Liberty Lobby worried, howintersection with a working traffic light, killing both drivers and all passengers and leaving no eye-witnesses. The circumstantial evidence of the working light suggests that one
of the drivers ran a red light, and thus leads to two competing inferences that either one
of the drivers could have done so. Because there would be no way a reasonable jury
could choose between the inferences, however, summary judgment should be granted in
favor of the party without the burden of persuasion. Friendenthal, supra note 289, at
785.
419. See Note, supra note 145, at 504, 506; see also Friedenthal, supra note 289, at 786
(discussing cases in which undisputed evidence can give rise to competing inferences
and when a reasonable choice between them can be made); infra notes 421-437 and
accompanying text (judge's role on summary judgment motion is not to decide which of
the competing inferences is more plausible or probable).
420. See Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988)
(court rejected the defendant's argument that no motivation was shown because the
plaintiff presented direct evidence of conspiracy); 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 119,
1425(b); supra note 327 and accompanying text.
421. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
422. Id. at 255.
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ever, that despite the majorities' invocation of the traditional rule,
those cases sent contrary signals to lower courts that a judge
"should go beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and
decide for himself whether the weight of the evidence favors the
plaintiff." 4 "
The dissents' fears seem justified. In peer-review cases, some
lower courts appear to have interpreted the trilogy as license to decide whether the plaintiff's inference of conspiracy from the circumstantial evidence is more probable than the defendants' innocent
explanation of their conduct, rather than leaving it to the jury 42to4
make that determination. The judge in Shah v. Memorial Hospital,
for example, seemed to make precisely this decision. In light of the
defendants' evidence that they restricted the plaintiff's privileges
because of alleged problems with her medical care, the court
granted summary judgment and observed: "I cannot find the hospital's decision to restrict her privileges was more likely motivated by
conspiracy than by the concern for patient care."14 25 The district
court in Nurse Midwifery Associates v. Hibbett 42 1 similarly found that "if
the [defendant's] innocent explanation of the questioned conduct is
plausible and more logical than a concerted action theory,14 27 then
summary judgment against the plaintiff was appropriate. The court
in Castelli v. Meadville Medical Center4 28 granted summary judgment
a unilateral
after finding that the facts were "much more consistent 4with
29
decision by [defendant] than with any conspiracy.
At least in their characterizations of their conclusions, these
courts have erroneously failed to distinguish the judge's role on a
motion for summary judgment from the jury's role at trial. Despite
its uncritically loose references to "implausible,"14 3 0 "more plausible, ' 4 -' and "equally plausible" 43 2 inferences, the Matsushita major423. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 600, (WhiteJ,
dissenting). See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Court's opinion
is also full of language which could surely be understood as an invitation-if not an
instruction-to trial courts to assess and weigh evidence much as a juror would").
424. [Shah II], 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,198 (W.D. Va. 1988), aft'd, 875 F.2d
316 (4th Cir. 1989).
425. Id. at 59,323 (emphasis added).
426. 689 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 918 F.2d 605 (6th
Cir. 1990), modifiedon reh'g, 927 F.2d 904 (1991).
427. Id. at 808 (emphasis added).
428. 702 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 872 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1988).
429. Id. at 1205 (emphasis added).
430. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 593.
431. Id. at 579.
432. Id. at 596.
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ity did not "give every judge hearing a motion for summary
judgment in an antitrust case the job of determining if the evidence
' 4
makes the inference of conspiracy more probable than not. 33
On a motion for summary judgment, the judge's role is to assess whether the plaintiff has met her burden of production with
sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in
her favor. It is for the jury after trial to determine whether the
plaintiff has in fact carried the burden of persuasion with credible
evidence to convince the jury that the plaintiff's view of the facts is,
more probably than not, the correct one. 43 4 The judge's function to
evaluate the evidence for its sufficiency must be carefully distinguished from the jury's function to weigh the evidence for its
persuasiveness.4 3 5
On the issue of the defendants' purpose in undertaking their
peer-review action, summary judgment should be handled similarly
with or without HCQIA. In neither case is the court authorized to
balance all the evidence pointing toward conspiracy or noncompliance with the reasonable-belief immunity standards against all the
evidence pointing toward independent action or compliance with
the standards.43 6 At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff need
not disprove the defendants' innocent explanation for their conduct. Rather, independently of the defendants' denials and explanations, 43 7 the court should evaluate whether the plaintiff's evidence is
433. Id. at 601 (White, J., dissenting) (to do so would be "overturning settled law");
see Note, supra note 145, at 492 (interpretation of Matsushita, that the judge may grant
summary judgment to the defendant upon finding the competing inferences of the
plaintiff and the defendant to be equally plausible, is dangerously overbroad).
434. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 157, § 5122, at 558-59 (distinguishing between a plaintiff satisfying the burden of production for the judge and the burden
of persuasion for the jury).
435. See Friedenthal, supra note 289, at 783 ("decisions concerning the sufficiency of
evidence to get to a trier of fact.., are of a different quality than decisions by the trier of
fact on evidence that it receives"); Mullenix, supra note 302, at 569 ("The judge at the
summary judgment stage was never intended to assess and weigh evidence as jurors
would at trial."); supra note 320.
436. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 600 n.l (White, J., dissenting).
437. See McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121, 130 (E.D. Ky. 1982)
("For purposes of reviewing the directed verdict motion, defendants' denials and explanations cannot be considered."), remanded on other grounds, 738 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1984);
Louis, supra note 293, at 760 ("The effect of not allowing the judge to weigh the evidence is that the moving party's evidence is usually ignored in evaluating the sufficiency
of the opposing party's response."); Schwarzer, supra note 148, at 482 ("Each party's
showing should be independently examined to determine if it meets the requirements of
[rule 56]."); see also P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRuST LAw § 1405, at 899 (1990

Supp.) (Matsushita Court "surely did not mean that the plaintiff must disprove all nonconspirational explanations for the defendants' conduct").
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sufficient for a rational factfinder to find in her favor.
Finally, it should be stressed that both HCQIA and the trilogy
have only allocated burdens of proof; neither authorizes judicial
deference to the actions of peer reviewers. Citing a reluctance to
substitute their judgment for that of a hospital administration's,
however, several lower courts have deferred to a hospital's restriction or denial of staff privileges if the medical or business reasonableness of that action was supported by "substantial evidence" in
the record.43 8 Such an approach is not warranted by HCQIA. Because the Act permits the presumption of compliance with the immunity standards to be overcome by a preponderance of the
evidence, the presumption does not serve to increase the weight of
plaintiff's burden of proof.4 9 Nor is judicial deference to the peer
reviewers warranted under antitrust law.4 40 Under the trilogy, the
peer-review defendants could support an innocent explanation for
their conduct with "substantial evidence," and yet the case would
nonetheless go to the jury if the plaintiff supported the inference of
conspiracy with sufficient probative evidence to permit the jury to
return a verdict in her favor.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Does HCQIA accomplish anything, conceptually or practically?
438. The leading case for this approach is Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde
Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971) ("No court should substitute its
evaluation of [physician competence and staff privileges] matters for that of the Hospital
Board."). See also Castelli v. Meadville Medical Center, 702 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (W.D.
Pa.) (plaintiff must demonstrate a lack of substantial evidence to support the hospital's
decision), aff'd, 872 F.2d 411 (1988); Nafrawi v. Hendrick Medical Center, 676 F. Supp.
770, 776 (N.D. Tex. 1987) ("The court must accept the findings and conclusions of the
hospital's trustees and of its subordinate committees-so long as there is substantial
evidence on the record to support them."). Some commentators have erroneously advanced this substantial-evidence approach. See, e.g., Comment, Antitrust Liability in the
Context of Medical Peer Review: Implications of Patrick v. Burget and the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986, 28 DUQ. L. REv. 577, 583-84 (1990) (concluding that if judicial
review is necessary, courts should not review the merits of the decision, but only
whether substantial evidence was presented).
439. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 157, § 5126, at 611-12 (argument has
usually been rejected that when a presumption is invoked against a party with the burden of proof, the presumption should operate to increase the weight of the burden of
proof).
440. See Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir.) (substantial evidence test
"has no place in an antitrust case where Congress has given the jury the responsibility of
resolving disputed fact issues"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); Havighurst, supra note
78, at 1130 (an antitrust defense that the actions of a peer review body were taken in the
public interest, with due process, and supported by substantial evidence, is "conceptually mistaken").
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As far as hospitals are concerned, the Act will very likely affect the
way they structure the peer-review process. 4 4 l As far as the courts
are concerned, however, HCQA is probably more of a placebo than
a cure for concerns about peer-review litigation under the antitrust
laws. Conceptually, the Act effects no real change in how substantive antitrust principles should be applied to these cases. Because of
the 1986 Supreme Court trilogy on summary judgment, the procedural handling of peer-review litigation should be the same, with or
without HCQIA.
Courts have applied traditional antitrust doctrines and procedural principles to terminate before trial nearly all of the hundreds
of reported peer-review cases in the defendants' favor, without the
benefit of HCQIA's protection.4 4 2 Remarkably, of the few remaining cases that courts have said were proper for jury resolution, only
a handful could even in theory have qualified for immunity.443
Moreover, it is doubtful that on their facts a court would have given
those cases pre-trial protection under the Act. One such case is Patrick v. Burget, which one of the Act's drafters made clear was precisely the sort of case for which immunity was not intended.4 4 4
Another such case is Bolt v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center, in which
the court found that the plaintiff's evidence, offered to show that the
hospital's conclusions about the plaintiff's competence were so
baseless that no reasonable practitioner could hold them, sufficed to
create a jury question on the issue of conspiracy; 4 4 1 this same evidence should also create a jury question on the issue of compliance
with the reasonable-belief immunity standards. In a few other cases,
the peer-review process was sufficiently tainted to raise a question of
whether HCQIA's due-process immunity standard would have been
441. See Gleitz & Strickland, Informal Peer Review Actions: Can They Survive the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act?, MED. STAFF COUNSELOR, Summer 1989, at 25 (HCQIA has

made peer review a "more formal, structured process"). The National Practitioner Data
Bank has imposed additional reporting obligations on hospitals. See supra note 8.
442. See supra notes 77-87, infra note 452, and accompanying text.
443. Several cases in which the plaintiffs have successfully avoided summary judgment
on the conspiracy issue would automatically be disqualified for protection under the Act.
See, e.g., Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff
was nurse anesthetist); Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center, 709 F. Supp. 1563
(M.D. Ga. 1989) (plaintiffs were nurse midwives); Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett,
689 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 918 F.2d 605, (6th Cir.
1990), modified on reh'g, 927 F.2d 904 (1991) (same).
444. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
445. See 891 F.2d 810, 821 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960) (1990); see also Shah
v. Memorial Hosp. [Shah I], 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,199, at 59,328 (W.D. Va.
1988) (no single rationale underlay defendants' actions against plaintiff).
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44 6

If Congress had intended to provide significant protection to
peer reviewers from antitrust liability, Congress could have enacted
other reforms. Congress might, for example, have granted blanket
immunity for peer review; or changed the plaintiff's burden of
proof; or authorized judges to act as factfinders on the immunity
question. Because Congress did not choose these alternatives, how44 7
ever, courts should be wary of interpreting HCQA as if it had.
Blanket immunity for peer review has not been granted. Congress might have chosen to give antitrust protection to peer reviewers analogous to the protection it gave to local governments in the
Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, which precludes the recovery of damages from municipalities for their anticompetitive conduct.4 4 8 Such broad immunity may be appropriate where there is
sufficient governmental action or governmental regulation of an industry's activities to have displaced competition within it. However,
most states have not yet chosen to regulate medical peer review that
extensively.4 4 9
Nor has the plaintiff's burden of proof been increased by the
Act. Congress might have altered this burden to require that the
plaintiff overcome the presumption of compliance with the immunity standards by clear and convincing evidence. The clear and con446. E.g., Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir.) (evidence presented of
irregularities and possible conflicts of interest in the hearing process as well as of motivation to destroy the plaintiff's competition), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
447. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 106 n.8 (1988) ("If physicians believe that the
Act provides insufficient immunity to protect the peer-review process fully, they must
take that matter up with Congress.").
448. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988) (damages not recoverable in an antitrust action
against local governments or persons acting under their direction).
449. Where states have chosen to regulate peer review, the state-action doctrine
would serve to immunize peer-review participants. The state-action doctrine originated
with Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), and immunizes the conduct of the state or
private parties acting at the direction of the state from antitrust liability even if such
conduct would have violated the Sherman Act if undertaken by private individuals without state involvement. The peer-review statutes of some states have been held to provide state-action immunity. E.g., Coastal Neuro-Psychiatric Ass'n v. Onslow Memorial
Hosp., 795 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1986) (North Carolina); Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy
Health Corp., 800 F.2d 119, 121-22 (7th Cir. 1986) (Indiana). The peer-review statutes
of some states have been held not to provide state-action immunity. E.g., Patric, 486
U.S. at 105 (Oregon); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65, 649 (3d
Cir. 1991) (Pennsylvania); Pinhas v. Summit Health Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir.
1989) (California), cert. granted in part, 110 S. Ct. 3268, cert. denied in part, 111 S. Ct. 61
(1990); Shahawy v. Harrison, 875 F.2d 1529, 1534-36 (11th Cir. 1989) (Florida);
Tambone v. Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County, 825 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Illinois); Griffith v. Health Care Auth. of City of Huntsville, 705 F. Supp. 1489, 15031505 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (Alabama).
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vincing standard is a higher burden of proof which, at least in
defamation actions, severely restricts the plaintiff's opportunity to
litigate the defendant's state of mind.4 5 0 Congress chose, however,
to retain the usual antitrust preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. 451 Because the Act does not expressly change the quantum of
proof necessary for the plaintiff to prevail at trial, courts should not
implicitly adopt an attitude of judicial deference to the actions of
peer reviewers.
As a practical matter, the Act does not even necessarily change
the focus of judicial review before trial. There are a multitude of
other defenses and immunities that defendants have successfully
employed to avoid protracted litigation.4 5 2 In cases where the defendants advance a legitimate reason for acting adversely to the
plaintiff, this issue as well can be handled separately and prelimina-

450. See Note, supra note 304, at 213 (clear and convincing standard "has virtually
eliminated trials on the issue of malice"); Note, Federal Summay Judgment: The "New"
Workhorse for an OverburdenedFederal Court System, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 955, 973 (1987)
(Liberty Lobby standard "is a nearly insurmountable hurdle for claimants with a heightened evidentiary burden").
451. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
452. A variety of issues have been raised to dispose of peer-review litigation prior to
trial. For example, in addition to dismissals under the state-action doctrine, see supra
note 449, summary judgment has been granted to defendants on the grounds: (1) that
their actions were immune from damage liability under the Local Government Antitrust
Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988), e.g., Sandcrest Outpatient Servs. v. Cumberland
County Hosp. Sys., 853 F.2d 1139, 1141-46 (4th Cir. 1988); Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center, 705 F. Supp. 1556, 1561-62 (M.D. Ga. 1989); (2) that the members of a hospital's board or medical staff lacked the legal capacity to conspire with the
hospital, e.g., Potters Medical Center v. City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 572-73 (6th Cir.
1986); McMorris v. Williamsport Hosp., 597 F. Supp. 899, 914-15 (M.D. Pa. 1984); (3)
that the statute of limitations barred plaintiff's antitrust claims, e.g., Mir v. Little Co. of
Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1988) (motion to dismiss granted); Baker v.
Chagrin Valley Medical Corp., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,622, at 66,100 (N.D. Ohio
1985); (4) that plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient impact on interstate commerce,
e.g., Sarin v. Samaritan Health Center, 813 F.2d 755, 758 (6th Cir. 1987); Seglin v. Esau,
769 F.2d 1274, 1278-84 (7th Cir. 1985) (motion to dismiss); Loiterman v. Antani, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7955, *8-14 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (motion to dismiss); Thompson v. Wise
Gen. Hosp., 707 F. Supp. 849, 855-56 (W.D. Va. 1989) (motion to dismiss), aff'd, 896
F.2d 547 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 132 (1990); Jaffee v. Horton Memorial Hosp.,
680 F. Supp. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (motion to dismiss); Rosenberg v. Healthcorp
Affiliates, 663 F. Supp. 222, 224-26 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (motion to dismiss); and (5) that the
plaintiff did not suffer antitrust injury and hence did not have standing to bring an antitrust claim, e.g., Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438 (11 th Cir. 1991)
(motion for summary judgment); Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., Inc., 731 F.
Supp. 1042, 1046 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (motion to dismiss); Colorado Chiropractic Council
v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 650 F. Supp. 231, 235-36 (D. Colo. 1986) (motion to dismiss); Griffing v. Lucius 0. Crosby Memorial Hosp., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,854,
at 67,565-66 (S.D. Miss. 1984) (motion for summary judgment).
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rily to trial without HCQIA.4 5 s Although Congress could have
made judges the ultimate arbiters of compliance with the reasonable-belief immunity standards,4 54 it did not. Rather, the defendants' reasonable belief in the health-care quality justifications for
their actions is still a fact question for the jury like any other fact
question in an antitrust conspiracy case.
That statutory reform may be ineffectual is not necessarily a bad
state of affairs. After all, if it ain't broke, why fix it?455 There is
scant evidence that traditional principles were not adequately protecting peer-review defendants from nonmeritorious lawsuits. As
Justice Stevens once observed: "Our legal system has developed
procedures for speedily disposing of unfounded claims; if they are
inadequate to protect [defendants] from vexatious litigation, then
there is something wrong with those procedures, not with the law of
45 6
antitrust immunity.

453. The sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence on the issue of conspiracy can be considered separately from other issues on a motion for summary judgment or directed
verdict. For example, to make trial more efficient in Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center,
the district court required the plaintiff to present his evidence of conspiracy first, so that
if this evidence were insufficient to go to the jury, the court could enter directed verdicts
for the defendants, thus eliminating the need for the plaintiff to present unnecessarily
his evidence of restraint on competition. See 891 F.2d 810, 817 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990).
454. One commentator argues that immunity under HCQIA should be handled like
qualified immunity for government officials. See Joy, supra note 7, at 975-79. Even if
HCQIA's immunity were to be treated analogously to such qualified immunity, it would
still be a question of fact for the jury whether the defendants qualified for immunity if
the evidence shows a genuine dispute over the defendants' purposes and reasonable
beliefs for undertaking their action. See supra note 318.
455. See supra note 42. For alternative suggestions that the benefits of the Act may be
symbolic or psychological rather substantive, see Rich, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: How Should Hospitals Respond?, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 277, 277 (1987);
Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act and Physician Peer Review: Ingredientsfor Effective Dispute Resolution, J. DisptrrE RESOL. 401, 410 n.58 (1990). See also Havighurst, supra
note 78, at 1160-65 (concluding that HCQIA does more to complicate than to simplify
antitrust litigation over peer review).
456. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 601 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

